Setting adequate wages for workers: Managers’ work experience, incentive scheme and gender matter

Many societies report an increasingly divergent development of managers’ salaries compared to that of their workforce. Moreover, there is often a lack in diversity amongst managerial boards. We investigate the role of managers’ gender and incentive scheme on wages chosen for workers by conducting two experimental studies. The data reveal male managers respond in more self-oriented ways to their incentive scheme. Further, we find that experience with the workers’ task can increase appreciation of workers. Effects are strongest when the managers’ compensation scheme rules out self-orientation. Overall, female managers display more consistency in choosing adequate wages for workers, i.e. their choices are less affected by incentives. An increase in diversity may thus help reducing salary disparities and foster work atmosphere

Gossip in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games: Its Immediate and Downstream Consequences for Cooperation

In this research, we examine how cooperation emerges and develops in sequential dyadic interactions when the initial interaction varies in strategic considerations (i.e., fear of partner rejection) or potential gossip by one’s partner that may affect subsequent interactions. In a lab experiment involving real-time interactions (N = 240) across 39 sessions, participants acted in different roles (i.e., Person A, B, and C) in two different games—Person A was first assigned to allocate an amount of resource to Person B in a dictator game or an ultimatum game. Afterward, Person C interacted with Person A (i.e., trustee) as a trustor in a trust game. Prior to their decisions, participants (a) learned that Person B could gossip by sending evaluations about Person A’s behavior to Person C prior to the trust game or (b) did not receive this information. Findings replicate previous research showing that potential gossip by one’s partner greatly increases cooperation that is revealed in the resources allocated to the partner. Yet, compared to the dictator game, the presence of strategic considerations in the ultimatum game does not significantly enhance cooperation, and even makes people less likely to reciprocate others’ behavior in the subsequent interaction. Interestingly, when there is no gossip, those who have played the ultimatum game, compared to the dictator game, are more trusted by others but do not vary in reciprocity in the subsequent interaction. However, when there is gossip, those who have played the dictator game, compared to the ultimatum game, are more trusted and also more likely to reciprocate others’ behavior in the subsequent interaction. These findings imply that gossip invariably promotes cooperation across strategic and non-strategic situations, but the potential rejection by one’s partner weakly promotes cooperation, and even undermines future cooperation especially when paired with reputation sharing opportunities. We discuss the implications of these findings for implementing reputation systems that can promote and maintain cooperation cost-effectively

Der Einfluss von Normen in Verlustexperimenten

Wir haben experimentell untersucht, welche Wirkung Normen in Verlustsituationen haben. Hierfür haben wir negative Diktator- und Ultimatumspiele durchgeführt und dabei in einem Treatment „Referenzwert“ den Fokus auf die deskriptive Norm gesetzt, welches Verhalten in der gegebenen Situation typisch ist. In einem weiteren Treatment „Rationaler Spieler“ haben wir die spieltheoretische Lösung der beiden Spiele angegeben um damit den Fokus vom üblichen fokalen Punkt der Gleichaufteilung abzulenken.:1. Einleitung 2. Theorie und Hypothesen 2.1 Wirkung einer Gleichaufteilungsnorm in Aufteilungs- und Verhandlungsproblemen 2.2 Wirkung deskriptiver Normen 2.3 Robustheit der Gleichverteilungsnorm 3. Methode und Treatments 4. Auswertungen 4.1 Ergebnisse zu den vermuteten Haupteffekten 4.2 Explorative Effekte zu Interaktion aus Studiengang und Treatment 5. Zusammenfassung und Interpretation der Ergebniss

How to Split Gains and Losses? Experimental Evidence of Dictator and Ultimatum Games

Previous research has typically focused on distribution problems that emerge in the domain of gains. Only a few studies have distinguished between games played in the domain of gains from games in the domain of losses, even though, for example, prospect theory predicts differences between behavior in both domains. In this study, we experimentally analyze players’ behavior in dictator and ultimatum games when they need to divide a monetary loss and then compare this to behavior when players have to divide a monetary gain. We find that players treat gains and losses differently in that they are less generous in games over losses and react differently to prior experiences. Players in the dictator game become more selfish after they have had the experience of playing an ultimatum game first