Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks

In this paper, we study the robustness of networks that are characterized by many-to-one communications (e.g., access networks and sensor networks) in a game-theoretic model. More specifically, we model the interactions between a network operator and an adversary as a two player zero-sum game, where the network operator chooses a spanning tree in the network, the adversary chooses an edge to be removed from the network, and the adversary’s payoff is proportional to the number of nodes that can no longer reach a designated node through the spanning tree. We show that the payoff in every Nash equilibrium of the game is equal to the reciprocal of the persistence of the network. We describe optimal adversarial and operator strategies and give efficient, polynomial-time algorithms to compute optimal strategies. We also generalize our game model to include varying node weights, as well as attacks against nodes

Multi-Layer Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience for Smart Grid

The smart grid is a large-scale complex system that integrates communication technologies with the physical layer operation of the energy systems. Security and resilience mechanisms by design are important to provide guarantee operations for the system. This chapter provides a layered perspective of the smart grid security and discusses game and decision theory as a tool to model the interactions among system components and the interaction between attackers and the system. We discuss game-theoretic applications and challenges in the design of cross-layer robust and resilient controller, secure network routing protocol at the data communication and networking layers, and the challenges of the information security at the management layer of the grid. The chapter will discuss the future directions of using game-theoretic tools in addressing multi-layer security issues in the smart grid.Comment: 16 page

MTDeep: Boosting the Security of Deep Neural Nets Against Adversarial Attacks with Moving Target Defense

Present attack methods can make state-of-the-art classification systems based on deep neural networks misclassify every adversarially modified test example. The design of general defense strategies against a wide range of such attacks still remains a challenging problem. In this paper, we draw inspiration from the fields of cybersecurity and multi-agent systems and propose to leverage the concept of Moving Target Defense (MTD) in designing a meta-defense for 'boosting' the robustness of an ensemble of deep neural networks (DNNs) for visual classification tasks against such adversarial attacks. To classify an input image, a trained network is picked randomly from this set of networks by formulating the interaction between a Defender (who hosts the classification networks) and their (Legitimate and Malicious) users as a Bayesian Stackelberg Game (BSG). We empirically show that this approach, MTDeep, reduces misclassification on perturbed images in various datasets such as MNIST, FashionMNIST, and ImageNet while maintaining high classification accuracy on legitimate test images. We then demonstrate that our framework, being the first meta-defense technique, can be used in conjunction with any existing defense mechanism to provide more resilience against adversarial attacks that can be afforded by these defense mechanisms. Lastly, to quantify the increase in robustness of an ensemble-based classification system when we use MTDeep, we analyze the properties of a set of DNNs and introduce the concept of differential immunity that formalizes the notion of attack transferability.Comment: Accepted to the Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec), 201

Game Theory Meets Network Security: A Tutorial at ACM CCS

The increasingly pervasive connectivity of today's information systems brings up new challenges to security. Traditional security has accomplished a long way toward protecting well-defined goals such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity. However, with the growing sophistication of the attacks and the complexity of the system, the protection using traditional methods could be cost-prohibitive. A new perspective and a new theoretical foundation are needed to understand security from a strategic and decision-making perspective. Game theory provides a natural framework to capture the adversarial and defensive interactions between an attacker and a defender. It provides a quantitative assessment of security, prediction of security outcomes, and a mechanism design tool that can enable security-by-design and reverse the attacker's advantage. This tutorial provides an overview of diverse methodologies from game theory that includes games of incomplete information, dynamic games, mechanism design theory to offer a modern theoretic underpinning of a science of cybersecurity. The tutorial will also discuss open problems and research challenges that the CCS community can address and contribute with an objective to build a multidisciplinary bridge between cybersecurity, economics, game and decision theory