On Generalizing Decidable Standard Prefix Classes of First-Order Logic

Recently, the separated fragment (SF) of first-order logic has been introduced. Its defining principle is that universally and existentially quantified variables may not occur together in atoms. SF properly generalizes both the Bernays-Sch\"onfinkel-Ramsey (BSR) fragment and the relational monadic fragment. In this paper the restrictions on variable occurrences in SF sentences are relaxed such that universally and existentially quantified variables may occur together in the same atom under certain conditions. Still, satisfiability can be decided. This result is established in two ways: firstly, by an effective equivalence-preserving translation into the BSR fragment, and, secondly, by a model-theoretic argument. Slight modifications to the described concepts facilitate the definition of other decidable classes of first-order sentences. The paper presents a second fragment which is novel, has a decidable satisfiability problem, and properly contains the Ackermann fragment and---once more---the relational monadic fragment. The definition is again characterized by restrictions on the occurrences of variables in atoms. More precisely, after certain transformations, Skolemization yields only unary functions and constants, and every atom contains at most one universally quantified variable. An effective satisfiability-preserving translation into the monadic fragment is devised and employed to prove decidability of the associated satisfiability problem.Comment: 34 page

Invariance and Necessity

Properties and relations in general have a certain degree of invariance, and some types of properties/relations have a stronger degree of invariance than others. In this paper I will show how the degrees of invariance of different types of properties are associated with, and explain, the modal force of the laws governing them. This explains differences in the modal force of laws/principles of different disciplines, starting with logic and mathematics and proceeding to physics and biology

Changing a semantics: opportunism or courage?

The generalized models for higher-order logics introduced by Leon Henkin, and their multiple offspring over the years, have become a standard tool in many areas of logic. Even so, discussion has persisted about their technical status, and perhaps even their conceptual legitimacy. This paper gives a systematic view of generalized model techniques, discusses what they mean in mathematical and philosophical terms, and presents a few technical themes and results about their role in algebraic representation, calibrating provability, lowering complexity, understanding fixed-point logics, and achieving set-theoretic absoluteness. We also show how thinking about Henkin's approach to semantics of logical systems in this generality can yield new results, dispelling the impression of adhocness. This paper is dedicated to Leon Henkin, a deep logician who has changed the way we all work, while also being an always open, modest, and encouraging colleague and friend.Comment: 27 pages. To appear in: The life and work of Leon Henkin: Essays on his contributions (Studies in Universal Logic) eds: Manzano, M., Sain, I. and Alonso, E., 201

Logicism, Ontology, and the Epistemology of Second-Order Logic

In two recent papers, Bob Hale has attempted to free second-order logic of the 'staggering existential assumptions' with which Quine famously attempted to saddle it. I argue, first, that the ontological issue is at best secondary: the crucial issue about second-order logic, at least for a neo-logicist, is epistemological. I then argue that neither Crispin Wright's attempt to characterize a `neutralist' conception of quantification that is wholly independent of existential commitment, nor Hale's attempt to characterize the second-order domain in terms of definability, can serve a neo-logicist's purposes. The problem, in both cases, is similar: neither Wright nor Hale is sufficiently sensitive to the demands that impredicativity imposes. Finally, I defend my own earlier attempt to finesse this issue, in "A Logic for Frege's Theorem", from Hale's criticisms