Eco-terrorism or Eco-tage: An Argument for the Proper Frame

What does the term “terrorism” mean? Is it accurate to lump illegal acts that destroy property but carefully avoid harming people into the same category as acts clearly intended to kill? Is this a difference of kind or just of degree? While we (the authors) don\u27t generally endorse the destruction of property as a method of generating social change, we believe that the destruction of property is fundamentally different from the intentional killing of people; therefore, to label acts of obstruction, trespassing, vandalism, sabotage, or arson as “terrorism” is inaccurate and has the potential to damage one\u27s understanding of real acts of terrorism, thereby reducing the potency of the term. We started this project with a hunch. In recent years, we have observed frequent use of the term “eco-terrorism,” in the news media and in conversations, in reference to the acts of environmentalists. Our observations were anecdotal, and we wanted to be sure they were accurate. We found no literature analyzing cultural acceptance of the term “eco-terrorism”; therefore, before embarking on an ethical analysis of this phenomenon, we set out to confirm our casual observation that the term was widely used in the United States. We conducted an analysis of the use of the term in US newspapers across a period of nearly 11 years. Our analysis indicates broad acceptance of the term among both journalists and their sources, making it all the more important to understand both the history and the implications of labeling obstruction, trespassing, vandalism, sabotage, and arson as “eco-terrorism.

Understanding digital intelligence and the norms that might govern it

Abstract: This paper describes the nature of digital intelligence and provides context for the material published as a result of the actions of National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. It looks at the dynamic interaction between demands from government and law enforcement for digital intelligence, and at the new possibilities that digital technology has opened up for meeting such demands. The adequacy of previous regimes of legal powers and governance arrangements is seriously challenged just at a time when the objective need for intelligence on the serious threats facing civil society is apparent. This paper suggests areas where it might be possible to derive international norms, regarded as promoting standards of accepted behaviour that might gain widespread, if not universal, international acceptance, for the safe practice of digital intelligence

Technological nightmares: Frederick S. Pardee distinguished lecture, October 2003

A version of this essay was delivered in October 2003 as the Frederick S. Pardee Distinguished Lecture at Boston University.Paul Streeten, 2003–2004 Pardee Visiting Professor of Future Studies at the Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, discusses the topic of technological progress—namely, the negative consequences often attributed to such progress. Advancements in technology are unfairly tied to things like pollution and environmental degradation, he says, and for decades, doomsayers have wrongly predicted that the world is coming to an end. Streeten insists that economic progress doesn’t have to have negative results. For starters, it’s important to remember that there are benefits to technological advancements, he says, such as the production of new goods, prolonged life, better health, and more. These advancements improve society. There are also other ways to accomplish economic growth, Streenten says. Our society can opt to produce different kinds of goods, such as hydrogen-fueled cars that don’t pollute the air. Or, quality of goods aside, perhaps we can promote faster production of goods to compensate for negative production effects. Streeten offers several growth options, discussing the merit and practicality of each

Do Not Advertise: The Current Fight Against Unsolicited Advertisements

Have you ever received a phone call from a telemarketer during dinner? Do e-mails entitled Protect Your Computer Against Viruses for $9.95 or GET A FREE PASS TO THOUSANDS OF XXX SITES annoy you? Are you tired of watching advertisements that continue after the posted start time for a movie? Many Americans are irritated with the amount of daily interruptions caused by the current lack of advertising regulations. In some instances, the advertisers shift their marketing costs to unwilling e-mail users or moviegoers. This article focuses on unsolicited communications and potential solutions to the seemingly endless problem of spam

Data on Demand

It is 2022, and for many, the concept of data tracking is nothing new. Perhaps you have heard that same story from friends and family about how companies like Facebook and Google use data to track your behavior. Maybe you have had that funny coincidence where you post about your new workout routine and suddenly find yourself inundated with ads for new exercise equipment. Whatever the case may be, this is not that fleeting remark about how tech giants are looming over our shoulders. Neither is this a technical dissection of what data is. Instead, this is a dispassionate and simplified analysis of the other side of data that lies behind the concerns of many being raised today. Read on knowing that this analysis is truly one half of the topic of data, not out of bias but because this side of the topic has yet to be critically conveyed in a manner that is digestible enough for consumers of all backgrounds. The goal of this essay is to bridge that gap, providing an explanation to the rationale of such concerns, and informing you of the role your data plays in today’s digital climate. This essay will not assume value judgements or conclude what is taking place is right or wrong; the question of ethics and legality is up to you. If, however, in the end, you are motivated to make a change, some potential options will be listed at the end of this essay. Lastly, if you have nothing to hide or do not use mainstream social media, don’t click away, you may find more relevance in this essay than you might have expected

Trump's travel bans. Harvesting personal data and requiem for the EU-US Privacy Shield. CEPS Policy Insights No. 2017/03, April 2017

This Policy Insight examines the main implications and challenges of the recent Executive Orders or ‘travel bans’ issued by US President Donald Trump. It argues that one of the key ulterior motives behind these orders is to manoeuvre the US into an advantageous position for harvesting personal data on individuals from around the world, including EU citizens and residents. The paper analyses these orders and other recent US legislative developments that allow for greater access and processing of raw communications of EU citizens, and argues that they put the sustainability of the EU-US Privacy Shield and the EU right to privacy under profound strain. The authors call for more diplomacy and democratic rule of law with fundamental rights guarantees and cooperation, as the most effective antidote to the pervasive mistrust and legal uncertainty engendered by these Executive Orders. In any case these developments call for the European Commission to take an assertive position and suspend the EU-US Privacy Shield, as this is the only way to ensure legal certainty for companies, citizens and authorities in the EU. This would also send a clear signal to the US about the absolute need to take into account the conflicts of law challengesthat these orders pose for the EU and member states' data protection legal systems. The paper also recommends re-designing and strengthening the current EU-US Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue between the European Parliament and its US counterparts to better allow for a closer consultation on relevant US and EU policies with deep repercussions on transatlantic relations and citizens across the board

The Perilous Dialogue

The master metaphor in the national security dialogue is, indeed, “security or freedom”. It dominates the counterterrorist discourse both in the United States and abroad. Transcripts from debates in Ireland’s Dáil Éireann, Turkey’s Büyük Millet Meclisi, and Australia’s Parliament are filled with reference to the need to weigh the value of liberty against the threat posed by terrorism. Perhaps nowhere is this more pronounced than in the United Kingdom, where, for decades, counterterrorist debates have turned on this framing. Owing in part, though, to different constitutional structures, what “security or freedom” means in America differs from what it means in Britain. In the United States, we tend to treat “security” and “freedom” as distinct phenomena: policy considerations set against pre-existing, political rights. Security becomes linked to decisions taken by the executive to preserve life—e.g., heightening protection against terrorist attacks by restricting entitlements specified in the Bill of Rights. Thus, Judge Richard Posner argues that in dangerous times, we must adjust constitutional rights to meet the demands of security. Professors Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner propose “a basic tradeoff between security and liberty.” As Professor Holmes points out, the tradeoff framework is not limited to those who come down more heavily on the security side of the equation; civil libertarians also refer to the framework, arguing for the protection of rights in the face of security demands. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, scholars and policy makers tend to consider security versus freedom as a case of competing rights: the right to life or the right to freedom from fear set against the right to move freely. As Prime Minister Tony Blair announced on 9/11, the exercise of state power would be necessary to protect “the basic civil liberty that people have to go about their business free form [sic] terror.” This framing—competing rights in tension—reflects Britain’s constitutional structure. Measures introduced by Parliament do not have to conform to a written constitution. While some documents, such as the 1215 Magna Carta, or the 1689 Bill of Rights, carry special significance, they are part of a broader system that encompasses legal and non-legal rules. The multiplicity and fluidity of rights, and the constant effort to balance them, reflect Britain’s relationship with Europe, where the European Convention on Human Rights (incorporated into British domestic law through the 1998 Human Rights Act) and European Communities law weave together to create a complex system of rights and rules protecting them. Despite the manner in which the United States and United Kingdom interpret “security or freedom,” reflective of their respective constitutional differences, in both countries the dichotomy between rights and security dominates the counterterrorist discourse. And in both regions, because the dichotomy ignores in its narrow terms of reference the far-reaching effects of counterterrorism, it stifles the debate. The “hydraulic” assumption inherent in the “security or freedom” framework overlooks the possibility that rules—indeed, the rule of law itself—provide security. There are multiple types of securities and liberties at stake. And the framework distorts the “real tradeoffs” that are being made, such as the risks inevitably entailed in the allocation of limited resources. Most importantly, “security or freedom” fails to capture the single most important characteristic of counterterrorist law: increased executive power that shifts the balance of power between the branches of government. This article suggests that at each point where the legislature would be expected to push back against the executive’s power—at the introduction of measures, at the renewal of temporary provisions, and in the exercise of oversight—its ability to do so is limited. The judiciary’s role is similarly restricted: constitutional structure and cultural norms narrow the courts’ ability to check the executive at anything but the margins. With the long-term political and economic effects of this expanded executive strength masked by the immediacy of the “security or freedom” dichotomy, the true costs of anti-terror legislation in the United States and in the United Kingdom have gone uncalculated. Over the past four decades, both countries have seen the relationship between governmental branches altered, individual rights narrowed, and the relationship of the citizens to the state changed. Counterterrorist law has alienated important domestic and international communities, created bureaucratic inefficiencies, and interrupted commercial activity. As these two countries set global counterterrorist norms through important multilateral and bilateral organizations, such as the United Nations (“UN”), the UN Security Council, the G7/G8, and the Financial Action Task Force, the risk increases that these detrimental effects will be transferred to other constitutional democracies. American and British provisions, moreover, have evolved outside the specter of terrorist groups actually using weapons of mass destruction to inflict mass casualties. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—and I would add biological weapons to Professor Holmes’s concern about fissile material—together with a growing willingness on the part of extremists to sacrifice themselves, may drive the two countries to take increasingly severe measures. Such provisions could lead to a shift in the basic constitutional structure of both countries

Classifying network attack scenarios using an ontology

This paper presents a methodology using network attack ontology to classify computer-based attacks. Computer network attacks differ in motivation, execution and end result. Because attacks are diverse, no standard classification exists. If an attack could be classified, it could be mitigated accordingly. A taxonomy of computer network attacks forms the basis of the ontology. Most published taxonomies present an attack from either the attacker's or defender's point of view. This taxonomy presents both views. The main taxonomy classes are: Actor, Actor Location, Aggressor, Attack Goal, Attack Mechanism, Attack Scenario, Automation Level, Effects, Motivation, Phase, Scope and Target. The "Actor" class is the entity executing the attack. The "Actor Location" class is the Actor‟s country of origin. The "Aggressor" class is the group instigating an attack. The "Attack Goal" class specifies the attacker‟s goal. The "Attack Mechanism" class defines the attack methodology. The "Automation Level" class indicates the level of human interaction. The "Effects" class describes the consequences of an attack. The "Motivation" class specifies incentives for an attack. The "Scope" class describes the size and utility of the target. The "Target" class is the physical device or entity targeted by an attack. The "Vulnerability" class describes a target vulnerability used by the attacker. The "Phase" class represents an attack model that subdivides an attack into different phases. The ontology was developed using an "Attack Scenario" class, which draws from other classes and can be used to characterize and classify computer network attacks. An "Attack Scenario" consists of phases, has a scope and is attributed to an actor and aggressor which have a goal. The "Attack Scenario" thus represents different classes of attacks. High profile computer network attacks such as Stuxnet and the Estonia attacks can now be been classified through the “Attack Scenario” class