Payoff-Based Dynamics for Multiplayer Weakly Acyclic Games

We consider repeated multiplayer games in which players repeatedly and simultaneously choose strategies from a finite set of available strategies according to some strategy adjustment process. We focus on the specific class of weakly acyclic games, which is particularly relevant for multiagent cooperative control problems. A strategy adjustment process determines how players select their strategies at any stage as a function of the information gathered over previous stages. Of particular interest are “payoff-based” processes in which, at any stage, players know only their own actions and (noise corrupted) payoffs from previous stages. In particular, players do not know the actions taken by other players and do not know the structural form of payoff functions. We introduce three different payoff-based processes for increasingly general scenarios and prove that, after a sufficiently large number of stages, player actions constitute a Nash equilibrium at any stage with arbitrarily high probability. We also show how to modify player utility functions through tolls and incentives in so-called congestion games, a special class of weakly acyclic games, to guarantee that a centralized objective can be realized as a Nash equilibrium. We illustrate the methods with a simulation of distributed routing over a network

Algorithm Portfolios for Noisy Optimization

Noisy optimization is the optimization of objective functions corrupted by noise. A portfolio of solvers is a set of solvers equipped with an algorithm selection tool for distributing the computational power among them. Portfolios are widely and successfully used in combinatorial optimization. In this work, we study portfolios of noisy optimization solvers. We obtain mathematically proved performance (in the sense that the portfolio performs nearly as well as the best of its solvers) by an ad hoc portfolio algorithm dedicated to noisy optimization. A somehow surprising result is that it is better to compare solvers with some lag, i.e., propose the current recommendation of best solver based on their performance earlier in the run. An additional finding is a principled method for distributing the computational power among solvers in the portfolio.Comment: in Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, Springer Verlag, 201