Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing

We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player follows such a strategy, then the joint mixed strategy profiles converge, almost surely, to a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The procedure requires very little in terms of players' information about the game. In fact, players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs and, in a variant of the strategy, players need not even know that their payoffs are determined through other players' actions. The procedure works for general finite games and is based on appropriate modifications of a simple stochastic learning rule introduced by Foster and Young

Algebraic Geometry Of Perfect And Sequential Equilibrium, Sets Of Sequential And Perfect Equilibrium Strategy Profiles Are Identical For Almost All Assignments Of Payoffs To Outcomes, Competitive Equilibria In Semi-Algebraic Economies, Semi-Algebraic Corr

Algebraic Geometry Of Perfect And Sequential Equilibrium, Sets Of Sequential And Perfect Equilibrium Strategy Profiles Are Identical For Almost All Assignments Of Payoffs To Outcomes, Competitive Equilibria In Semi-Algebraic Economies, Semi-Algebraic Correspondence That Maps Parameters To Positive Numbers, Multiplicity In Applied General Equilibrium, Algorithmic Approach Toward The Tracing Procedure For Bi-Matrix Games, Geometrical Approach To Two-Dimensional Conformal Field Theory, Consideration Of Topology Changing Amplitudes, Study Of Rational Models Is In Its Rigidity Very Analogous To Finite Group Theory, Global Nash Convergence Of Foster And Young's Regret Testing, Regret-Based Learning, Stochastic Dynamics; Random Search; Uncoupled Dynamics; Unknown Games; Global Convergence To Nash... The full paper: http://www.iiste.org/PDFshare/APTA-PAGENO-724181-730495.pd