27 research outputs found
A novel result on the revenue equivalence theorem
This paper gives two examples to break through the revelation principle. Furthermore, the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold.Quantum game theory; Algorithmic Bayesian mechanism; Revelation principle; Revenue equivalence theorem.
Truthful Mechanisms for Secure Communication in Wireless Cooperative System
To ensure security in data transmission is one of the most important issues
for wireless relay networks, and physical layer security is an attractive
alternative solution to address this issue. In this paper, we consider a
cooperative network, consisting of one source node, one destination node, one
eavesdropper node, and a number of relay nodes. Specifically, the source may
select several relays to help forward the signal to the corresponding
destination to achieve the best security performance. However, the relays may
have the incentive not to report their true private channel information in
order to get more chances to be selected and gain more payoff from the source.
We propose a Vickey-Clark-Grove (VCG) based mechanism and an
Arrow-d'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet (AGV) based mechanism into the investigated
relay network to solve this cheating problem. In these two different
mechanisms, we design different "transfer payment" functions to the payoff of
each selected relay and prove that each relay gets its maximum (expected)
payoff when it truthfully reveals its private channel information to the
source. And then, an optimal secrecy rate of the network can be achieved. After
discussing and comparing the VCG and AGV mechanisms, we prove that the AGV
mechanism can achieve all of the basic qualifications (incentive compatibility,
individual rationality and budget balance) for our system. Moreover, we discuss
the optimal quantity of relays that the source node should select. Simulation
results verify efficiency and fairness of the VCG and AGV mechanisms, and
consolidate these conclusions.Comment: To appear in IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communication
A novel result on the revenue equivalence theorem
This paper gives two examples to break through the revelation principle. Furthermore, the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold
Ad auctions and cascade model: GSP inefficiency and algorithms
The design of the best economic mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions
(SSAs) is a central task in computational mechanism design/game theory. Two
open questions concern the adoption of user models more accurate than that one
currently used and the choice between Generalized Second Price auction (GSP)
and Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism (VCG). In this paper, we provide some
contributions to answer these questions. We study Price of Anarchy (PoA) and
Price of Stability (PoS) over social welfare and auctioneer's revenue of GSP
w.r.t. the VCG when the users follow the famous cascade model. Furthermore, we
provide exact, randomized, and approximate algorithms, showing that in
real-world settings (Yahoo! Webscope A3 dataset, 10 available slots) optimal
allocations can be found in less than 1s with up to 1000 ads, and can be
approximated in less than 20ms even with more than 1000 ads with an average
accuracy greater than 99%.Comment: AAAI16, to appea
Pricing and Investments in Internet Security: A Cyber-Insurance Perspective
Internet users such as individuals and organizations are subject to different
types of epidemic risks such as worms, viruses, spams, and botnets. To reduce
the probability of risk, an Internet user generally invests in traditional
security mechanisms like anti-virus and anti-spam software, sometimes also
known as self-defense mechanisms. However, such software does not completely
eliminate risk. Recent works have considered the problem of residual risk
elimination by proposing the idea of cyber-insurance. In this regard, an
important research problem is the analysis of optimal user self-defense
investments and cyber-insurance contracts under the Internet environment. In
this paper, we investigate two problems and their relationship: 1) analyzing
optimal self-defense investments in the Internet, under optimal cyber-insurance
coverage, where optimality is an insurer objective and 2) designing optimal
cyber-insurance contracts for Internet users, where a contract is a (premium,
coverage) pair