Players' Patience and Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model

This paper investigates a generalized Baron-Ferejohn model with different discount factors, different recognition probabilities and q-majority rule. In the paper, it is shown that if players are sufficiently patient, recognition probabilities are similar and the voting rule is not unanimous, each player's equilibrium payoff is inversely proportional to the ratio of the player''s discount factor to the harmonic mean of all players'' discount factors. This result implies the followings: (i) A less patient player obtains a greater payoff (ii) As a player slightly becomes more patient, her payoff becomes smaller (iii) The equilibrium payoffs do not depend on recognition probabilities and (iv) They do not also depend on q.Baron-Ferejohn model (Legislative bargaining)

On the probability of breakdown in participation games

In this paper I analyze a participation game i.e. a public good game where contributions to the public good are binary (people either participate or not participate). Although variants of this game have been studied extensively, most previous work takes the benefit of provision of the public good to be independent of the number of players that contribute and show that the probability of breakdown, i.e. the probability that no one participates, is increasing in group size. Here this assumption is dropped. I show when the probability of breakdown is decreasing in group size and also present sufficient conditions under which the probability of breakdown is increasing in group size. Moreover I show that for large groups this probability is non-negligible and exceeding exp(−1) in the limit and that the expected number of participants is less than one. Also two economic examples, concerning R&D and debt overhang, are discussed.

Fixing the Quorum: Representation versus Abstention

The majority of the participating voters in referenda does not necessarily reflect the majority of the whole population since voters can abstain. This paper shows that a quorum exists for which the outcome of the referendum coincides with the population preference. However, a second equilibrium can exist in which the proposal is always rejected. When insu±cient information makes the optimal quorum unknown, it is in general more harmful to set the quorum too high than too low. Robustness of the results is analyzed by allowing pressure groups to encourage or discourage participation after the quorum is set.Electoral engineering, quorum, referendum, voting/not-voting decision, voting rules

How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox

We show that due to free riding of potential voters facing positive voting costs, the proposal with the highest number of supporters can still be the most likely to lose a binary election. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox

Abstract. We show that due to free riding of potential voters facing positive voting costs, the proposal with the highest number of supporters can still be the most likely to lose a binary election.

Legislative Bargaining and Parties\u27 Patience

We investigate the relationship between parties\u27 patience and continuation values in legislative bargaining. We consider the legislative bargaining game without assuming common discount factor. In the game, it is observed a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon that more patient party obtains less continuation value than less patient party. Also, we show that in some cases, a party\u27s continuation value decreases as she marginally becomes more patient. These seemingly paradoxical results come from the role of patience different from ordinary bargaining games. The role is unique to the majority rule in the legislative bargaining

Coordination, Expectations and Crises.

no abstract availableCurrency crises -- Models; Liquidity (Economics) -- Econometric models; Bank failures -- Models;