First-price auctions with reimbursement in NSP alliances with asymmetric buyers

International audienceWe propose a pricing scheme for Quality-assured services over Network Service Providers (NSPs) alliances which is based on First-price auctions and where a pre-announced percentage of the price paid is reimbursed if the quality is not satisfied. The use of First-price auctions and an optimal percentage of reimbursement, q, maximizes the seller's revenue and provides an easy-to-apply scheme. We consider asymmetric buyers, i.e. their willingness to pay are not alike, which while more realistic than typical symmetric scenarios, limits the possibilities to determine q analytically. We propose a simulator that approximates q. Simulations show that the optimal percentage of reimbursement is q = 100% and that this value prevents problems such as the market for lemons, which we show would arise if no reimbursement is in place