Reasoning about Dependence, Preference and Coalitional Power

This paper presents a logic of preference and functional dependence (LPFD) and its hybrid extension (HLPFD), both of whose sound and strongly complete axiomatization are provided. The decidability of LPFD is also proved. The application of LPFD and HLPFD to modelling cooperative games in strategic and coalitional forms is explored. The resulted framework provides a unified view on Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality and the core. The philosophical relevance of these game-theoretical notions to discussions of collective agency is made explicit. Some key connections with other logics are also revealed, for example, the coalition logic, the logic functional dependence and the logic of ceteris paribus preference

Properly Quantized History Dependent Parrondo Games, Markov Processes, and Multiplexing Circuits

In the context of quantum information theory, "quantization" of various mathematical and computational constructions is said to occur upon the replacement, at various points in the construction, of the classical randomization notion of probability distribution with higher order randomization notions from quantum mechanics such as quantum superposition with measurement. For this to be done "properly", a faithful copy of the original construction is required to exist within the new "quantum" one, just as is required when a function is extended to a larger domain. Here procedures for extending history dependent Parrondo games, Markov processes and multiplexing circuits to their "quantum" versions are analyzed from a game theoretic viewpoint, and from this viewpoint, proper quantizations developed

Contracts or scripts? A critical review of the application of institutional theories to the study of environmental change

The impact of new institutionalism on the study of human environment interactions has been meaningful. Institutional perspectives have further shaped and modified the field problems of common pool resources, environmental hazards, and risk and environmental management. Given the relative potential of institutional theories to increase the comprehension of the various dimensions of human-environmental interactions, it has become increasingly important to attempt to consolidate different interpretations of what institutions are, and how they mediate and constrain possibilities for more successful environmental outcomes. This article focuses primarily on contending ontological perspectives on institutions and institutional change. It argues that what should guide the application of institutional theories in practical research regarding environmental change is the ontological dimension, and that the focus of research should be on uncovering the underlying dynamics of institutional change. In doing so, it calls for a methodological pluralism in the investigation of the role institutions play in driving/managing for environmental change

A Semiparametric Test of Agent's Information Sets for Games of Incomplete Information

We propose semiparametric tests of misspecification of agent's information for games of incomplete information. The tests use the intuition that the opponent's choices should not predict a player's choice conditional on the proposed information available to the player. The tests are designed to check against some commonly used null hypotheses (Bajari et al. (2010), Aradillas-Lopez (2010)). We show that our tests have power to discriminate between common alternatives even in small samples. We apply our tests to data on entry in the US airline industry. Both the assumptions of independent and correlated private shocks are not supported by the data