Urban Public Transportation Planning with Endogenous Passenger Demand

An effective and efficient public transportation system is crucial to people\u27s mobility, economic production, and social activities. The Operations Research community has been studying transit system optimization for the past decades. With disruptions from the private sector, especially the parking operators, ride-sharing platforms, and micro-mobility services, new challenges and opportunities have emerged. This thesis contributes to investigating the interaction of the public transportation systems with significant private sector players considering endogenous passenger choice. To be more specific, this thesis aims to optimize public transportation systems considering the interaction with parking operators, competition and collaboration from ride-sharing platforms and micro-mobility platforms. Optimization models, algorithms and heuristic solution approaches are developed to design the transportation systems. Parking operator plays an important role in determining the passenger travel mode. The capacity and pricing decisions of parking and transit operators are investigated under a game-theoretic framework. A mixed-integer non-linear programming (MINLP) model is formulated to simulate the player\u27s strategy to maximize profits considering endogenous passenger mode choice. A three-step solution heuristic is developed to solve the large-scale MINLP problem. With emerging transportation modes like ride-sharing services and micro-mobility platforms, this thesis aims to co-optimize the integrated transportation system. To improve the mobility for residents in the transit desert regions, we co-optimize the public transit and ride-sharing services to provide a more environment-friendly and equitable system. Similarly, we design an integrated system of public transit and micro-mobility services to provide a more sustainable transportation system in the post-pandemic world

Strategic Eurasian Natural Gas Model for Energy Security

The mathematical formulation of a large-scale equilibrium natural gas simulation model is presented. Although large-scale natural gas models have been developed and used for energy security and policy analysis quite extensively (e.g., Holz (2007), Egging et al. (2008), Holz et al. (2009) and Lise et al. (2008)), this model differs from earlier ones in its detailed representation of the structure and operations of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) gas sector. In particular, the model represents: (i) market power of transit countries, (ii) transmission pipelines in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia, (iii) differentiation among gas production regions in Russia, and (iv) gas trade relations between FSU countries (e.g., Gazprom’s re-exporting of Central Asian gas). To demonstrate the model, a social benefit-cost analysis of the Nord Stream gas pipeline project from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea is provided. It is found that Nord Stream project is profitable for its investors and the project also improves social welfare in all market power scenarios. Also, if transit countries (Ukraine and Belarus) exert substantial market power then the economic value of Nord Stream to its investors and to society improves substantially. We also found that the value of Nord Stream investment is rather sensitive to the degree of downstream competition in European markets and that lack of downstream competition might result in the negative value of the Nord Stream system to Gazprom

‘Unfair’ Discrimination in Two-sided Peering? Evidence from LINX

‘Unfair’ Discrimination in Two-sided Peering? Evidence from LINX Abstract: Does asymmetry between Internet Providers affect the “fairness” of their interconnection contracts? While recent game theoretic literature provides contrasting answers to this question, there is a lack of empirical research. We introduce a novel dataset on micro-interconnection policies and provide an econometric analysis of the determinants of peering decisions amongst the Internet Service Providers interconnecting at the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX). Our key result shows that two different metrics, introduced to capture asymmetry, exert opposite effects. Asymmetry in “market size” enhances the quality of the link, while asymmetry in “network centrality” induces quality degradation, hence “unfairer” interconnection conditions

Devising a Game Theoretic Approach to Enable Smart City Digital Twin Analytics

Despite investments in advancing information and communications technology (ICT)-integrated infrastructure systems toward becoming Smarter Cities, cities often face a large gap between smart sustainable supply and demand. Here, we review the core concepts of ICT-integrated infrastructure systems as they pertain to developing smart and sustainable cities, and describe how a game theoretic-based digital twin of a city can enable more visibility and insight into the successful implementation of such systems. This study is a foundational step toward enabling participation of all city stakeholders (i.e., government, industry, and citizens) in the decision making process and the creation of smart sustainable cities. Engaging city stakeholders in such a manner allows for collective participation in changes, which can enable continuous adaptation toward more sustaining growth and prosperity

Regulating For-Hire Autonomous Vehicles for An Equitable Multimodal Transportation Network

This paper assesses the equity impacts of for-hire autonomous vehicles (AVs) and investigates regulatory policies that promote spatial and social equity in future autonomous mobility ecosystems. To this end, we consider a multimodal transportation network, where a ride-hailing platform operates a fleet of AVs to offer mobility-on-demand services in competition with a public transit agency that offers transit services on a transportation network. A game-theoretic model is developed to characterize the intimate interactions between the ride-hailing platform, the transit agency, and multiclass passengers with distinct income levels. An algorithm is proposed to compute the Nash equilibrium of the game and conduct an ex-post evaluation of the performance of the obtained solution. Based on the proposed framework, we evaluate the spatial and social equity in transport accessibility using the Theil index, and find that although the proliferation of for-hire AVs in the ride-hailing network improves overall accessibility, the benefits are not fairly distributed among distinct locations or population groups, implying that the deployment of AVs will enlarge the existing spatial and social inequity gaps in the transportation network if no regulatory intervention is in place. To address this concern, we investigate two regulatory policies that can improve transport equity: (a) a minimum service-level requirement on ride-hailing services, which improves the spatial equity in the transport network; (b) a subsidy on transit services by taxing ride-hailing services, which promotes the use of public transit and improves the spatial and social equity of the transport network. We show that the minimum service-level requirement entails a trade-off: as a higher minimum service level is imposed, the spatial inequity reduces, but the social inequity will be exacerbated. On the other hand ..

Do the selected Trans European transport investments pass the Cost Benefit test?

This paper assesses the economic justification for the selection of priority projects defined under the auspices of the Trans-European transport network. In analyzing the current list of 30 priority projects, we apply three different transport models to undertake a cost-benefit comparison. We find that many projects do not pass the cost-benefit test and only a few of the economically justifiable projects would need European subsidies to make them happen. Two remedies are proposed to minimize the inefficiencies in future project selection. The first remedy obliges each member state or group of states to perform a cost-benefit analysis (followed by a peer review) and to make the results public prior to ranking priority projects. The second remedy would require federal funding to be available only for projects with important spillovers to other countries, in order to avoid pork barrel behaviour.transport infrastructure, cost benefit analysis, Europe Union