How to Incentivize Data-Driven Collaboration Among Competing Parties

The availability of vast amounts of data is changing how we can make medical discoveries, predict global market trends, save energy, and develop educational strategies. In some settings such as Genome Wide Association Studies or deep learning, sheer size of data seems critical. When data is held distributedly by many parties, they must share it to reap its full benefits. One obstacle to this revolution is the lack of willingness of different parties to share data, due to reasons such as loss of privacy or competitive edge. Cryptographic works address privacy aspects, but shed no light on individual parties' losses/gains when access to data carries tangible rewards. Even if it is clear that better overall conclusions can be drawn from collaboration, are individual collaborators better off by collaborating? Addressing this question is the topic of this paper. * We formalize a model of n-party collaboration for computing functions over private inputs in which participants receive their outputs in sequence, and the order depends on their private inputs. Each output "improves" on preceding outputs according to a score function. * We say a mechanism for collaboration achieves collaborative equilibrium if it ensures higher reward for all participants when collaborating (rather than working alone). We show that in general, computing a collaborative equilibrium is NP-complete, yet we design efficient algorithms to compute it in a range of natural model settings. Our collaboration mechanisms are in the standard model, and thus require a central trusted party; however, we show this assumption is unnecessary under standard cryptographic assumptions. We show how to implement the mechanisms in a decentralized way with new extensions of secure multiparty computation that impose order/timing constraints on output delivery to different players, as well as privacy and correctness

How to Incentivize Data-Driven Collaboration Among Competing Parties

The availability of vast amounts of data is changing how we can make medical discoveries, predict global market trends, save energy, and develop new educational strategies. In certain settings such as Genome Wide Association Studies or deep learning, the sheer size of data (patient files or labeled examples) seems critical to making discoveries. When data is held distributedly by many parties, as often is the case, they must share it to reap its full benefits. One obstacle to this revolution is the lack of willingness of different entities to share their data, due to reasons such as possible loss of privacy or competitive edge. Whereas cryptographic works address the privacy aspects, they shed no light on individual parties\u27 losses and gains when access to data carries tangible rewards. Even if it is clear that better overall conclusions can be drawn fom collaboration, are individual collaborators better off by collaborating? Addressing this question is the topic of this paper. Our contributions are as follows. * We formalize a model of $n$-party collaboration for computing functions over private inputs in which the participants receive their outputs in sequence, and the order depends on their private inputs. Each output ``improves\u27\u27 on all previous outputs according to a score function. * We say that a mechanism for collaboration achieves a \emph{collaborative equilibrium} if it guarantees a higher reward for all participants when joining a collaboration compared to not joining it. We show that while in general computing a collaborative equilibrium is NP-complete, we can design polynomial-time algorithms for computing it for a range of natural model settings. When possible, we design mechanisms to compute a distribution of outputs and an ordering of output delivery, based on the $n$ participants\u27 private inputs, which achieves a collaborative equilibrium. The collaboration mechanisms we develop are in the standard model, and thus require a central trusted party; however, we show that this assumption is not necessary under standard cryptographic assumptions. We show how the mechanisms can be implemented in a decentralized way by $n$ distrustful parties using new extensions of classical secure multiparty computation that impose order and timing constraints on the delivery of outputs to different players, in addition to guaranteeing privacy and correctness

Towards an open cloud marketplace: vision and first steps

As one of the most promising, emerging concepts in Information Technology (IT), cloud computing is transforming how IT is consumed and managed; yielding improved cost efficiencies, and delivering flexible, on-demand scalability by reducing computing infrastructures, platforms, and services to commodities acquired and paid-for on-demand through a set of cloud providers. Today, the transition of cloud computing from a subject of research and innovation to a critical infrastructure is proceeding at an incredibly fast pace. A potentially dangerous consequence of this speedy transition to practice is the premature adoption, and ossification, of the models, technologies, and standards underlying this critical infrastructure. This state of affairs is exacerbated by the fact that innovative research on production-scale platforms is becoming the purview of a small number of public cloud providers. Specifically, the academic research communities are effectively excluded from the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the evolution not to mention innovation and healthy mutation of cloud computing technologies. As the dependence on our society and economy on cloud computing increases, so does the realization that the academic research community cannot be shut out from contributing to the design and evolution of this critical infrastructure. In this article we provide an alternative vision that of an Open Cloud eXchange (OCX) a public cloud marketplace, where many stakeholders, rather than just a single cloud provider, participate in implementing and operating the cloud, thus creating an ecosystem that will bring the innovation of a broader community to bear on a much healthier and more efficient cloud marketplace

Government By and For Millenial America: A Blueprint for 21st Century Government

Using this generation's unique ethos and commitment to pragmatic problem-solving, Millennials across the country have collaborated to design their vision for a 21st century democracy and reject the idea that our system is too broken, too stagnant, and too outdated. They have identified the parts of the system that need to be fixed while articulating what a true democracy should look like. Government By and For Millennial America, the third installment of our blueprint series, tackles some of the most fundamental, divisive, and difficult questions on the purpose of government in furthering our country's progress: how can we hear from more voices? How can we be more transparent? How can government be more egalitarian? How can we both support individual communities and the common good of every American? Most importantly, this pursuit is grounded in one fundamental idea that defines America's distinctive pursuit of self-governance: in the words of our namesake, Let us never forget that government is ourselves and not an alien power over us. The ultimate rulers of our democracy are not a President and senators and congressmen and government officials, but the voters of this country. - President Franklin D. Roosevelt We set out to craft a blueprint, and discovered, in conversations with over a thousand young people across the country, that the Millennial generation is not yet ready to give up on America's ever evolving experiment in a government by and for the people

Global Risks 2014, Ninth Edition.

The Global Risks 2014 report highlights how global risks are not only interconnected but also have systemic impacts. To manage global risks effectively and build resilience to their impacts, better efforts are needed to understand, measure and foresee the evolution of interdependencies between risks, supplementing traditional risk-management tools with new concepts designed for uncertain environments. If global risks are not effectively addressed, their social, economic and political fallouts could be far-reaching, as exemplified by the continuing impacts of the financial crisis of 2007-2008

The role of fiscal instruments in encouraging the private sector and smallholders to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation: Evidence from Indonesia

While developing countries around the world are preparing to implement REDD+, there is a debate on the possible role of fiscal instruments in encouraging the private sector and smallholder stakeholders in reducing emissions. Drawing on a case of Indonesia, an early leader on REDD+, this paper investigates the role of fiscal instruments in encouraging the private sector to reduce forest-based emissions and the implications for improving the forest sector governance. In particular the study highlights the perspectives of a range of forest sector stakeholders on the role of fiscal instruments that contribute either positively or negatively to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia. The study comprised a review of the existing instruments in Indonesia, as well as surveys and interviews. An online survey and structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with a range of forest sector stakeholders, including government, civil society, academia, and palm oil concession holders. Findings indicate that there is a range of formal and informal fiscal instruments at the various jurisdictional levels, and a variety of incentives and disincentives. More emphasis on cross-sectoral co-ordination, alternatives to commodities such as palm oil, and continued land reform, is required

Measurement and reporting of climate-smart agriculture: technical guidance for a countrycentric process

Given the extent of climate-smart agriculture (CSA) initiatives at project, national, regional and global levels, there is increasing interest in tracking progress in implementing CSA at national level. CSA is also expected to contribute to higher-level goals (e.g., the Paris Agreement, Africa Union’s Vision 25x25, and the Sustainable Development Goals [SDGs], etc.). Measurement and reporting of climate-smart agriculture (MR of CSA) provides intelligence on necessary the status, effectiveness, efficiency and impacts of interventions, which is critical for meeting stakeholders’ diverse management and reporting needs. In this paper, we build the case for a stakeholder-driven, country-centric framework for MR of CSA, which aims to increase coordination and coherence across stakeholders’ MR activities, while also aligning national reporting with reporting on international commitments. We present practical guidance on how to develop an integrated MR framework, drawing on findings from a multi-country assessment of needs, opportunities and capacities for national MR of CSA. The content of a unified MR framework is determined by stakeholders’ activities (how they promote CSA), needs (why MR is useful to them) and current capacities to conduct periodic monitoring, evaluation and reporting (how ready are institutions, staff and finances). Our analysis found that explicit demand for integration of data systems and active engagement of stakeholders throughout the entire process are key ingredients for building a MR system that is relevant, useful and acted upon. Based on these lessons, we identify a seven-step framework for stakeholders to develop a comprehensive information system for MR of progress in implementing CSA