Evolution of emotions on networks leads to the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas

We show that the resolution of social dilemmas in random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of better-performing players but, rather, their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy to be the two emotions that determine the strategy of each player in any given interaction, and we define them as the probabilities of cooperating with players having a lower and a higher payoff, respectively. Starting with a population where all possible combinations of the two emotions are available, the evolutionary process leads to a spontaneous fixation to a single emotional profile that is eventually adopted by all players. However, this emotional profile depends not only on the payoffs but also on the heterogeneity of the interaction network. Homogeneous networks, such as lattices and regular random graphs, lead to fixations that are characterized by high sympathy and high envy, while heterogeneous networks lead to low or modest sympathy but also low envy. Our results thus suggest that public emotions and the propensity to cooperate at large depend, and are in fact determined by, the properties of the interaction network

The comparison in the rate of learning of colorful and abstract words in grade two

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston Universit

Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach

One of the most elusive ingredients in the success of a deal is what deal makers euphemistically refer to as "Social issues" - how power, position, and status will be allocated among the merging companies' executives. A failure to resolve these issues often leads to the destruction of shareholder wealth and portrayal of top executives as petty corporates chieftains, unable to subordinate their selfish interests to the goal of promoting shareholder well-being.MERGERS ; EFFICIENCY ; EQUITY

Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride

We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages when there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).Envy, Pride, Wages, Prizes, Bonus

Advances in negotiation theory : bargaining, coalitions, and fairness

Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as climate change control). What factors determinethe outcomes of such negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The authors address these questions by focusing on a noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, noncooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, they try to identify the connections among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress toward a unified framework.Economic Theory&Research,Social Protections&Assistance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Science Education

Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness

Bargaining is ubiquitous in real-life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (e.g. climate change control). What factors determine the outcome of negotiations such as those mentioned above? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? This paper addresses these questions by focusing on a non-cooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, non-cooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, this paper will try to identify the connection among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate the progress towards a unified framework.Negotiation theory, Bragaining, Coalitions, Fairness, Agreements

Learning from those "imitative" Japanese : Edward S. Morse and the civilization of the Mikado's empire

Already in the twelfth century, men canvassed different views on the ways in which they thought lordship ought to be exercised. They used their picture of how an idealised "Good Lord" -- a familiar label in later times -- comported himself to assess the treatment they actually received from their lords. This Good Lordship had both Positive and Negative aspects: the "good lord" maintained his vassals in their honours and renounced his right to revoke grants afterwards. One excellent way to study the pursuit of this double ideal is through the language of charters, more particularly through the warranty clauses by which Good Lordship was often implemented. The transformation of warranty into its familiar Common-Law shape reflects corresponding and complex changes in both lord-vassal relations and the role of the King and his justice. Warranty actually began as a security device, designed to keep men to their word, and is found used in this sense over wide areas of sub- Carolingian Europe. It was probably imported to England by the French, and can be seen in twelfth-century charters progressively superseding other forms of words to become the classic "guarantee" of Good Lordship. In this manner it came by 1200 to be virtually equated with the lordship it had originally been used to enforce. Warranty was lordship seen from the vassal's point of view, that is, tenant-right. Despite this origin in very personal relations, warranty probably always created between the parties' heirs some kind of obligation, which sharpened and was made infinitely more clear-cut with the emergence of full legal inheritance rights. Warranty swelled to full tenant-right, a full guarantee of the Right to Good Lordship. As the heir's claim grew into an enforceable right of inheritance through increasing access to remedies by royal justice, and because such justice tended to strict construction, warranty became a contractual addition to which claimants had to prove their entitlement. The narrative of legal change from 1150 argues for gradual evolution but also suggests 1153-4 as the decisive turning-point in this development. Detailed (sometimes technical) examination of evidence for some relevant cases, royal writs concerning warranty and the turning-point of 1153-4 is reserved for three appendixes