Identity and the Legislative Decision Making Process: A Case Study of the Maryland State Legislature

Both politicians and the mass public believe that identity influences political behavior yet, political scientists have failed to fully detail how identity is salient for all political actors not just minorities and women legislators. To what extent do racial, gendered, and race/gendered identities affect the legislation decision process? To test this proposition, I examine how race and gender based identities shape the legislative decisions of Black women in comparison to White men, White women, and Black men. I find that Black men and women legislators interviewed believe that racial identity is relevant in their decision making processes, while White men and women members of the Maryland state legislature had difficulty deciding whether their identities mattered and had even more trouble articulating how or why they did. African American women legislators in Maryland articulate or describe an intersectional identity as a meaningful and significant component of their work as representatives. More specifically, Black women legislators use their identity to interpret legislation differently due to their race/gender identities

The Faculty Notebook, September 2019

The Faculty Notebook is published periodically by the Office of the Provost at Gettysburg College to bring to the attention of the campus community accomplishments and activities of academic interest. Faculty are encouraged to submit materials for consideration for publication to the Associate Provost for Faculty Development. Copies of this publication are available at the Office of the Provost

Commentary on “An alternative to working on machine consciousness”, by Aaron Sloman

A commentary on a current paper by Aaron Sloman where he argues that in order to make progress in AI, consciousness (and other such unclear concepts of common-sense regarding the mind), "should be replaced by more precise and varied architecture-based concepts better suited to specify what needs to be explained by scientific theories". This original vision of philosophical inquiry as the mapping out of 'design-spaces' for a contested concept seeks to achieve a holistic, synthetic understanding of what possibilities such spaces embody and how different parameters might structure them in nomic and highly inter-connected ways. It therefore does not reduce to either "relations of ideas" or "matters of fact" in Hume's famous dichotomy. It is also shown to be in interesting ways the exact opposite of the current vogue for 'experimental philosophy'

History Begins in the Future: On Historical Sensibility in the Age of Technology

The humanities and the social sciences have been hostile to future visions in the postwar period. The most famous victim of their hostility was the enterprise of classical philosophy of history, condemned to illegitimacy precisely because of its fundamental engagement with the future. Contrary to this attitude, in this essay I argue that there is no history (neither in the sense of the course of human affairs nor in the sense of historical writing) without having a future vision in the first place. History, its very possibility, begins in the future, in the postulation of a future where further change can take place. Our notions of history, change, and the future are interdependent, they come as one package, meaning that the abandonment of one entails the abandonment of the other two. As to the current situation, although lately it became a commonplace to diagnose our age as presentist, Western societies are deeply engaged in a vision of the future revolving around artificial intelligence and the prospect of technological singularity. This technological vision is best characterized as the prospect of unprecedented change, substantially differing from Enlightenment and nineteenth-century developmental visions of future. If our notions of history, change, and the future are necessarily interdependent, and if we have a characteristically new future vision, it follows that our historical sensibility is already transformed and is accommodated to the prospect of unprecedented change. The ultimate aim of this essay is to outline this transformed historical sensibility of our technological age

But everyone else is doing it: A closer look at the occupational taxpaying culture of one business sector

When individuals embark on their careers they not only become acculturated into their occupational sectors' day-to-day norms and practices, but also their taxpaying ones. Although the research on taxpaying cultures is still in its infancy, understanding more about taxpaying cultures could improve our understanding of the processes underlying tax compliance. To this end, this study aimed to build a detailed picture of the taxpaying culture (i.e. the norms and values) of one business sector—the hairdressing/beauty industry. Nineteen small business and self-employed hairdressers/beauticians were interviewed and a variant of Grounded theory was used to uncover the main themes that ran through the interviews as a whole. The main themes that emerged—which appear to characterize this sector's culture—include a reliance on accountants/tax advisors, the notion of an acceptable level of cash-in-hand payments, and the use of different mental accounts for different types of income. Although some of these themes have already arisen in the small business literature they have often been couched in individualistic terms. We build a case that these issues are more cultural than individual—they are tied to occupational group membership as they are socially constructed within occupational groups and are a key component of the group's taxpaying culture. Implications and directions for future research are discussed

Minds, Brains and Programs

This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4