90,528 research outputs found
Husserlâs Concept of the âTranscendental Personâ: Another Look at the HusserlâHeidegger Relationship
This paper offers a further look at Husserlâs late thought on the transcendental subject and the HusserlâHeidegger relationship. It attempts a reconstruction of how Husserl hoped to assert his own thoughts on subjectivity vis-Ă -vis Heidegger, while also pointing out where Husserl did not reach the new level that Heidegger attained. In his late manuscripts, Husserl employs the term âtranscendental personâ to describe the transcendental ego in its fullest âconcretionâ. I maintain that although this concept is a consistent development of Husserlâs earlier analyses of constitution, Husserl was also defending himself against Heidegger, who criticized him for framing the subject in terms of transcendental ego rather than as Dasein. Husserl was convinced that he could successfully respond to Heideggerâs critique, but he did not grasp that Heideggerâs fundamental ontology was an immanent development, rather than a scathing criticism, of his own phenomenology
Husserlâs Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction: Between Life-World and Cartesianism
This essay attempts a renewed, critical exposition of Husserl\u27s theory of the phenomenological reduction, incorporating manuscript material that has been published since the defining essays of the first generation of Husserl research. The discussion focuses on points that remain especially crucial, i.e., the concept of the natural attitude, the ways into the reduction (and their systematics), and finally the question of the meaning of the reduction. Indeed, in the reading attempted here, this final question leads to two, not necessarily related, focal points: a Cartesian and a Life-world tendency. It is my claim that in following these two paths, Husserl was consistent in pursuing two evident leads in his philosophical enterprise; however, he was at the same time unable to systematically unify these two strands. Thus, I am offering an interpretation which might be called a modified departure from Cartesianism reading that Landgrebe proposed in his famous essay from the 1950s, in which he was clearly influenced by Heidegger (a reading that is still valid in many contemporary expositions of Husserl\u27s thought). This discussion should make apparent that Husserl\u27s theory of the phenomenological reduction deserves a renewed look both in light of material that has since appeared in the Husserliana and in light of a new incorporation of the most important results of recent tendencies in Husserl research
Husserlian Aspects of Wittgenstein"s Middle Period
It is not immediately obvious that there was anything\ud
connecting Husserl or phenomenology with Wittgenstein"s\ud
work, but with an examination of the evidence, this attitude\ud
can be changed. I will establish the modest probability that\ud
Wittgenstein had contact with the ideas of Husserl, and\ud
that the ideas of Husserl were either directly or indirectly\ud
influential in Wittgenstein"s work. Wittgenstein"s concern\ud
with phenomenology is most explicitly expressed in his\ud
Philosophical Remarks (hereafter Remarks), however\ud
there is tacit concern throughout most of his writing
Husserl, Dummett, and the linguistic turn
Michael Dummett famously holds that the âphilosophy of thoughtâ must proceed via the philosophy of language, since that is the only way to preserve the objectivity of thoughts while avoiding commitments to âmythological,â Platonic entities. Central to Dummettâs case is his thesis that all thought contents are linguistically expressible. In this paper, I will (a) argue that making the linguistic turn is neither necessary nor sufficient to avoid the problems of psychologism, (b) discuss Wayne Martinâs argument that not all thought-contents are linguistically communicable, and (c) present another, stronger argument, derived from Husserlâs early account of fulfillment, that establishes the same conclusion
Husserl, the absolute flow, and temporal experience
Edmund Husserlâs phenomenological analysis of internal time consciousness
has a reputation for being complex, occasionally to the point
of approaching impenetrability. The latter applies in particular to his
remarks about what he calls the âabsolute time-constituting flowâ,1 some
of which Husserl himself describes as ââshocking (when not initially
even absurd)ââ (Husserl, 1991, p. 84). [...
T.S. Eliot and others: the (more or less) definitive history and origin of the term âobjective correlativeâ
This paper draws together as many as possible of the clues and
pieces of the puzzle surrounding T. S. Eliotâs âinfamousâ literary
term âobjective correlativeâ. Many different scholars have claimed
many different sources for the term, in Pound, Whitman,
Baudelaire, Washington Allston, Santayana, Husserl, Nietzsche,
Newman, Walter Pater, Coleridge, Russell, Bradley, Bergson,
Bosanquet, Schopenhauer and Arnold. This paper aims to rewrite
this list by surveying those individuals who, in different ways,
either offer the truest claim to being the source of the term, or
contributed the most to Eliotâs development of it: Allston, Husserl,
Bradley and Bergson. What the paper will argue is that Eliotâs
possible inspiration for the term is more indebted to the idealist
tradition, and Bergsonâs aesthetic development of it, than to the
phenomenology of Husserl
Phenomenology is not phenomenalism. Is there such a thing as phenomenology of sport?
Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called âphenomenologyâ in the context of sport. Objective: The goal is to show how and why the phenomenological method is very often misused in the sportrelated research. Methods: Interpretation of the key texts, explanation of their meaning. Results: The confrontation of concrete sport-related texts with the original meaning of the key phenomenological notions shows mainly three types of misuse â the confusion of phenomenology with immediacy, with an epistemologically subjectivist stance
(phenomenalism), and with empirical research oriented towards objects in the world. Conclusions: Many of the discussed authors try to take over the epistemological validity of phenomenology for their research, which itself is not phenomenological, and it seems that this is because they lack such a methodological foundation. The authors believe that an authentically phenomenological analysis of sport is possible, but it must respect the fundamental distinctions that differentiate phenomenology from other styles of thinking
Rational a priori or Emotional a priori? Husserl and Schelerâs Criticisms of Kant Regarding the Foundation of Ethics
Based on the dispute between Protagoras and Socrates on the origin of ethics, one can ask the question of whether the principle of ethics is reason orfeeling/emotion, or whether ethics is grounded on reason or feeling/emotion. The development of Kantâs thoughts on ethics shows the tension between reason and feeling/emotion. In Kantâs final critical ethics, he held to a principle of ârational a priori.â On the one hand, this is presented as the rational a priori principle being the binding principle of judgment. On the other hand, it is presented as the doctrine of ârational factâ as the ultimate argument of his ethics. Husserl believed that Kantâs doctrine of a rational a priori totally disregarded the a priori essential laws of feeling. Like Husserl, Scheler criticized Kantâs doctrine of a rational a priori, and therefore developed his own theory of an âemotional a prioriâ. Both of them focused their critiques on the grounding level of ethics. Scheler, however, did not follow Husserl all the way, but criticized him and reflected on his thoughts. At last, he revealed the primary status of a phenomenological material ethics of value
From Being to Givenness and Back: Some Remarks on the Meaning of Transcendental Idealism in Kant and Husserl
This paper takes a fresh look at a classical theme in philosophical scholarship, the meaning of transcendental idealism, by contrasting Kantâs and Husserlâs versions of it. I present Kantâs transcendental idealism as a theory distinguishing between the world as in-itself and as given to the experiencing human being. This reconstruction provides the backdrop for Husserlâs transcendental phenomenology as a brand of transcendental idealism expanding on Kant: through the phenomenological reduction Husserl universalizes Kantâs transcendental philosophy to an eidetic science of subjectivity. He thereby furnishes a new sense of transcendental philosophy, rephrases the quid iurisquestion, and provides a new conception of the thing-in-itself. What needs to be clarified is not exclusively the possibility of a priori cognition but, to start at a much lower level, the validity of objects that give themselves in experience. The thing-in-itself is not an unknowable object, but the idea of the object in all possible appearances experienced at once. In spite of these changes Husserl remains committed to the basic sense of Kantâs Copernican Turn. I end with some comments on how both Kant and Husserl view the relation between theoretical and moral philosophy
Kant, Neo-Kantianism, and Phenomenology
This chapter offers a reassessment of the relationship between Kant, the Kantian tradition, and phenomenology, here focusing mainly on Husserl and Heidegger. Part of this reassessment concerns those philosophers who, during the lives of Husserl and Heidegger, sought to defend an updated version of Kantâs philosophy, the neo-Kantians. The chapter shows where the phenomenologists were able to benefit from some of the insights on the part of Kant and the neo-Kantians, but also clearly points to the differences. The aim of this chapter is to offer a fair evaluation of the relation of the main phenomenologists to Kant and to what was at the time the most powerful philosophical movement in Europe
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