Hume and the Cause of Inductive Inferences

I present Hume’s problem of induction and a puzzle that initially arises from the conclusion to the problem. In order to solve the puzzle I will present two ways we can understand Hume’s conclusion. I argue that the second interpretation provides an especially charitable account of what Hume intends to prove with the problem. On this interpretation, Hume is concerned with the cause of an inductive inference. I present three arguments in favor of this reading and conclude by summarizing Hume’s negative conclusion about induction

Hume, Skepticism, and Induction

This paper concerns the following interpretative problem: Hume\u27s most explicit arguments in both the Treatise and the Enquiry strongly suggest that he is a skeptic about inductive reasoning. This, indeed, has been the traditional interpretation. And yet, Hume engages in and explicitly endorses inductive reasoning throughout his works. I examine two prominent attempts to reconcile these features of Hume\u27s position. One group of commentators, the descriptivists, argues that Hume is not concerned with whether we ought to accept inductive beliefs; he is only concerned with the psychological causes of such beliefs. Because Hume is not concerned with the normative epistemic question, there is no tension in his text. Another group, the externalists, takes Hume to be engaged in an epistemological project; they even acknowledge the skeptical potential of Hume\u27s arguments, but they reject the idea that Hume is a skeptic about induction because they find in Hume an externalist strategy of justification which offers an escape from the skeptical conclusion. I criticize these readings on both textual and conceptual grounds. Against the descriptivist, I argue that Hume is indeed engaged in normative epistemology. Against externalist, I argue that Hume offers no broad solution to skepticism about induction. I defend the following interpretation: Hume endorses skepticism about induction in philosophical reflection. Against the background of modern epistemic contextualism, I argue that Hume appeals to multiple standards for belief justification depending on the context of the investigation. Hume repeatedly announces the success of the skeptic in destroying even our strongest beliefs, but only in cases of philosophical reflection: when we examine the fundamental justification of our beliefs. But he also insists that the power of the skeptic is destroyed when the inquiry shifts to practical matters: when the context of inquiry is that of common life. These multiple justificatory standards explain the apparent conflict between Hume\u27s skepticism and endorsement of induction. I conclude that this contextualist reading of Hume\u27s work offers both the strongest philosophical position for Hume, as well as an interpretation which sacrifices relatively little of the traditional impact of Hume\u27s skeptical arguments

On the Problem of the Hedgeless Hedgefunds of Sleepy Hollow: An Evolutionary Stable Solution in an Open Letter to Kenneth Griffin

This discourse explores and illuminates a fundamental problem, the Achilles' heel, which dominates the hedgefund industry: namely, that hedgefunds no are not positioned to accomplish what they were designed to do: namely, hedge against catastrophic loss in the financial markets. Contemporary fund strategies where built upon random-walk, efficient market theories which are now well-known to be false, thus our present dilemma. This discourse tables the Evolutionary Stable Strategy, for prospective hedgefund investors which, essentially, follows the dominant strategy outlined by Smith in 1776. Our discourse also highlights the dimly recognized difference between internal and external financial shocks, as well as several key points regarding economic methodology.hedgefunds; evolutionary stable strategy; problem of induction; kenneth griffin; george soros; karl popper; clive granger; adam smith; ted turner; catastrophic risk; external shocks; internal shocks; citadel investments; hawaii; rangelands; ranch economics; david hume

Stroud's Humean Skepticism

In “The Constraints of Hume’s Naturalism” Barry Stroud takes on the task of looking at Hume’s negative and positive accounts of induction in conjunction. Stroud goes about doing this so that we might walk away with “a more general lesson about naturalism, at least when it is indulged in for philosophical purposes”. Given the boldness of Stroud’s quote from above there should be some explicit talk of this general lesson about naturalism outside of Hume’s, but there is none that is readily apparent. If a more general and philosophically motivated lesson about naturalism is to be gleaned from Stroud’s investigation of Hume, then we should take this to be a lesson implicit in Stroud and not Hume. Hence I shall argue that Stroud tacitly endorses the skeptical conclusions of David Hume about naturalism in general when indulged for philosophical purposes

What Can Armstrongian Universals Do for Induction?

David Armstrong (1983) argues that necessitation relations among universals are the best explanation of some of our observations. If we consequently accept them into our ontologies, then we can justify induction, because these necessitation relations also have implications for the unobserved. By embracing Armstrongian universals, we can vindicate some of our strongest epistemological intuitions and answer the Problem of Induction. However, Armstrong’s reasoning has recently been challenged on a variety of grounds. Critics argue against both Armstrong’s usage of inference to the best explanation and even whether, by Armstrong’s own standards, necessitation relations offer a potential explanation of this explanandum, let alone the best explanation. I defend Armstrong against these particular criticisms. Firstly, even though there are reasons to think that Armstrong’s justification fails as a self-contained defence of induction, it can usefully complement several other answers to Hume. Secondly, I argue that Armstrong’s reasoning is consistent with his own standards for explanation

Kritické zhodnocení Popperova řešení problému indukce

A critical evaluation of Popper’s solutionto the problem of inductionIs there any kind of justification fora belief that the future will be largely like the past? In the eighteenth century David Hume formulatedthe problem of induction in a similar spirit, andhis version is now conventional. Even two hundred and fifty years after Hume’s death, the ef-fort to justify inductive inferences still preoccupiesphilosophers. Sir Karl Popper believed that he hadsuccessfully solved this fundamental philosophicalproblem. The present article introduces the problematic situation formulated by David Hume, followed by Popper’s original solution to the problem. Along with that, relevant criticism from John Worall and Wes Salmon will be presented. It concentrates on Popper’s rejection of induction and therelated inability to implement any prediction aboutthe future within critical rationalism. The validityor failure of Popper’s solution is discussed towardsthe end of the article, together with a reconsideration of the current state of the debate. The lastpart of the study is devoted to the author’s proposal, which should be able to stand up againstanti-Popperian objections while remaining withinthe boundaries of critical-rationalist methodology

Logical and Spiritual Reflections

Logical and Spiritual Reflections is a collection of six shorter philosophical works, including: Hume’s Problems with Induction; A Short Critique of Kant’s Unreason; In Defense of Aristotle’s Laws of Thought; More Meditations; Zen Judaism; No to Sodom. Of these works, the first set of three constitutes the Logical Reflections, and the second set constitutes the Spiritual Reflections. Hume’s Problems with Induction, which is intended to describe and refute some of the main doubts and objections David Hume raised with regard to inductive reasoning. It replaces the so-called problem of induction with a principle of induction. David Hume’s notorious skepticism was based on errors of observation and reasoning, with regard to induction, causation, necessity, the self and freewill. These are here pointed out and critically analyzed in detail – and more accurate and logical theories are proposed. The present work also includes refutations of Hempel’s and Goodman’s alleged paradoxes of induction. A Short Critique of Kant’s Unreason, which is a brief critical analysis of some of the salient epistemological and ontological ideas and theses in Immanuel Kant’s famous Critique of Pure Reason. It shows that Kant was in no position to criticize reason, because he neither sufficiently understood its workings nor had the logical tools needed for the task. Kant’s transcendental reality, his analytic-synthetic dichotomy, his views on experience and concept formation, and on the forms of sensibility (space and time) and understanding (his twelve categories), are here all subjected to rigorous logical evaluation and found deeply flawed – and more coherent theories are proposed in their stead. In Defense of Aristotle’s Laws of Thought, which addresses, from a phenomenological standpoint, numerous modern and Buddhist objections and misconceptions regarding the basic principles of Aristotelian logic. Many people seem to be attacking Aristotle’s Laws of Thought nowadays, some coming from the West and some from the East. It is important to review and refute such ideas as they arise. More Meditations, which is a sequel to the author’s earlier work, Meditations. It proposes additional practical methods and theoretical insights relating to meditation and Buddhism. It also discusses certain often glossed over issues relating to Buddhism – notably, historicity, idolatry, messianism, importation to the West. Zen Judaism, which is a frank reflection on the tensions between reason and faith in today’s context of knowledge, and on the need to inject Zen-like meditation into Judaism. This work also treats some issues in ethics and theodicy. No to Sodom, which is an essay against homosexuality, using biological, psychological, spiritual, ethical and political arguments

Naturalism and wonder: Peirce on the logic of Hume’s argument against miracles

How should we proceed when confronted with a phenomenon (or evidence which points towards a phenomenon) which baffles us? The term "miracle" is a convenient term on which to hang this question. It has a religious meaning, and the arguments I will be discussing are applicable to the case of deciding, for example, whether to believe in the Judaeo-Christian God, based on the reports of miracles offered by the Bible. However, one can generalise from this case to deeper issues about our attitude to the apparently inexplicable. By the apparently inexplicable I mean that which contradicts our most well-confirmed beliefs. This general question is the theme of this paper