167 research outputs found
Cooperative arrangements for water sharing and ecosystem protection under scarcity and drought in the Jucar Basin, Spain
The research has been supported
by projects BIL13MA072 from MAPFRE and project INIA RTA2010-00109-C04 from
the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness.PublishedThis Working Document draws from the second chapter of the Ph.D. dissertation by
Mohamed Taher Kahil âWater management policies under scarcity and climate change:
Analysis of economic instruments, institutions and collective actionâ, Department of
Economic Analysis of the University of Zaragoza, Spain
Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 3. application to water resources
This paper reviews various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of water resources. With an increase in the competition over various water resources, the incidents of disputes have been in the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of various water uses, such as multi-objective water projects, irrigation, groundwater, hydropower, urban water supply, wastewater, and transboundary water disputes. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce water resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. In particular, the various approaches for cost sharing and for allocation of physical water infrastructure and flow can serve as a basis for stable and efficient agreement, such that long-term investments in water projects are profitable and sustainable. The latter point is especially important, given recent developments in water policy in various countries and regional institutions such as the European Union (Water Framework Directive), calling for full cost recovery of investments and operation and maintenance in water projects. The CGT approaches discussed and demonstrated in this paper can provide a solid basis for finding possible and stable cost-sharing arrangements.Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Water Supply and Systems,Water and Industry
Jåtékelméleti kutatåsok = Investigations in Game Theory
A jĂĄtĂ©kelmĂ©let kĂŒlönbözĆ kĂ©rdĂ©sköreiben vĂ©gzett kutatĂĄsaink eredmĂ©nyeit eddig 9 nemzetközi Ă©s 5 hazai folyĂłiratban, valamint 2 szerkesztett kötetben mĂĄr megjelent cikkben közöltĂŒk (Ă©s tovĂĄbbi 2-4 nemzetközi cikkre szĂĄmĂtunk). EredmĂ©nyeinket több mint 30 nemzetközi, illetve hazai konferencia elĆadĂĄsban is bemutattuk. Legfontosabb eredmĂ©nyeink: âą Megmutattuk, hogy a Nash-fĂ©le alkuproblĂ©mĂĄkra ismert implementĂĄciĂłs modellek ĂĄtalakĂtĂĄsĂĄval megkaphatĂł a limit-Nash megoldĂĄs is. âą BevezettĂŒk a puha korrelĂĄlt egyensĂșly fogalmĂĄt. Bemutattuk, hogy ez az Ășj korrelĂĄlt egyensĂșly több modellben Pareto-Ă©rtelemben jobb megoldĂĄst eredmĂ©nyez, mint mĂĄs korrelĂĄlt egyensĂșlyok. âą Megmutattuk, hogy a hozzĂĄrendelĂ©si piacokon bĂĄrmelyik szereplĆ eredmĂ©nyesen tudja manipulĂĄlni a âfair egyensĂșlyiâ, illetve a nukleolusz allokĂĄciĂłs mechanizmust, ugyanakkor Ă©les felsĆ korlĂĄtokat is megadtunk ennek mĂ©rtĂ©kĂ©re. âą KarakterizĂĄltuk a stabil halmazokat az egy-eladĂłs hozzĂĄrendelĂ©si jĂĄtĂ©kokban. âą KĂŒlönfĂ©le jĂĄtĂ©kosztĂĄlyokon megvizsgĂĄltuk a Shapley-Ă©rtĂ©k fĆbb karakterizĂĄciĂłjainak Ă©rvĂ©nyessĂ©gĂ©t. Erre alapozva javasoltuk a Shapley-Ă©rtĂ©k âmĂ©rĂ©si eszközkĂ©ntâ valĂł hasznĂĄlatĂĄt a regressziĂłs modellekben, az ĂĄltalĂĄnosĂtott szavazĂĄsi helyzetekben, illetve a rizikĂł allokĂĄciĂłs problĂ©mĂĄkban. âą Megmutattuk, hogy nincsen univerzĂĄlis topologikus tĂpustĂ©r, a HarsĂĄnyi-program ilyen tĂpusterekben tehĂĄt nem mƱködik. Ugyanakkor matematikailag megalapoztunk egy ilyen jellegƱ, a mĂ©rhetĆ tĂpusterekre vonatkozĂł pozitĂv eredmĂ©nyt. | We have investigated various topics in game theory and published so far 9 articles in international journals (and expect to have 2-4 more), 5 articles in domestic journals, 2 papers in an edited volume. We have also presented our results in more than 30 talks at international and domestic conferences. Our main contributions include (but not limited to) the following: âą We adjusted various implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems to obtain the limit-Nash solution as well. âą We introduced a new correlation protocol. We demonstrated in several settings that this new (called soft) correlated equilibrium can give Pareto-better outcomes than what other correlated equilibria can. âą We showed that in assignment markets each agent can manipulate the âfair equilibriumâ and the nucleolus allocation mechanisms to his benefit, but established sharp upper bounds to its extent. âą We characterized stable sets in assignment games with one-seller. âą We examined several characterizations of the Shapley value on various classes of games. Based on these results, we proposed using the Shapley-value as a âmeasurementâ tool in regression models, in generalized weighted voting situations, and in risk allocation problems. âą We have demonstrated that the HarsĂĄnyi program does not work in topological type spaces, therefore no universal topological type space exists. We have laid the mathematical foundation of a positive result on measurable type spaces
Water management under scarcity and climate change: methodological proposals and analysis of policy instruments
Esta tesis aborda algunos de los desafĂos mĂĄs importantes en relaciĂłn a los recursos hĂdricos de las zonas ĂĄridas y semiĂĄridas. Estos desafĂos incluyen la creciente escasez de agua, los impactos del cambio climĂĄtico, y la degradaciĂłn generalizada de los ecosistemas acuĂĄticos. Los cuatro capĂtulos principales presentan el desarrollo de distintos mĂ©todos de modelizaciĂłn hidroeconĂłmica que integran aspectos hidrolĂłgicos, econĂłmicos, institucionales y medioambientales, y que se aplican al caso de la cuenca del JĂșcar en España. Los capĂtulos ofrecen una descripciĂłn detallada del proceso de modelizaciĂłn, los anĂĄlisis realizados, y las principales conclusiones e implicaciones. Sin embargo, los modelos tambiĂ©n pueden aplicarse a otras cuencas de las zonas ĂĄridas y semiĂĄridas. Las metodologĂas desarrolladas en esta tesis representan un conjunto de herramientas muy prometedoras para realizar anĂĄlisis integrados de los escenarios climĂĄticos y de polĂtica de agua. Los resultados obtenidos proporcionan informaciĂłn Ăștil para el diseño de polĂticas de gestiĂłn sostenible de los recursos hĂdricos. En esta tesis se consideran varios mĂ©todos para mejorar los modelos de anĂĄlisis de la polĂtica de agua. Estos avances metodolĂłgicos estĂĄn relacionados con el proceso de integraciĂłn de las diferentes dimensiones de los recursos hĂdricos, la mejora de los aspectos estocĂĄsticos y dinĂĄmicos de los modelos, y la inclusiĂłn del comportamiento estratĂ©gico de los grupos de interĂ©s. No existen muchos estudios en la literatura que consideren conjuntamente las cuestiones de modelizaciĂłn y de implementaciĂłn de las polĂticas de agua. Los resultados empĂricos muestran el potencial de los modelos hidroeconĂłmicos integrados para evaluar los impactos econĂłmicos y medioambientales de las polĂticas de agua bajo distintos escenarios climĂĄticos. La modelizaciĂłn parcial basada solamente en las relaciones econĂłmicas, pero sin un fundamento biofĂsico sĂłlido, no pueden determinar con rigor estos impactos que son importantes para la toma de decisiĂłn en la gestiĂłn de los recursos hĂdricos. Los resultados de esta tesis tienen implicaciones polĂticas importantes porque muestran las dificultades para lograr una gestiĂłn mĂĄs sostenible de los recursos hĂdricos en las regiones ĂĄridas y semiĂĄridas. La toma de decisiones es compleja para poder resolver los impactos de la escasez de agua, las sequĂas y el cambio climĂĄtico en las actividades econĂłmicas y los ecosistemas de las cuencas. Los gobiernos pueden implementar varias polĂticas para mitigar dichos impactos, tales como la promociĂłn de la gestiĂłn cooperativa de los recursos hĂdricos, facilitar la implementaciĂłn de mercados de agua, y proporcionar incentivos econĂłmicos para el ahorro del agua. Sin embargo, los decisores polĂticos deben ser conscientes de las consecuencias adversas de la mala planificaciĂłn hĂdrica, como son los impactos medioambientales negativos. TambiĂ©n deben considerar la aceptabilidad de las polĂticas por los grupos de interĂ©s, para evitar el fracaso de las polĂticas
A Political Reciprocity Mechanism
We consider the problem of designing legislative mechanisms that guarantee equilibrium existence, Pareto-efficiency, and inclusiveness. To address this question, we propose a finite-horizon voting procedure that embeds clauses of reciprocity. These clauses grant voters the right to oppose actions that are not in their interest, retract actions that face opposition, and punish harmful actions. We study voters\u27 strategic behavior under this voting procedure using two classical approaches. Following the blocking approach, we introduce two related solution concepts---the reciprocity set and the sophisticated reciprocity set---to predict equilibrium policies. We then show that these solution concepts (1) are always non-empty; (2) only select Pareto-efficient policies; (3) strategically protect minority interests; and (4) are compatible with classical notions of fairness and Rawlsian justice in distributive problems. Following the non-cooperative approach, we provide an implementation of each of these solution concepts in subgame perfect equilibrium, which makes them applicable in a wide range of legislative settings. We also extend them to effectivity functions, a large class of games that includes strategic form games. A comparative analysis shows that the reciprocity mechanism has other desirable features and properties that distinguish it from other well-known voting mechanisms and solution concepts
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