Effects of noise and confidence thresholds in nominal and metric Axelrod dynamics of social influence

We study the effects of bounded confidence thresholds and of interaction and external noise on Axelrod's model of social influence. Our study is based on a combination of numerical simulations and an integration of the mean-field Master equation describing the system in the thermodynamic limit. We find that interaction thresholds affect the system only quantitatively, but that they do not alter the basic phase structure. The known crossover between an ordered and a disordered state in finite systems subject to external noise persists in models with general confidence threshold. Interaction noise here facilitates the dynamics and reduces relaxation times. We also study Axelrod systems with metric features, and point out similarities and differences compared to models with nominal features. Metric features are used to demonstrate that a small group of extremists can have a significant impact on the opinion dynamics of a population of Axelrod agents.Comment: 15 pages, 12 figure

CAN OPINION BE STABLE IN AN OPEN NETWORK WITH HIERARCHY?AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF THE COMMERCIAL COURT OF PARIS

The co-evolution of social networks and opinion formation has received increasing attention in recent years. As a contribution to the growing literature on this topic, we explore connections between empirical data representing the advice network of judges at the Commercial Court in Paris and an agent-based simulation protocol testing various hypotheses on the motives that drive agent behaviors. A previous work (Rouchier et al. 2007) had already modeled the dynamics of advice-seeking among judges and studied the implications of different rationality assumptions on the shape of the emerging network. Here, we add an influence model to the previously examined advice-seeking relationships in order to explore the possibility that there is a form of “culture” at the Court that harmonizes the opinions of members over time; we identify a set of relevant stylized facts, and we use new indicators to evaluate how agents choose with whom to interact within this framework. The basic assumptions we analyze are that they seek advice from senior judges who are higher up in the hierarchy, who enjoy high reputation, or who are similar to them. Our simulations test which criterion –or which combination of criteria– is most credible, by comparing both the properties of the emerging network and the dynamics of opinion at the Court to the stylized facts. Our results single out the combination of criteria that most likely guide individuals' selection of advisors and provide insight into their effects on opinion formation.Advice network ; Agent-Based Simulation ; Influence Model ; Opinion Dynamics ; Hierarchy ; Reputation

Three Essays on the Determinants of Radicalization: A Case of North-Western Pakistan

Radicalization is as a formidable challenge for several nations. While radicalization continues to flare across the world, empirical evidence and consensus regarding its determinants remain scarce. This cumulative dissertation aims to contribute to understanding the determinants of radicalization based on three research papers. The first paper undertakes a systematic review of the existing scientific literature on radicalization. The second paper empirically tests the predictive power of the most plausible factors identified in the systematic review. The third paper empirically investigates the existence of non-linearities in the relationship between radicalization and socioeconomic factors.:1. Introduction 2. Understanding the Determinants of Radicalization: A Systematic Review 3. An Empirical Assessment of the Determinants of Radicalization: Evidence from North-Western Pakistan 4. Socioeconomic Factors and Radicalization in Pakistan: A Non-Linear Exploration 5. Reference

The Burqa Ban: Legal Precursors for Denmark, American Experiences and Experiments, and Philosophical and Critical Examinations

As the title of the article suggests, “The Burqa Ban”: Legal Precursors for Denmark, American Experiences and Experiments, and Philosophical and Critical Examinations, the authors embark on a factually investigative as well as a reflective response. More precisely, they use The 2018 Danish “Burqa Ban”: Joining a European Trend and Sending a National Message (published as a concurrent but separate article in this issue of INTERNATIONAL STUDIES JOURNAL) as a platform for further analysis and discussion of different perspectives. These include case-law at the international level while focusing attention on recent rulings and judicial reasoning by the ECtHR and the ECJ; critical thought-experiments in religion, morality, human rights, and the democratic public space; a contextualized account of burqa-wearing interventions by federal and state governments and, moreover, various courts in the United States; and philosophical commentary and, in some instances, criticism of the Danish and/or European (French, etc.) approach. The different contributions have different aims. The section on case-law at the international level reports on those central judgments that, in effect, helped to pave the path for the Kingdom of Denmark’s burqa ban. Concerning the concurring judges at the ECtHR, the opinions served to uphold a preexisting ban and to grant a wide margin of appreciation to the national authorities, thereby limiting the Court’s own review. As regards to the ECJ, the legality of company rules that contain a policy of neutrality for the workplace was examined, with a similar outcome. The authors who discuss religion, morality, human rights and the democratic public space are endeavoring to, respectively, appeal to ethics as a testing stone for law and to both challenge and address several forms of “expressivist worry” in connection with face veils. In doing so, the authors ask a number of thought-provoking questions that hopefully will inspire public policymakers to careful analysis. While the section that is devoted to American perspectives highlights a comprehensive survey of political and legal responses to, in particular, full-face veils like the burqa, the relevant author also incorporates public perceptions and, in the course of examining these, draws a parallel to “the fate” of the hoodie. The constitutionality of burqa-wearing in America, so it also appears, is partially an open question, but differentiating between religious, political, or personal reasons is a de jure premise. Given that the Danish legislators who drafted law L 219 to ban burqa-wearing in public places rely on a reference to political Islam, they relegate religious and personal reasons to the private domain, thereby also adopting secularism as a premise. This is explored in the last author response of the article, more precisely, in an account of the underlying materialism that, in turn, is applied to Muslim women. If policymakers and legislators engaged in Thinking Things Through exercises, they could, as a minimum, avoid law-making strategies that are not in the spirit of the theory they themselves invoke, albeit tacitly. While the aim of, as it were, arresting culturally self-contradicting legislators is unique for the section in question, all the authors who contribute to the joint research project have one end-goal in common, namely to inform about important perspectives while at the same time opening up for parameters for (more) fruitful, constructive and (if need be) critical debate in the future. With this in mind, four recommendations are presented by the research director for the project. Legally, politically, socially and culturally, conflict-resolution should not translate the relationship between rulers and the ruled into a separation ideology, an instance of controllers versus the controlled. All things being equal, that is the objective limit for a democratic society

Facing the fourth foreign fighters wave: what drives Europeans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from the Belgian case

Exactly one year ago, the first edition of this Egmont Paper was released. Its aim was to explore the wider circumstances that could help explain the decision of thousands of, mostly young, European volunteers to journey to a faraway war theatre in the Levant. This Egmont Paper is a thoroughly revised, updated and expanded version. Several new features have been introduced. It proposes, firstly, a more systematic attempt at understanding why people with different social backgrounds feel attracted by IS, also known by its Arabic acronym Daesh. Two categories of Syria travellers (a more general term than ‘foreign fighters’) can be identified. For a first group comprises pre-existing kinship and friendship gangs. For them, joining IS is merely a shift to another form of deviant behaviour, next to membership of street gangs, rioting, drug trafficking, and juvenile delinquency. But it adds and opens a thrilling, bigger-than-life dimension to their way of life – indeed transforming them from delinquents without a future into mujahedeen with a cause. Whereas most individuals of the first group are known to the police, this is not necessarily the case for the second group. Before suddenly deciding to leave for Syria, the youngsters in this group didn’t show any sign of deviant behaviour and nothing seemed to distinguish them from their peers. But frequently they refer to the absence of a future, to personal difficulties they faced in their everyday life, to feelings of exclusion and absence of belonging, as if they didn’t have a stake in society. They are often solitary, isolated adolescents, frequently at odds with family and friends, in search of belonging and a cause to embrace. At a certain point, the succession of such estrangements resulted in anger. The relative share of both groups may differ according to national backgrounds. But, however different in background and motivations, they share common characteristics. Together these constitute the subculture on which IS’ force of attraction thrives. ‘No future’ is the essence of the youth subculture that drives the majority of Syria travellers from the West. The explanation for their decision is found not in how they think, but in how they feel. Going to Syria is an escape from an everyday life seemingly without prospects. Vulnerability, frustration, perceptions of inequity, and a feeling that by traveling to Syria they have nothing to lose and everything to gain, are common traits among both groups. Religion is not of the essence. As of lately, Europol has also begun to acknowledge the declining role of religion in the foreign fighters issue. Religion has systematically decreased as a driver of terrorism as the waves of foreign fighters succeed one another. This is indeed the second new feature of this updated Egmont Paper. On closer examination, the current foreign fighters movement represents the fourth wave of jihadi terrorism, as originally conceived by Marc Sageman in 2008. The first wave fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and became the companions-in-arms of Osama bin Laden. The second wave were often elite expatriates from the Middle East who went to the West to attend universities. Motivated by the suffering of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Philippines, they volunteered to fight in those hotspots. But by 2004–2005, the first two waves of truly global jihadi travellers had reached their limits. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 breathed new life in the decaying jihadi terrorist scene. A new wave of radicals emerged, angered by this invasion. This wave was labelled ‘home-grown’. They entered the jihadi scene through local kinship and friendship bonds, and were often connected to the global context via the internet. By 2008-2010, the third wave too had run its course. The start of the civil war in Syria in 2012 and the emergence of potent jihadi groups in the Levant, in particular IS, once again reinvigorated a waning jihadi movement. It gave rise to a new, fourth wave of militants and wannabe foreign fighters. The fourth wave resembles its immediate predecessor by the local dynamics of the networks. Nowadays too, they are formed among friends and family who have known each other for years. Distinct from the third wave is the opportunity to again link up with one another on the battlefield, as part of a conquering terrorist and insurgent organisation: IS. As a result, technical expertise can again be acquired and skills transferred, in particular training with assault weapons. Just like the preceding waves, the fourth wave of foreign fighters too will ultimately end, mostly for the same reasons as its predecessors. But the time needed to reach this point depends also on the measures we collectively take in reacting to the phenomenon. A final new section in this update deals with these measures. Five policy recommendations are suggested that might effectively contribute to countering the current wave of foreign fighters – and protect a new generation from following suit. Firstly, reframe the debate. Unless we understand how the motivations of the fourth wave foreign fighters essentially derive from a ‘no future’ subculture and not simply from a narrative, prevention will fail. Secondly, focus on tailor-made approaches. One-size-fits-all overall deradicalisation initiatives will be of marginal use. Thirdly, separate the discussion on Islam in Europe from deradicalisation initiatives. The discussion on a ‘European Islam’ is a discussion worth to be held for its own merits, on its own terms, and with Muslims in the lead. It should not be pushed within the deradicalisation framework. Not only will this not work as envisaged, it will also harden positions, corrode an already fragile social fabric, and thus backfire. Fourthly, don’t get terrorized by terrorists. Following the July 2005 bombings in London, the London mayor Ken Livingstone reacted in simple and inclusive terms. Inclusiveness is a tough thing to come by in today’s frenzied debates. Finally, invest in intelligence (for a proper long term perspective) and encourage short-term operational information sharing. Looking for explanations for vicious behaviour doesn’t imply justifying it. The sole responsibility for the violence perpetrated by foreign fighters are the foreign fighters themselves. Each and every person is ultimately accountable for his or her actions. But understanding the context is crucial if one is to devise adequate measures and prevent yet another generation from becoming receptive to the siren songs of extremist political violence

The Impact of Council’s Internal Decision-Making Rules on the Future EU

This paper deals with the voting rules in the EU Council. Both internal and external impact of the voting rules are evaluated. Internal impact affects the distribution of power among the member states and external impact affects power relations between the main decision-making bodies in the EU. One of the main lessons of the analysis is clearly to explain why the design of Council voting rules has required so much bargaining and cumbersome marathon negotiations.European integration, Council of Ministers, power

Sources of Inter-State Alignments: Internal Threats and Economic Dependence in the Former Soviet Union

This dissertation develops a framework for understanding the alignment patterns of states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) vis-à-vis Russia. The framework challenges traditional alignment theories, such as balance of power and balance of threat theories, and suggests that these theories provide less accurate predictions of alignment behavior in the FSU than the present framework because of a variety of situational and contextual factors. In particular, the present framework highlights the impact of two variables on alignment patterns, (1) the internal political threats to leaders, and (2) the economic dependence on Russia. These two variables produce a four-outcome model, presented as four testable hypotheses. When internal threats are high and economic dependence is high, FSU leaders are more likely to adopt a strong pro-Russian alignment. When internal threats are low and economic dependence is high, FSU leaders are more likely to adopt a moderate pro-Russian alignment. When internal threats are high and economic dependence is low, FSU leaders are more likely to adopt a moderate pro-Russian alignment. Finally, when internal threats and low and economic dependence is low, FSU leaders are more likely to adopt a pro-independence (sometimes anti-Russian) alignment. The present framework is then tested against the empirical behavior of Uzbekistan and Ukraine