Biases in the Decision-Making Process and Possibilities of Overcoming Them

Starting from the normative approach, a decision as the outcome of the decision-making process should represent a rational choice made by a completely informed decision-maker. With the development of the behavioral perspective of the decision-making process, certain mistakes in decision-makers’ behavior have been noticed, emerging as a consequence of their limited cognitive capacities and the information asymmetry. The application of heuristics as simplified mental strategies, as well as certain deformations in decision-makers’ thinking and perception, leads to the different biases that affect their attitudes and approach to problem solving. The aim of the research study is reflected in identifying the biases that most often occur in the decision-making process, as well as their causes and consequences. The qualitative methodology of the research has been applied in parallel with the relevant methods of analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction. On the basis of the conducted empirical studies, the recommendations for overcoming biases have been defined, which represents the main result of the research study. The derived conclusions with respect to the possibilities of overcoming biases can help decision-makers to improve the decision-making process in real situations

Heuristics and normative models of judgment under uncertainty

Psychological evidence shows that probability theoryisnotaproper descriptive model of intuitive human judgment. Instead, some heuristics have been proposed as such a descriptive model. This paper argues that probability theory has limitations even as a normative model. A new normative model of judgment under uncertainty is designed under the assumption that the system's knowledge and resources are insu cient with respect to the questions that the system needs to answer. The proposed heuristics in human reasoning can also be observed inthis new model, and can be justi ed according to the assumption

The cognitive antecedents of psychosis-like (anomalous) experiences: variance within a stratified quota sample of the general population

In the general population, psychosis-like experiences have been extensively studied under the psychometric rubric of schizotypy (psychosis-proneness). As such, Phase 1 of this thesis aimed to assess the distribution of schizotypal traits and associated personality correlates displayed within a quota sample of the general population stratified by Gender and Ageband, the emphasis being upon anomalous experiences (positive schizotypy). Respondents (N = 130) completed a battery of established self-report measures assessing thirteen areas of personal experience. Correlational analysis revealed that eleven of the measures of ostensibly anomalous experiences possessed significant intercorrelations. Subsequent principal components analysis identified three factors accounting for 64.91% of the total variance; the factor accounting for the greatest proportion of variance (42.97%) was interpreted as representing a psychological disposition towards reporting ‘Anomalous Cognitions’. The other two factors are named ‘Lifeview System’ (12.60% of total variance) and ‘Social Adaptation Skills’ (9.34% of total variance). From the principal factor inclusion criteria for Phase 2 of the research are explicated. No significant mean Gender differences were revealed for the six self-report measures that provided unique contributions toward anomalous cognitions, the two self-report measures that uniquely contributed toward a lifeview system, or for the single self-report measure that uniquely contributed toward social adaptation skills. Additionally, four of the nine self-report measures which provided unique factorial contributions generated significant mean differences between Agebands, with a further three providing trends toward significant mean differences. Implications for the role of anomalous cognitions, a framework for a lifeview system, and social adaptation skills with regard to psychosis-proneness are discussed. From the primary factor (anomalous cognitions), three experimental groups were identified for cognitive testing: respondents scoring 1) ≤ 20th percentile; 2) 10% ± the mean; and 3) ≥ 80th percentile. This procedure provided a total of 78 participants (three x 26) for Phase 2 testing. Phase 2 of this thesis sought to identify some of the cognitive mechanisms underpinning subclinical anomalous cognitions with a view to deciphering which measures best predicted experimental group membership. A comprehensive literature review highlighted six domains of cognition, five accompanying self-report measures, and two measures of intelligence functioning (verbal and fluid/visuoconstructive), which, following previous research, were utilised as covariate measures. Based on prescribed delineation points, participants were allocated, according to scores on the primary factor from Phase 1, to one of three experimental groups (low-, mid, and high-anomalous cognitions). Of the six cognitive domains—1) sustained visual attention; 2) false (illusory) memory; 3) probability reasoning (decision making); 4) object recognition; 5) reality monitoring; and 6) self-monitoring—four succeeded in eliciting significant mean differences between experimental groups with the noted exceptions of sustained visual attention and self-monitoring. Subsequent canonical discriminant analyses identified that the best predictors of XPG membership were the number of critical lures recognised on the false memory test, the number of correct responses and confidence when uncertain on the object recognition test, plus two self-report measures pertaining to comorbid psychopathology and the vividness of visual imagery. In light of previous research, the inclusion of fasle (illusory) memory biases, the comorbidity of mental pathology (especially, depressive and anxiety-related symptoms), and the vividness of visual imagery are unsurprising; however, the two object recognition variables (the ‘number of correct responses’ and ‘confidence when uncertain’) offer exciting avenues for future research into the continuum of psychosis. Moreover, the ‘confidence when uncertain’ data from the object recognition test (perceptual) and the probability reasoning (decision making) data from the Beads test suggest that cognitive underconfidence may well be an enduring personality disposition in those reporting elevated levels of anomalous cognitions, including positive and disorganised schizotypal personality traits. The results of Phase 2 add confirmatory evidence to previous research suggestive of memory and perceptual biases plus comorbid psychopathology and the vividness of visual imagery as being integral to the psychogenesis of psychosis-like (anomalous) symptomatology

Heuristics and Normative Models of Judgment under Uncertainty

Psychological evidence shows that probability theory is not a proper descriptive model of intuitive human judgment. Instead, some heuristics have been proposed as such a descriptive model. This paper argues that probability theory has limitations even as a normative model. A new normative model of judgment under uncertainty is designed under the assumption that the system's knowledge and resources are insufficient with respect to the questions that the system needs to answer. The proposed heuristics in human reasoning can also be observed in this new model, and can be justified according to the assumption. KEYWORDS: Subjective probability, normative and descriptive models, heuristics and bias, insufficient knowledge and resources, non-axiomatic reasoning system. 1. Introduction The study of human judgment under uncertainty reveals systematic discrepancy between actual human behaviors and conclusions of probability This work is supported by a research assistantship from the Center fo..