A Re-Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions

We define social institutions as strategies in some repeated game. With this interpretation in mind, we consider the impact of introducing requirements on strategies which have been viewed as necessary properties for any social institution to endure. The properties we study are finite complexity, symmetry, global stability, and semi-perfection. We show that: (1) If a strategy satisfies these properties then players play a Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every period; (2) The set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game equals the set of Nash equilibria payoffs in the stage game; and (3) A strategy vector satisfies these properties in a Pareto optimal way if and only if players play some Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every stage. These results provide a social institution interpretation of Nash equilibrium: individual behavior in enduring social institutions is described by Nash equilibria.Nash equilibrium, discounted repeated games, semi-perfect equilibrium, global stability, finite automata, social norms.

Non-blocking supervisory control for initialised rectangular automata

We consider the problem of supervisory control for a class of rectangular automata and more specifically for compact rectangular automata with uniform rectangular activity, i.e. initialised. The supervisory controller is state feedback and disables discrete-event transitions in order to solve the non-blocking forbidden state problem. The non-blocking problem is defined under both strong and weak conditions. For the latter maximally permissive solutions that are computable on a finite quotient space characterised by language equivalence are derived

Imitation in Large Games

In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation types: that of players who imitate choice of other (optimizing) types. Game theorists typically study the evolution of such games in dynamical systems with imitation rules. In the setting of games of infinite duration on finite graphs with preference orderings on outcomes for player types, we explore the possibility of imitation as a viable strategy. In our setup, the optimising players play bounded memory strategies and the imitators play according to specifications given by automata. We present algorithmic results on the eventual survival of types

Optimal Strategies in Infinite-state Stochastic Reachability Games

We consider perfect-information reachability stochastic games for 2 players on infinite graphs. We identify a subclass of such games, and prove two interesting properties of it: first, Player Max always has optimal strategies in games from this subclass, and second, these games are strongly determined. The subclass is defined by the property that the set of all values can only have one accumulation point -- 0. Our results nicely mirror recent results for finitely-branching games, where, on the contrary, Player Min always has optimal strategies. However, our proof methods are substantially different, because the roles of the players are not symmetric. We also do not restrict the branching of the games. Finally, we apply our results in the context of recently studied One-Counter stochastic games

Parity and Streett Games with Costs

We consider two-player games played on finite graphs equipped with costs on edges and introduce two winning conditions, cost-parity and cost-Streett, which require bounds on the cost between requests and their responses. Both conditions generalize the corresponding classical omega-regular conditions and the corresponding finitary conditions. For parity games with costs we show that the first player has positional winning strategies and that determining the winner lies in NP and coNP. For Streett games with costs we show that the first player has finite-state winning strategies and that determining the winner is EXPTIME-complete. The second player might need infinite memory in both games. Both types of games with costs can be solved by solving linearly many instances of their classical variants.Comment: A preliminary version of this work appeared in FSTTCS 2012 under the name "Cost-parity and Cost-Streett Games". The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreements 259454 (GALE) and 239850 (SOSNA