Group influence on blogs design behaviour

Issues of national culture influence on web design behaviour have been rampant and stimulating on static web pages across the globe. The emergence of a new breed of publication-type web page brought about by the advancement of web technology however, saw a different species of online communication groups. Bloggers as these groups are called; used blogs as their communication and publication tool to distinguish themselves from other websites and online social media users. Since bloggers are groups that are recognised and credited to cultivate their own culture, the idea that national culture has an influence on blogs design behaviour and preferences may have been weakened. Bloggers groups themselves would be the influential factor that determines design preferences of bloggers in a network of blogs. To address the issue, this paper has conducted an assessment on blogs from six countries using content analysis method, national culture traits and SIDE model to ascertain design features characteristics and behaviour. Results from both the global and local blogs in each country showed that blogs design preferences in one country differ between both the global and local bloggers. Furthermore, global bloggers design preferences in countries under observation are found to be similar to one another

Interest group influence on EU policy-making: A quantitative analysis across issues

This paper presents a large-scale empirical analysis of interest group influence on EU policy-making across a wide range of issues. The explanation of policy outcomes as well as the democratic legitimacy of the EU crucially depends on how much influence interest groups have and how influence is distributed among them. However, only few studies have addressed the question of influence and most are limited to case studies focusing only on one single issue. Recent literature however suggests that interest group influence varies considerably across issues. It is assumed that influence is not a mere function of interest group characteristics, but strongly shaped by the issue context. The lack of large-N studies controling for issue variables is mainly due to methodological difficulties in measuring influence. Hence, this paper employs a new approach: Drawing on a quantitative text analysis performed with Wordfish, policy preferences of interest groups will be compared with the policy proposal in order to identify the winners and the losers of the decision-making process. While controling for interest group characteristics, the effect of issue-related variables on interest group influence will be tested across 15 policy issues

The Pace of Progress at Superfund Sites: Policy Goals and Interest Group Influence

Bureaucracies may set priorities for their workload according to social goals or the desires of concentrated private interests. This paper explores bureaucratic priorities empirically by studying Superfund, the federal program for cleaning up contaminated sites. It examines the amount of time that sites on Superfund's National Priorities List require to complete three states from listing to cleanup, using an econometric method for multiple sequential durations. The empirical results provide little evidence that the EPA prioritizes sites according to their harms. By contrast, concentrated private interests, such as liable parties and local communities, play an important role in the EPA's priorities. Delays caused by liable parties may reduce net benefits of cleanup by 8%. This result suggests a benefit from funding provision of environmental quality and other public goods through diffuse sources, such as broad-based taxes, to avoid the detrimental effects of such concentrated interests.

Term limits and interest group influence.

Supporters of term limits argued that they would decrease interest group influence. Using data from 24 states from 1998 to 2008, this paper finds that this assumption is not the case. This analysis finds that states with term limits have higher numbers of lobbyists and campaign contributions than those states without term limits. This suggests that interest groups have become more entrenched in term limited states and have become more influence in the inexperience legislatures

The question of interest group influence

"Interest groups are a major channel through which citizens can express their opinions to decision-makers. Their participation in policymaking may improve decision-making processes by supporting policies that are in line with citizen preferences and blocking policies that solely reflect the interests of the governing elite. At the same time, however, intense interest group pressures may make it difficult for policy-makers to implement the most efficient policies since such policies often impose costs on parts of the public.Competition among interest groups over the distribution of economic gains may also slow down the rate of economic growth (Olson 1982). Finally, if some groups constantly win, interest group politics may undermine the legitimacy of electorally accountable decision making in a democracy. A normative assessment of the role of interest groups in democracies thus crucially depends upon how much power interest groups have, and how power is distributed among different groups. Moreover, an understanding of the role of interest groups in the policymaking process is essential for explanations of policy outcomes. Finally, analysts trying to advise government on policies also have to be aware of the power of interest groups, as this factor determines the political feasibility of different suggestions. In short, research into variations in influence across groups and political systems is important for a series of reasons. Recognising this fact, political scientists have long engaged in theoretical debates on this issue." (excerpt

Group Influence On Individual Risk Taking 1

Does group interaction lead to greater conservatism or to greater risk taking in decisions than would obtain were the decisions arrived at individually.–or is there an averaging effect? This question was investigated with a procedure in which the protagonist in each of 12 everyday life situations must choose between two courses of action, one of which involves considerably more risk than the other but also is much more rewarding if successful. The S must decide on the lowest level of probability for the success of the risky alternative that he would deem sufficient to warrant its choice. A total of 218 liberal arts university students participated in the study. In the experimental condition, the S s first arrived at individual decisions concerning each of the 12 situations; then, they were brought together in discussion groups of six with the request that they reach a group consensus on each decision; and afterward, they were asked to make all their decisions privately once again. Some S s also made private decisions yet another time two to six weeks later. The group members' judgments of one another's relative degrees of influence and of popularity within the group also were obtained. There were 14 all‐male and 14 all‐female groups. In the control condition, S s made their decisions individually each of two times with one week intervening, under instructions the second time that encouraged them to change rather than simply to recall their earlier decisions. It was found that (1) group decisions exhibit greater risk taking than appears in pre‐discussion individual decisions; (2) post‐discussion private decisions exhibit the same increase in risk taking as occurs in the group decisions; (3) the increase in risk taking resulting from the discussion process is still maintained after a subsequent period of two to six weeks has elapsed; (4) no shift in risk taking level occurs over time in the absence of the discussion process; and (5) degree of risk taking in pre‐discussion individual decisions and degree of judged influence within the group are positively related. Two interpretations of these findings were suggested, either or both of which may apply: (1) the knowledge that one's decisions are being made jointly with others leads to a diffusion of personal responsiblity, the outcome of which is an increased willingness to take risks; (2) high risk takers are more likely to take the initiative in social situations, with the result that they become more influential in the group.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/108371/1/ets200112.pd

An empirical application of the median voter model and of the interest group influence model to the Portuguese and Galician municipalities

The analysis of the median voter hypothesis indicates that a more realistic comprehension of local public choice might be achieved with the opening of the median voter model to the interst group influence hypothesis. A non-nested specification that combines the two models is estimated and its results are compared to the median voter model (MVM) and to the interest group influence model (IGM) results. The empirical analysis is developed for the Portuguese and the Galician municipalities. In addition, I tested the hypothesis of the relative political power of the median voter and of interest groups to vary with the dimension of the population of the municipalities. Finally, I analyse the existence of institutional and political differences between the two territories and their effects on the results. Fiscal illusion is compared for Portugal and Galicia.

Investigating Community or Peer Group Influence among Early Adolescents

Having friends or being part of a friendship or peer group is a significant social achievement for adolescents and an indicator of social competence (Berndt, 1990). Whilst it has been acknowledged that child peer influence varies with age, gender and product situations, previous findings do not consider adolescent peer influence in relation to the family structure and type. This paper considers how peer groups or "communities" influence consumption of music during early adolescence and how this consumption is moderated by family type (intact, blended or single)

Interest Group Influence on Political Parties in Western Democracies

This thesis asks when and why interest groups influence political parties. I address this question in two ways: 1) by examining the organizational ties between parties and interest groups, given that party-interest group ties may constitute an important step on groups' way to influence, and 2) by more directly examining interest group influence on parties. By doing this, the thesis contributes to the literatures on interest group influence, party positions, and party-interest group ties. Paper I examines the relationship between private and public party finance and party-interest group organizational ties. The paper lends systematic support to the idea that groups and parties are more likely to maintain closer relationships today when the groups donate money. The institutional setting the actors operate in may furthermore affect ties.Paper II gives an overview of the Party-Interest Group Relationships in Contemporary Democracies (PAIRDEM) datasets, and presents descriptive results regarding the organizational ties parties and interest groups maintain today. Paper III considers the relationship between parties' goals and interest group influence on parties. I find that interest groups are more likely to perceive that they influence parties they are ideologically similar to as well as parties that are more willing to compromise on policy. Interest groups' access to parties moreover seems to be an important mechanism here. Paper IV asks whether organizational ties affect one-sided interest group influence on parties as well as mutual party-interest group influence. We find positive correlations between stronger ties and both types of influence.Paper V asks when parties listen to interest groups and adopt their input. I find that parties are more likely to do this when 1) the issue in question is less publicly salient, 2) parties emphasize the issue more than their competitors, 3) the interest group input is supported by a larger and/or more coordinated interest group coalition, and 4) parties are in opposition