6 research outputs found

    The Mind of the Nation: The Debate about Völkerpsychologie, 1851-1900

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    Völkerpsychologie or ‘folk psychology’ has a bad reputation amongst historians. It is either viewed as a pseudo-science not worth studying in detail, or considered a ‘failure’ since, in contrast to sociology, psychology, and anthropology, it never established itself as an independent discipline at university level. This article argues that Völkerpsychologie as developed by Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal was an important current in nineteenth-century German thought. While it was riddled with conceptual and methodological problems and received harsh criticism from academic reviewers, it contributed to the establishing of the social sciences since key concepts of folk psychology were appropriated by scholars such as Georg Simmel and Franz Boas. The article summarizes the main features of Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie, discusses its reception in Germany and abroad, and shows how arguments originally developed for folk psychology were used by Lazarus to reject antisemitism in the 1870s and 1880s. It concludes that Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie epitomized the mentality of nineteenth-century liberals with its belief in science, progress, and the nation, which was reinforced by their experience of Jewish emancipation

    Arguments to believe and beliefs to argue. Epistemic logics for argumentation and its dynamics

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    Arguing and believing are two skills that have typically played a crucial role in the analysis of human cognition. Both notions have received notable attention from a broad range of disciplines, including linguistics, philosophy, psychology, and computer science. The main goal of this dissertation consists in studying from a logical perspective (that is, focused on reasoning) some of the existing relations between beliefs and argumentation. From a methodological point of view, we propose to combine two well-known families of formalisms for knowledge representation that have been relatively disconnected (with some salient exceptions): epistemic logic (Fagin et al., 2004; Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995) together with its dynamic extensions (van Ditmarsch et al., 2007; van Benthem, 2011), on the one hand, and formal argumentation (Baroni et al., 2018; Gabbay et al., 2021), on the other hand. This choice is arguably natural. Epistemic logic provides well-known tools for qualitatively representing epistemic attitudes (belief, among them). Formal argumentation, on its side, is the broad research field where mathematical representations of argumentative phenomena are investigated. Moreover, the notion of awareness, as treated in the epistemic logic tradition since Fagin and Halpern (1987), can be used as a theoretical bridge among both areas. This dissertation is presented as a collection of papers [compendio de publicaciones], meaning that its main contributions are contained in the reprint of six works that have been previously published, placed in Chapter 4. In chapter 1, we pursue a general introduction to the research problem. Chapter 2 is devoted to the presentation of the technical tools employed through the thesis. Chapter 3 explains how the contributions approach the research problem. Chapter 5 provides a general discussion of results, by analysing closely related work. We conclude in Chapter 6 with some remarks and open paths for future research

    Forgetting an Argument

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    The notion of forgetting, as considered in the famous paper by Lin and Reiter in 1994 has been extensively studied in classical logic and more recently, in non-monotonic formalisms like logic programming. In this paper, we convey the idea of forgetting to another major AI formalism, namely Dung-style argumentation frameworks. Our approach is axiomatic-driven and not limited to any specific semantics: we propose semantical and syntactical desiderata encoding different criteria for what forgetting an argument might mean; analyze how these criteria relate to each other; and check whether the criteria can be satisfied in general. The analysis is done for a number of widely used argumentation semantics. Our investigation shows that almost all desiderata are individually satisfiable. However, combinations of semantical and/or syntactical conditions reveal a much more interesting landscape. For instance, we found that the ad hoc approach to forgetting an argument, i.e., by the syntactical removal of the argument and all of its associated attacks, is too restrictive and only compatible with the two weakest semantical desiderata. Amongst the several interesting combinations identified, we showed that one satisfies a notion of minimal change and presented an algorithm that given an AF F and argument x, constructs a suitable AF G satisfying the conditions in the combination

    Forgetting an Argument

    Get PDF
    The notion of forgetting, as considered in the famous paper by Lin and Reiter in 1994 has been extensively studied in classical logic and more recently, in non-monotonic formalisms like logic programming. In this paper, we convey the idea of forgetting to another major AI formalism, namely Dung-style argumentation frameworks. Our approach is axiomatic-driven and not limited to any specific semantics: we propose semantical and syntactical desiderata encoding different criteria for what forgetting an argument might mean; analyze how these criteria relate to each other; and check whether the criteria can be satisfied in general. The analysis is done for a number of widely used argumentation semantics. Our investigation shows that almost all desiderata are individually satisfiable. However, combinations of semantical and/or syntactical conditions reveal a much more interesting landscape. For instance, we found that the ad hoc approach to forgetting an argument, i.e., by the syntactical removal of the argument and all of its associated attacks, is too restrictive and only compatible with the two weakest semantical desiderata. Amongst the several interesting combinations identified, we showed that one satisfies a notion of minimal change and presented an algorithm that given an AF F and argument x, constructs a suitable AF G satisfying the conditions in the combination

    Forgetting an Argument

    No full text
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