Minds, Brains and Programs

This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4

Making metaethics work for AI: realism and anti-realism

Engineering an artificial intelligence to play an advisory role in morally charged decision making will inevitably introduce meta-ethical positions into the design. Some of these positions, by informing the design and operation of the AI, will introduce risks. This paper offers an analysis of these potential risks along the realism/anti-realism dimension in metaethics and reveals that realism poses greater risks, but, on the other hand, anti-realism undermines the motivation for engineering a moral AI in the first place

Fundamental Strings and D-strings in the IIB Matrix Model

The matrix model for IIB Superstring proposed by Ishibashi, Kawai, Kitazawa and Tsuchiya is investigated. Consideration of planar and non-planar diagrams suggests that the large N perturbative expansion is consistent with the double scaling limit proposed by the above authors. We write down a Wilson loop that can be interpreted as a fundamental string vertex operator. The one point tadpole in the presence of a D-string has the right form and this can be viewed as a matrix model derivation of the boundary conditions that define a D-string. We also argue that if world sheet coordinates $\sigma$ and $\tau$ are introduced for the fundamental string, then the conjugate variable ${d}/{d\sigma}$ and ${d}/{d\tau}$ can be interpreted as the D-string world sheet coordinates. In this way the $SL(2Z)$ duality group of the IIB superstring becomes identified with the symplectic group acting on ($p,q$).Comment: 21 pages, Latex file. Two references added and two figures include

Automation of play:theorizing self-playing games and post-human ludic agents

This article offers a critical reflection on automation of play and its significance for the theoretical inquiries into digital games and play. Automation has become an ever more noticeable phenomenon in the domain of video games, expressed by self-playing game worlds, self-acting characters, and non-human agents traversing multiplayer spaces. On the following pages, the author explores various instances of automated non-human play and proposes a post-human theoretical lens, which may help to create a new framework for the understanding of videogames, renegotiate the current theories of interaction prevalent in game studies, and rethink the relationship between human players and digital games