5 research outputs found
Recent trends in applying TPM to cloud computing
Trusted platform modules (TPM) have become important safeâguards against
variety of softwareâbased attacks. By providing a limited set of
cryptographic services through a wellâdefined interface, separated from
the software itself, TPM can serve as a root of trust and as a building
block for higherâlevel security measures. This article surveys the
literature for applications of TPM in the cloudâcomputing environment,
with publication dates comprised between 2013 and 2018. It identifies
the current trends and objectives of this technology in the cloud, and
the type of threats that it mitigates. Toward the end, the main research
gaps are pinpointed and discussed. Since integrity measurement is one
of the main usages of TPM, special attention is paid to the assessment
of run time phases and software layers it is applied to.</p
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Formal modeling and verification of cloudproxy
Services running in the cloud face threats from several parties, including malicious clients, administrators, and external attackers. CloudProxy is a recently-proposed framework for secure deployment of cloud applications. In this work, we present the first formal model of CloudProxy, including a formal specification of desired security properties. We model CloudProxy as a transition system in the UCLID modeling language, using term-level abstraction. Our formal specification includes both safety and non-interference properties. We use induction to prove these properties, employing a back-end SMT-based verification engine. Further, we structure our proof as an âassurance caseâ, showing how we decompose the proof into various lemmas, and listing all assumptions and axioms employed. We also perform some limited model validation to gain assurance that the formal model correctly captures behaviors of the implementation
Formal Modeling and Verification of CloudProxy
Abstract. Services running in the cloud face threats from several parties, including malicious clients, administrators, and external attackers. CloudProxy is a recentlyproposed framework for secure deployment of cloud applications. In this work, we present the first formal model of CloudProxy, including a formal specification of desired security properties. We model CloudProxy as a transition system in the UCLID modeling language, using term-level abstraction. Our formal specification includes both safety and non-interference properties. We use induction to prove these properties, employing a back-end SMT-based verification engine. Further, we structure our proof as an âassurance caseâ, showing how we decompose the proof into various lemmas, and listing all assumptions and axioms employed. We also perform some limited model validation to gain assurance that the formal model correctly captures behaviors of the implementation.