Computing the shapley value in allocation problems: Approximations and bounds, with an application to the Italian VQR research assessment program

In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximized, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money compensation to perform a fair allocation taking into account the actual contribution of all agents to the social welfare. Coalitional games provide a formal mathematical framework to model such problems, in particular the Shapley value is a solution concept widely used for assigning worths to agents in a fair way. Unfortunately, computing this value is a #P-hard problem, so that applying this good theoretical notion is often quite difficult in real-world problems. In this paper, we first review the application of the Shapley value to an allocation problem that models the evaluation of the Italian research structures with a procedure known as VQR. For large universities, the problem involves thousands of agents and goods (here, researchers and their research products). We then describe some useful properties that allow us to greatly simplify many such large instances. Moreover, we propose new algorithms for computing lower bounds and upper bounds of the Shapley value, which in some cases provide the exact result and that can be combined with approximation algorithms. The proposed techniques have been tested on large real-world instances of the VQR research evaluation problem

Computing the Shapley value in allocation problems: approximations and bounds, with an application to the Italian VQR research assessment program

In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximised, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money compensation to perform a fair allocation taking into account the actual contribution of all agents to the social welfare. Coalitional games provide a formal mathematical framework to model such problems, in particular the Shapley value is a solution concept widely used for assigning worths to agents in a fair way. Unfortunately, computing this value is a #P-hard problem, so that applying this good theoretical notion is often quite difficult in real-world problems. We describe useful properties that allow us to greatly simplify the instances of allocation problems, without affecting the Shapley value of any player. Moreover, we propose algorithms for computing lower bounds and upper bounds of the Shapley value, which in some cases provide the exact result and that can be combined with approximation algorithms. The proposed techniques have been implemented and tested on a real-world application of allocation problems, namely, the Italian research assessment program known as VQR (Verifica della Qualità della Ricerca, or Research Quality Assessment)1. For the large university considered in the experiments, the problem involves thousands of agents and goods (here, researchers and their research products). The algorithms described in the paper are able to compute the Shapley value for most of those agents, and to get a good approximation of the Shapley value for all of the

On the Shapley value and its application to the Italian VQR research assessment exercise

Research assessment exercises have now become common evaluation tools in a number of countries. These exercises have the goal of guiding merit-based public funds allocation, stimulating improvement of research productivity through competition and assessing the impact of adopted research support policies. One case in point is Italy's most recent research assessment effort, VQR 2011–2014 (Research Quality Evaluation), which, in addition to research institutions, also evaluated university departments, and individuals in some cases (i.e., recently hired research staff and members of PhD committees). However, the way an institution's score was divided, according to VQR rules, between its constituent departments or its staff members does not enjoy many desirable properties well known from coalitional game theory (e.g., budget balance, fairness, marginality). We propose, instead, an alternative score division rule that is based on the notion of Shapley value, a well known solution concept in coalitional game theory, which enjoys the desirable properties mentioned above. For a significant test case (namely, Sapienza University of Rome, the largest university in Italy), we present a detailed comparison of the scores obtained, for substructures and individuals, by applying the official VQR rules, with those resulting from Shapley value computations. We show that there are significant differences in the resulting scores, making room for improvements in the allocation rules used in research assessment exercises

Chebyshev polynomial filtered subspace iteration in the Discontinuous Galerkin method for large-scale electronic structure calculations

The Discontinuous Galerkin (DG) electronic structure method employs an adaptive local basis (ALB) set to solve the Kohn-Sham equations of density functional theory (DFT) in a discontinuous Galerkin framework. The adaptive local basis is generated on-the-fly to capture the local material physics, and can systematically attain chemical accuracy with only a few tens of degrees of freedom per atom. A central issue for large-scale calculations, however, is the computation of the electron density (and subsequently, ground state properties) from the discretized Hamiltonian in an efficient and scalable manner. We show in this work how Chebyshev polynomial filtered subspace iteration (CheFSI) can be used to address this issue and push the envelope in large-scale materials simulations in a discontinuous Galerkin framework. We describe how the subspace filtering steps can be performed in an efficient and scalable manner using a two-dimensional parallelization scheme, thanks to the orthogonality of the DG basis set and block-sparse structure of the DG Hamiltonian matrix. The on-the-fly nature of the ALBs requires additional care in carrying out the subspace iterations. We demonstrate the parallel scalability of the DG-CheFSI approach in calculations of large-scale two-dimensional graphene sheets and bulk three-dimensional lithium-ion electrolyte systems. Employing 55,296 computational cores, the time per self-consistent field iteration for a sample of the bulk 3D electrolyte containing 8,586 atoms is 90 seconds, and the time for a graphene sheet containing 11,520 atoms is 75 seconds.Comment: Submitted to The Journal of Chemical Physic

Budget-feasible Egalitarian Allocation of Conflicting Jobs

Allocating conflicting jobs among individuals while respecting a budget constraint for each individual is an optimization problem that arises in various real-world scenarios. In this paper, we consider the situation where each individual derives some satisfaction from each job. We focus on finding a feasible allocation of conflicting jobs that maximize egalitarian cost, i.e. the satisfaction of the \nc{individual who is worst-off}. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to combine egalitarianism, budget-feasibility, and conflict-freeness in allocations. We provide a systematic study of the computational complexity of finding budget-feasible conflict-free egalitarian allocation and show that our problem generalizes a large number of classical optimization problems. Therefore, unsurprisingly, our problem is \NPH even for two individuals and when there is no conflict between any jobs. We show that the problem admits algorithms when studied in the realm of approximation algorithms and parameterized algorithms with a host of natural parameters that match and in some cases improve upon the running time of known algorithms.Comment: Accepted in 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems(AAMAS 2024

FPGA-based High-Performance Parallel Architecture for Homomorphic Computing on Encrypted Data

Homomorphic encryption is a tool that enables computation on encrypted data and thus has applications in privacy-preserving cloud computing. Though conceptually amazing, implementation of homomorphic encryption is very challenging and typically software implementations on general purpose computers are extremely slow. In this paper we present our year long effort to design a domain specific architecture in a heterogeneous Arm+FPGA platform to accelerate homomorphic computing on encrypted data. We design a custom co-processor for the computationally expensive operations of the well-known Fan-Vercauteren (FV) homomorphic encryption scheme on the FPGA, and make the Arm processor a server for executing different homomorphic applications in the cloud, using this FPGA-based co-processor. We use the most recent arithmetic and algorithmic optimization techniques and perform design-space exploration on different levels of the implementation hierarchy. In particular we apply circuit-level and block-level pipeline strategies to boost the clock frequency and increase the throughput respectively. To reduce computation latency, we use parallel processing at all levels. Starting from the highly optimized building blocks, we gradually build our multi-core multi-processor architecture for computing. We implemented and tested our optimized domain specific programmable architecture on a single Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC ZCU102 Evaluation Kit. At 200 MHz FPGA-clock, our implementation achieves over 13x speedup with respect to a highly optimized software implementation of the FV homomorphic encryption scheme on an Intel i5 processor running at 1.8 GHz.Peer reviewe