Improvement of the hazard identification and assessment in application of the Seveso II directive (part II)

National audienceThe Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, known as Seveso II Directive, aims at the prevention of major accidents in high risk industries, and the limitation of their consequences for human beings and environment. Although rules are well established to identify maximal hazard potential, there is no recognised method for taking into account, in the assessment of risk level, safety devices and safety management systems implemented by operators. This paper deals with the second stage of a global methodology aiming at better assessing benefits gained from safety devices and safety management systems, through accident scenarios selection. The methodology presented in this paper enables risk assessors and competent authorities to identify Reference Accidents Scenarios (RAS), by taking into account the influence of some safety barriers, in accordance with the Seveso II Directive requirements. This method could help stakeholders involved in the public risk-based decision-making process to evaluate the safety level of high-risk establishments. Since the risk management decisions are based on the risk assessment [12], and since the choices and hypothesis to define the RAS are arbitrary, there is a need to reach a consensus among all the stakeholders to limit the discrepancy in the decision and improve the transparency.La Directive européenne 96/82/EC du 9 Décembre 1982 sur le contrôle des accidents majeurs impliquant des substances dangereuses, connue également sous le nom de Directive Seveso II, a pour objectif la prévention des accidents majeurs dans les sites industriels à hauts risques, et la limitation de leurs conséquences pour les populations et l'environnement. Bien que les règles soient bien établies pour l'identification du risque potentiel, il n'y a pas de méthode reconnue pour la prise en compte, dans l'évaluation du potentiel maximal de danger, des dispositifs de sécurité et des systèmes de gestion de la sécurité mis en oeuvre par les exploitants. Cet article traite de la seconde étape d'une méthodologie générale, qui vise à mieux évaluer les améliorations apportées par les dispositifs de sécurité et des systèmes de gestion de la sécurité, à travers la sélection des scénarios d'accidents. La méthode présentée dans cet article permet aux évaluateurs du risque ainsi qu'aux autorités compétentes d'identifier les Scénarios Accidentels de Référence, qui prennent en compte l'influence de certaines barrières de sécurité, en accord avec les exigences de la Directive Seveso II. Cette méthode pourrait aider les parties prenantes impliquées dans le processus décisionnel de gestion publique basé sur les risques, afin d'évaluer le niveau de sécurité des établissements à hauts risques. Comme les décisions de gestion des risques sont basées sur l'évaluation des risques, et comme les choix et les hypothèses pour définir les Scénarios Accidentels de Référence sont arbitraires, il est nécessaire d'obtenir un consensus parmi les parties prenantes, afin de limiter les divergences dans les décisions et améliorer la transparence

Risk assessment in decision making related to land-use planning (LUP) as required by the Seveso II directive

The 1999 annual report from the European Environment Agency indicated that in spite of measures on major industrial accidents in force since 1984, the trend in accidents shows that many of the often seemingly trivial 'lessons learned' from accidents have not yet been sufficiently evaluated and implemented in industry's practices and standards. It was confirmed by the recent accidents (Enschede in 2000, Toulouse in 2001) that have shown that disasters continue to occur throughout the EU despite of the efforts to control major accident hazards with Seveso I and Seveso II directives. Moreover, a recent communication from the Commission (European Commission, 2002) indicates that the frequency of major accidents is estimated at about 3.10~3 per year if we consider the number of accidents reported in the accident database of the European Commission MARS (Major Accident Reporting System) versus the number of hazardous installations throughout the European Union. So, controlling major accident hazards by reducing the risk on-site is not sufficient to promote a sustainable development for both industry and urban areas in the next decades. It is necessary to organise the settlement of industrial and urban areas with land-use planning (LUP). This paper presents an approach to implement LUP in the context of the Seveso II directive1 . In the first part, the requirements of the directive regarding LUP are given, and the use of LUP in a risk management policy is analysed. Then, in the second part, the authors describe the current situation in France, where LUP is applied for more than 10 years with an approach based on the evaluation of the consequences of major accident scenarios. In the third part, the authors share their thoughts to improve the LUP procedure by distinguishing a risk assessment phase and a negotiation phase involving the stakeholders

Criteria for risk decision-making process related to hazardous installation : a french experience

Chemical process industry gathers critical infrastructures since chemical plants represent for the society both an instrument to generate activity and benefits (production of goods, employment, services ... ), and an instrument that can harm people and the environment. This paper describes the risk assessment approach led in France for licensing the hazardous installation, in particular those covered by the Seveso II directive and the implication for land-use planning. The first part explains why the French risk assessment procedure is based on the quantitative evaluation of major accident scenarios with explicit criteria, and only on qualitative analysis of the risk reduction measures without explicit criteria. The second part shows some on-going evolutions in the formal definition of criteria to make the analysis of the safety barriers

Emergency Response Planning for Chemical Accident Hazards. Key points and conclusions for Seveso enforcement and implementation.

Emergency response combines with prevention and mitigation to form the risk management triad of control measures for reducing chemical accident risks. In fact, standard good practice dictates that appropriate emergency response measures are identified for every major accident scenario of a hazardous operation. Consistent with this philosophy, emergency planning has been taken on board as an essential component of the Seveso Directive since its inception in 1982. Within the current Seveso Directive (2012/18/EU), under Article 12, emergency planning for upper-tier sites is assigned as a direct obligation to both the operator (for internal emergency planning) and the authorities (for external emergency planning). These obligations present considerable challenges for the authorities, in particular, in verifying that internal emergency planning of each upper tier site is conducted in accordance with Seveso requirements and existing performance standard; that a parallel process for external emergency planning is established; and an appropriate strategy is defined to inform populations potentially at risk from the accident scenarios of concern. To bring improvements and consistency to Member State practices in this regard, the European Commission and the Irish Health and Safety Authority organised a workshop in 2012 for Seveso inspectors from EU and aligned countries to exchange information on challenges and successes in implementing emergency planning obligations. This publication summarizes the main conclusions and observations from the workshop discussions.JRC.G.5-Security technology assessmen

Risk assessment and decision making related to land-use planning in France

International audienceThis paper describes and discusses suggestions that will be implemented in the French risk management system according to the new law on the control of technological and natural risks. In particular, the paper will focus on propositions to improve the efficiency of the land-use planning procedure

Introduction of frequency in France following the AZF accident

International audienceIn France, regulations regarding risk prevention and risk management are the result of more than 200 years of legislation, the evolution of which has often been consecutive to industrial accidents. Two years after the industrial accident of AZF (French initials for AZote Fertilisant), a new law was introduced on July 30, 2003 which described both prevention and repair of the damage caused by industrial and natural disasters. Since then, regulations have been made considerably tighter and the entire approach towards risk assessment has changed. This law has developed very interesting tools for risk assessment and risk management (some of which are unique worldwide) and has initiated the use of frequency and probability in the French system. Better information to the public, stronger regulations, new methodology for safety reports, over-hauling of land-use planning and improved accident analysis are some of the mainstays of the law. Regarding the introduction of frequencies and probabilities, as operators in France are free to choose the methodology of probability assessment, it is interesting to review the different methodologies used by operators, with their advantages and disadvantages. In the light of these elements, France's National Institute of Industrial Environment and Risks (INERIS) has developed a methodology and tools aiming at helping both operators and authorities in the assessment of accident probabilities. This methodology focuses on installation characteristics. However, to deal with the lack of input data, tools are developed to build up available generic data regarding loss of containment, initiating events, safety barrier failure rates and root causes distributions. Six years after the law of July 30, 2003 was passed, it is now possible to highlight the challenges and improvements brought about by the use of frequency and probability in risk assessment and policies developed as a result

Design and implementation of a database for QRA management

En aquest treball s’ha dut a terme una recerca bibliogràfica sobre la legislació a nivell europeu, espanyol i català aplicat als establiments afectats per la directiva SEVESO. S’ha realitzat una investigació sobre l’evolució d’aquestes normatives i els canvis que presenten entre elles, documentant quina és a informació requerida que cada establiment ha de presentar segons la seva categoria. La literatura fa referència a l’anàlisi quantitatiu de risc i l’informe de seguretat. S’ha dissenyat una base de dades per la recollida d’informació a partir d’informes de seguretat, basant la seva estructura en la taula de codificació de possibles accidents de la Generalitat de Catalunya. En aquesta base de dades s’ha introduït informació sobre la localització, l’activitat industrial, les condiciones meteorològiques, la substància involucrada, l’iniciador del possible accident greu i l’efecte final associat a aquest. S’ha realitzat un anàlisi exploratori de la base de dades en funció de la seva localització, condiciones meteorològiques, destacant la temperatura, humitat relativa, estabilitat atmosfèrica, direcció i velocitat del vent. També s’ha tingut en compte la substància present, el possible accident bàsic juntament amb les distàncies de seguretat (zona d’intervenció, zona d’alerta i zona d’efecte dominó). Addicionalment, s’ha estudiat l’impacte de cada un d’aquests factors en les distancies de seguretat. Finalment, s’ha realitzat una exploració pel reconeixement de patrons utilitzant la anàlisis de components principals i l’ajustament de la regressió per veure la relació que hi ha entre aquests factors, en funció de l’accident final, i les diferents distàncies de seguretat.En este trabajo se ha realizado una investigación bibliográfica sobre la legislación a nivel europeo, español y catalán aplicado a los establecimientos afectados por la directiva SEVESO. Se ha realizado una investigación sobre cuál es la evolución de esta normativa y los cambios que presentan entre ellas, documentando cuál es la información requerida que debe presentar cada establecimiento según su categoría. La literatura hace referencia al análisis cuantitativo de riesgo y al informe de seguridad. Se ha diseñado una base de datos para la recogida de información a partir de informes de seguridad, basando su estructura en la tabla de codificación de posibles accidentes de la Generalitat de Catalunya. En esta base de datos se ha introducido información sobre la localización, la actividad industrial, las condiciones meteorológicas, la sustancia involucrada, el iniciador del posible accidente grave y el efecto final asociado al mismo. Se ha realizado un análisis exploratorio de la base de datos en función de su localización, condiciones meteorológicas, destacando la temperatura, humedad relativa, estabilidad atmosférica, dirección y velocidad del viento. También se ha tenido en cuenta la sustancia presente, el posible accidente básico especificado junto con las distancias de seguridad (zona de intervención, zona de alerta y zona de efecto dominó). Adicionalmente, se ha estudiado el impacto de cada uno de estos factores en las distancias de seguridad. Por último, se ha realizado una exploración para el reconocimiento de patrones utilizando el análisis de componentes principales y el ajuste de regresión para ver la relación existente entre estos factores, en función del accidente final, y las diferentes distancias de seguridad.In this project, bibliographic research is carried out on the European, Spanish, and Catalan legislation applied to establishments affected by the SEVESO directive. Research on the evolution of these regulations and the modifications between them is conducted, documenting the required information that each establishment must present according to its category. The literature refers to quantitative risk analysis and safety reports. A database is designed for the collection of information from safety reports, basing its structure on the coding table of possible accidents of the Generalitat de Catalunya. Information on the location, industrial activity, meteorological conditions, substance involved, initiator of the possible major accident and the final event, are the fields introduced in the database. An exploratory analysis of the database is carried out according to its location, meteorological conditions, including temperature, relative humidity, atmospheric stability, wind direction and velocity. The substance present, the possible basic accident and final event, specified together with the safety distances (intervention zone, alert zone, and domino effect zone) are also considered. In addition, the impact of each of these factors on the safety distances is studied. Finally, an exploration via pattern recognition using principal component analysis and regression adjustment is done to investigate the existing relation between these factors, as a function of the final event, and the different safety distances

EU-Project ARAMIS (Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for Industries in the framework of the SEVESO II directive)

International audienceARAMIS overall objective is to build up a new Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for Industries that combines the strengths of both deterministic and risk-based approaches. This paper intends to summarise the major features of the methodology and to show how the needs of ARAMIS potential users were addressed. In a second part, the objectives of the case studies that are presently under progress will be discussed

Strengthening Chemical Accident Prevention and Preparedness in European Neighbour Countries. Prepared for DG-ECHO by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau and the Natech Project

The Seveso Directive aims at control of major hazards associated with dangerous substances and has existed as legislation in the European Union since 1982. It was the first comprehensive legislation of its kind in the world and continues to be a leading model for process safety governance globally. In 2014 DG-ECHO and the Joint Research Centre agreed on collaboration the implementation of the Seveso Directive by European Neighbourhood Policy countries in support to the Civil Protection Mechanism 2014-2010. The Year 1 strategy for this project aimed at building profiles of country progress in establishing chemical accident and prevention programmes. It also began the first phase in making a selection of analytical tools accessible to support government and industry in their efforts to perform hazard identification and risk analysis and understand results. This document proposes a strategy for Year 2 of the project. The proposal describes a strategy targeted to establish and maintain visibility and direct communication on the project with EU Neighbour Countries, determine a first subset of countries for in order to begin targeted capacity building, and to complete a first set of online tool prototypes for implementation support as well as identify opportunities for further tool development in future.JRC.G.5-Security technology assessmen