Distributed Power Control Techniques Based on Game Theory for Wideband Wireless Networks

This thesis describes a theoretical framework for the design and the analysis of distributed (decentralized) power control algorithms for high-throughput wireless networks using ultrawideband (UWB) technologies. The tools of game theory are shown to be expedient for deriving scalable, energy-efficient, distributed power control schemes to be applied to a population of battery-operated user terminals in a rich multipath environment. In particular, the power control issue is modeled as a noncooperative game in which each user chooses its transmit power so as to maximize its own utility, which is defined as the ratio of throughput to transmit power. Although distributed (noncooperative) control is known to be suboptimal with respect to the optimal centralized (cooperative) solution, it is shown via large-system analysis that the game-theoretic distributed algorithm based on Nash equilibrium exhibits negligible performance degradation with respect to the centralized socially optimal configuration. The framework described here is general enough to also encompass the analysis of code division multiple access (CDMA) systems and to show that UWB slightly outperforms CDMA in terms of achieved utility at the Nash equilibrium

Large System Analysis of Game-Theoretic Power Control in UWB Wireless Networks with Rake Receivers

This paper studies the performance of partial-Rake (PRake) receivers in impulse-radio ultrawideband wireless networks when an energy-efficient power control scheme is adopted. Due to the large bandwidth of the system, the multipath channel is assumed to be frequency-selective. By using noncooperative game-theoretic models and large system analysis, explicit expressions are derived in terms of network parameters to measure the effects of self- and multiple-access interference at a receiving access point. Performance of the PRake is compared in terms of achieved utilities and loss to that of the all-Rake receiver.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications (SPAWC), Helsinki, Finland, June 17-20, 200

Energy-Efficient Power Control in Impulse Radio UWB Wireless Networks

In this paper, a game-theoretic model for studying power control for wireless data networks in frequency-selective multipath environments is analyzed. The uplink of an impulse-radio ultrawideband system is considered. The effects of self-interference and multiple-access interference on the performance of generic Rake receivers are investigated for synchronous systems. Focusing on energy efficiency, a noncooperative game is proposed in which users in the network are allowed to choose their transmit powers to maximize their own utilities, and the Nash equilibrium for the proposed game is derived. It is shown that, due to the frequency selective multipath, the noncooperative solution is achieved at different signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios, depending on the channel realization and the type of Rake receiver employed. A large-system analysis is performed to derive explicit expressions for the achieved utilities. The Pareto-optimal (cooperative) solution is also discussed and compared with the noncooperative approach.Comment: Submitted to the IEEE Journal on Selected Topics in Signal Processing - Special issue on Performance Limits of Ultra-Wideband System

Power allocation for optimal synchronization of CDMA and UWB signals based on game theory

This thesis describes a theoretical framework for the design and the analysis of distributed (decentralized) power control algorithms for wireless networks using ultrawideband (UWB) technologies over a frequency-selective and slow-fading channel, focusing of the issue of initial code synchronization. The framework described here is general enough to also encompass the analysis of Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) systems, seen as a special case of the Impulse-Radio (IR)-UWB technology. To develop this work, we use the tools of game theory that are expedient for deriving scalable, energy-efficient, distributed power control schemes to be applied to a population of battery-operated user terminals in a rich multipath environment. The power control issue is modeled as a noncooperative game in which each transmitter-receiver pair chooses its transmit power and detection threshold pair so as to maximize its own utility, which is defined as the ratio of the probability of signal detection to the transmitted energy per acquisition period (or per bit)

SciTech News Volume 71, No. 2 (2017)

Columns and Reports From the Editor 3 Division News Science-Technology Division 5 Chemistry Division 8 Engineering Division 9 Aerospace Section of the Engineering Division 12 Architecture, Building Engineering, Construction and Design Section of the Engineering Division 14 Reviews Sci-Tech Book News Reviews 16 Advertisements IEEE

The Question of Spectrum: Technology, Management, and Regime Change

There is general agreement that the traditional command-and-control regulation of radio spectrum by the FCC (and NTIA) has failed. There is no general agreement on which regime should succeed it. Property rights advocates take Ronald Coase's advice that spectrum licenses should be sold off and traded in secondary markets, like any other assets. Commons advocates argue that new technologies cannot be accommodated by a licensing regime (either traditional or property rights) and that a commons regime leads to the most efficient means to deliver useful spectrum to the American public. This article reviews the scholarly history of this controversy, outlines the revolution of FCC thinking, and parses the question of property rights vs. commons into four distinct parts: new technology, spectrum uses, spectrum management, and the overarching legal regime. Advocates on both sides find much to agree about on the first three factors; the disagreement is focused on the choice of overarching regime to most efficiently and effectively make spectrum and its applications available to the American public. There are two feasible regime choices: a property rights regime and a mixed licensed/commons regime subject to regulation. The regime choice depends upon four factors: dispute resolution, transactions costs, tragedies of the commons and anticommons, and flexibility to changing technologies and demands. Each regime is described and analyzed against these four factors. With regard to pure transactions costs, commons may hold an advantage but it appears quite small. For all other factors, the property rights regime holds very substantial advantages relative to the mixed regime. I conclude that the choice comes down to markets vs. regulation as mechanism for allocating resources.

A Survey on Energy-Efficient Communications

International audienceIn this paper, we review the literature on physical layer energy-efficient communications. The most relevant and recent works are mainly centered around two frameworks: the pragmatic and the information theoretical approaches. Both of them aim at finding the best transmit and/or receive policies which maximize the number of bits that can be reliably conveyed over the channel per unit of energy consumed. Taking into account both approaches, the analysis starts with the single user SISO (single-input single-output) channel, and is then extended to the MIMO (multiple-input multiple-output) and multi-user scenarios