Conditionals in interaction

There are several issues with the standard approach to the relationship between conditionals and assertions, particularly when the antecedent of a conditional is (or may be) false. One prominent alternative is to say that conditionals do not express propositions, but rather make conditional assertions that may generate categorical assertions of the consequent in certain circumstances. However, this view has consequences that jar with standard interpretations of the relationship between proofs and assertion. Here, I analyse this relationship, and say that, on at least one understanding of proof, conditional assertions may reflect the dynamics of proving, which (sometimes) generate categorical assertions. In particular, when we think about the relationship between assertion and proof as rooted in a dialogical approach to both, the distinction between conditional and categorical assertions is quite natural

Polylogical fallacies: Are there any?

Dialectical fallacies are typically defined as breaches of the rules of a regulated discussion between two participants (di-logue). What if discussions become more complex and involve multiple parties with distinct positions to argue for (poly-logues)? Are there distinct argumentation norms of polylogues? If so, can their violations be conceptualized as polylogical fallacies? I will argue for such an approach and analyze two candidates for argumentative breaches of multi-party rationality: false dilemma and collateral straw man

Peirce's Account of Assertion

One usually makes assertions by means of uttering indicative sentences like “It is raining”. However, not every utterance of an indicative sentence is an assertion. For example, in uttering “I will be back tomorrow”, one might be making a promise. What is to make an assertion? C.S. Peirce held the view that “to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth” (CP 5.543). In this thesis, I interpret Peirce’s view of assertion and I evaluate Peirce’s reasons for holding it. I begin by reconstructing and assessing Peirce’s case for such view as it appears in (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 5.546, 1908). Then, I continue by elaborating on three aspects of Peirce’s view of assertion, namely, assertion as an act involving a certain kind of responsibility, the proposition as what is asserted, and responsibility for truth as a responsibility to give reasons. With respect to these three aspects, I argue for the following claims: (1) Peirce construed the responsibility involved in asserting as a moral responsibility; (2) Peirce held that propositions are types; and (3) Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of “responsibility to give reasons”. Finally, I end by presenting two objections to Peirce’s view of assertion and its corresponding replies. I conclude that Peirce’s account of assertion is a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on assertion

Platon : théâtre et philosophie : fondements, nature et visée de la méthode dialectique

Afin de comprendre le processus d’acquisition de connaissance chez Platon, nous proposons une étude de la dialectique selon un spectre large, en se focalisant principalement sur la nature dramatique des textes du corpus. À partir d’une analyse des fondement éléates de la méthode antilogique, nous tenterons par le biais de la dialogique (ou sémantique des jeux) de comprendre le caractère agonistique de la méthode proposée par Platon dans ses dialogues. Nous tâcherons par la suite de faire le lien entre les conclusions intermédiaires et la structure générale de la métaphysique platonicienne afin de ne pas perdre la cohérence du système pris dans sa globalité. Nous évaluerons la qualité de l’outil interprétatif obtenu à travers une lecture du Gorgias.Abstract : In order to understand Plato’s knowledge acquisition process, we suggest a wide-range study of the dialectic, mainly focusing on the theatrical nature of his texts. From an analysis of the eleatic foundations of the antilogical method, we will try to understand the agonistic feature of the method given by Plato in his dialogs by using the dialogical logic (or game semantic). Then, we will bind our mid-conclusions and the general structure of Plato’s metaphysic; in order not to loose the coherence of the whole system. We will evaluate the quality of our interpretative tool through a reading of the Gorgias