Inattentive Consumers in Markets for Services

In an experiment on markets for services, we find that consumers are likely to stick to default tariffs and achieve suboptimal outcomes. We find that inattention to the task of choosing a better tariff is likely to be a substantial problem in addition to any task and tariff complexity effect. The institutional setup on which we primarily model our experiment is the UK electricity and gas markets, and our conclusion is that the new measures by the UK regulator Ofgem to improve consumer outcomes are likely to be of limited impact

When herding and contrarianism foster market efficiency: a financial trading experiment

While herding has long been suspected to play a role in financial market booms and busts, theoretical analyses have struggled to identify conclusive causes for the effect. Recent theoretical work shows that informational herding is possible in a market with efficient asset prices if information is bi-polar, and contrarianism is possible with single-polar information. We present an experimental test for the validity of this theory, contrasting with all existing experiments where rational herding was theoretically impossible and subsequently not observed. Overall we observe that subjects generally behave according to theoretical predictions, yet the fit is lower for types who have the theoretical potential to herd. While herding is often not observed when predicted by theory, herding (sometimes irrational) does occur. Irrational contrarianism in particular leads observed prices to substantially differ from the efficient benchmark. Alternative models of behavior, such as risk aversion, loss aversion or error correction, either perform quite poorly or add little to our understanding

Nominal Price Shocks in Monopolistically Competitive Markets: An Experimental Analysis

We report a market experiment that examines the capacity of price and information frictions to explain real responses to nominal price shocks. As predicted by the standard dynamic adjustment models, we find that both price and information frictions impede the response to a nominal shock. We also find, however, that the observed adjustment delays far exceed predicted levels. Results of a pair of subsequent treatments indicate that a combination of announcing the shock privately to all sellers (rather than publicly) and a failure of many sellers to best respond to their expectations explains the observed adjustment inertia.Market Experiments, Price Rigidities, Information Rigidities, Bounded Rationality

Virtual Clinical Trials: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

Virtual clinical trials have entered the medical research landscape. Today’s clinical trials recruit subjects online, obtain informed consent online, send treatments such as medications or devices to the subjects’ homes, and require subjects to record their responses online. Virtual clinical trials could be a way to democratize clinical research and circumvent geographical limitations by allowing access to clinical research for people who live far from traditional medical research centers. But virtual clinical trials also depart dramatically from traditional medical research studies in ways that can harm individuals and the public at large. This article addresses the issues presented by virtual clinical trials with regard to: (1) recruitment methods; (2) informed consent; (3) confidentiality; (4) potential risks to the subjects; and (5) the safety and efficacy of treatments that are approved

Closing down the Farm: An Experimental Analysis of Disinvestment Timing

Agrarian structures are often characterized by some kind of economic inertia. It is particularly puzzling why unprofitable farms persist over time instead of being sold. In this paper we analyze the exit decision of farmers using the real options approach. The validity of the real options theory is assessed by means of laboratory experiments. Our results show that real options models are able to predict actual disinvestment decisions better than traditional investment theory. Nevertheless, the observed disinvestment reluctance was even more pronounced as predicted by theory. This finding suggests the inclusion of bounded rationality into normative disinvestment models.Disinvestment, Real Options, Experimental Economics, Agricultural Finance, Farm Management, C91, D81, D92,

Vacancy Referrals, Job Search, and the Duration of Unemployment: A Randomized Experiment

One goal of the public employment service is to facilitate matching between unemployed job seekers and job vacancies; another goal is to monitor job search so as to bring search efforts among the unemployed in line with search requirements. The referral of job seekers to vacancies is one instrument used for these purposes. We report results from a randomized Swedish experiment where the outcome of referrals is examined. To what extent do unemployed individuals actually apply for the jobs they are referred to? Does information to job seekers about increased monitoring affect the probability of applying and the probability of leaving unemployment? The experiment indicates that a relatively large fraction (one third) of the referrals do not result in job applications. Information about intensified monitoring causes an increase in the probability of job application, especially among young people. However, we find no significant impact on the duration of unemployment.vacancy referral, job matching, job search, randomized experiment

Custom Made Versus Ready to Wear Treatments; Behavioral Propensities in Physician's Choices

To customize treatments to individual patients entails costs of coordination and cognition. Thus, providers sometimes choose treatments based on norms for broad classes of patients. We develop behavioral hypotheses explaining when and why doctors customize to the particular patient, and when instead they employ "ready-to-wear" treatments. Our empirical studies examining length of office visits and physician prescribing behavior find evidence of norm-following behavior. Some such behavior, from our studies and from the literature, proves sensible; but other behavior seems far from optimal.

Health Insurance Status and Physician-Induced Demand for Medical Services in Germany: New Evidence from Combined District and Individual Level Data

Germany is one of the few OECD countries with a two-tier system of statutory and primary private health insurance. Both types of insurance provide fee-for-service insurance, but chargeable fees for identical services are more than twice as large for privately insured patients than for statutorily insured patients. This price variation creates incentives to induce demand primarily among the privately insured. Using German SOEP 2002 data, I analyze the effects of insurance status and district (Kreis-) level physician density on the individual number of doctor visits. The paper has four main findings. First, I find no evidence that physician density is endogenous. Second, conditional on health, privately insured patients are less likely to contact a physician but more frequently visit a doctor following a first contact. Third, physician density has a significant positive effect on the decision to contact a physician and on the frequency of doctor visits of patients insured in the statutory health care system, whereas, fourth, physician density has no effect on privately insured patients' decisions to contact a physician but an even stronger positive effect on the frequency of doctor visits than the statutorily insured. These findings give indirect evidence for the hypothesis that physicians induce demand among privately insured patients but not among statutorily insured.supplier-induced demand, health care utilization