On Decidability Properties of Local Sentences

Local (first order) sentences, introduced by Ressayre, enjoy very nice decidability properties, following from some stretching theorems stating some remarkable links between the finite and the infinite model theory of these sentences. We prove here several additional results on local sentences. The first one is a new decidability result in the case of local sentences whose function symbols are at most unary: one can decide, for every regular cardinal k whether a local sentence phi has a model of order type k. Secondly we show that this result can not be extended to the general case. Assuming the consistency of an inaccessible cardinal we prove that the set of local sentences having a model of order type omega_2 is not determined by the axiomatic system ZFC + GCH, where GCH is the generalized continuum hypothesi

Some Problems in Automata Theory Which Depend on the Models of Set Theory

We prove that some fairly basic questions on automata reading infinite words depend on the models of the axiomatic system ZFC. It is known that there are only three possibilities for the cardinality of the complement of an omega-language $L(A)$ accepted by a B\"uchi 1-counter automaton $A$. We prove the following surprising result: there exists a 1-counter B\"uchi automaton $A$ such that the cardinality of the complement $L(A)^-$ of the omega-language $L(A)$ is not determined by ZFC: (1). There is a model $V_1$ of ZFC in which $L(A)^-$ is countable. (2). There is a model $V_2$ of ZFC in which $L(A)^-$ has cardinal $2^{\aleph_0}$. (3). There is a model $V_3$ of ZFC in which $L(A)^-$ has cardinal $\aleph_1$ with $\aleph_0<\aleph_1<2^{\aleph_0}$. We prove a very similar result for the complement of an infinitary rational relation accepted by a 2-tape B\"uchi automaton $B$. As a corollary, this proves that the Continuum Hypothesis may be not satisfied for complements of 1-counter omega-languages and for complements of infinitary rational relations accepted by 2-tape B\"uchi automata. We infer from the proof of the above results that basic decision problems about 1-counter omega-languages or infinitary rational relations are actually located at the third level of the analytical hierarchy. In particular, the problem to determine whether the complement of a 1-counter omega-language (respectively, infinitary rational relation) is countable is in $\Sigma_3^1 \setminus (\Pi_2^1 \cup \Sigma_2^1)$. This is rather surprising if compared to the fact that it is decidable whether an infinitary rational relation is countable (respectively, uncountable).Comment: To appear in the journal RAIRO-Theoretical Informatics and Application

Set Theory

This meeting covered all important aspects of modern Set Theory, including large cardinal theory, combinatorial set theory, descriptive set theory, connections with algebra and analysis, forcing axioms and inner model theory. The presence of an unusually large number (19) of young researchers made the meeting especially dynamic

Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics

This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's "criterial" identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the modal commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic modality and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the interaction between epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, epistemic set theory, and absolute decidability. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebraic automata to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction of the interpretational and objective modalities thereof. The hyperintensional, topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{2} is applied in chapters \textbf{7}, \textbf{8}, \textbf{10}, and \textbf{11}. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides four models of hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory