"Real Places in Virtual Spaces"

Despite what might seem to be the case, "Virtual" reality can be used to create fully "real" places with their own grammar and norms, where real events take place

Whatever Happened to Evans' Action Component?

A long line of writers on Evans – Andy Hamilton, Lucy O'Brien, Jose Bermudez, and Jason Stanley, to name just a few – assess Evans' account of first-person thought without heeding his warnings that his theory comprises an information and an action component. By omitting the action component, these critics are able to characterize Evans' theory as a perceptual model theory and reject it on that ground. This paper is an attempt to restore the forgotten element. With this component put back in, the charge of Evans' theory as a perceptual model of such thoughts falls apart, and the theory turns out to have enough merit to project itself as a legitimate contender for a plausible account of 'I'-thought

Comment on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception

In Susanna Siegel’s compelling presentation of the case for the rationality of perception, a “significant part of the constructive defense” is played by the idea that there are “inferential routes to perceptual experience” (Siegel 2017, p. 94). Inferences, after all, are epistemically evaluable and bear on the rational standing of their conclusions. She argues that an obstacle to accepting this idea is a “Reckoning Model” of inference, and shows by example that we recognize as inferences various familiar kinds of responses to information that do not fit this model. She offers a more general approach to the nature of inference that fits these examples and accommodates inferential routes to perceptual experience. I argue that Siegel needs to say more about the mental processes involved in such inferrings, and how it can be more than merely associative and yet still distinct from Reckoning. Fortunately, a psychologically‐ and conceptually‐grounded distinction between model‐free vs. model‐based learning and guidance processes can provide a characterization that plays the role Siegel needs.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/163584/2/phpr12735.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/163584/1/phpr12735_am.pd

Intentionality

Articl

Intuition and concrete particularity in Kant's transcendental aesthetic

By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35). These, he argues, are the laws that properly direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability to make empirical judgments about particular works of art. These presuppositions are sensible rather than intellectual because on Kant’s view, all intellection that considers objects of any kind, whether abstract or concrete, must at base connect to actual, material objects with which we come into direct contact; and this we can do only through sensibility (A 19/B 33). Thus the following discussion explores what Kant claims must be true of us in order to make the sorts of aesthetic judgments we make, rather than any particular class or quality of aesthetic judgments itself. On Kant’s view, what must be true of us in order to make aesthetic judgments is not different from what must be true of us in order to make any other kind of judgment about empirical objects

Science in Wonderland

Lewis Carroll's Alice, who first explores Wonderland (1865) and later on the country behind the Looking-Glass (1872), belongs to the most well-known characters in world literature. [...] The scientific reception of Carroll's stories – concerning physics as well as the humanities – has taken place on different levels. On the one hand, […] various Carrollian ideas and episodes obviously correspond to topics, subjects and models that are treated in the contexts of scientific discourses. Therefore, they can be quoted or alluded to in order to represent theories and questions […] – as […] physical models of the world […]or theoretical models of language and communication. […] On a more abstract level of observation, Carroll's stories have been used in order to explain and to discuss the pre-conditions, the procedures, and the limits . of scientific modeling as such. Above all, they make it possible to narrate on the problem of defining and observing an 'object' of research. […] According to Deleuze, the paradox structures of the world that Alice experiences give an idea of all meaning being groundless and all logic being subverted by the illogical. Finally, besides all affinities of Alice's adventures to scientific attempts to explain the world, the absolutely incomprehensible is present in Carroll's books as well. Especially the self proves to be something profoundly incomprehensible […]

Numbers, Empiricism and the A Priori

The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers Frege ́s proposal in Grundlagen upon the background of the Post-Kantian semantic turn in analytical philosophy. Through a more systematic study of his philosophical premises, it comes to unearth a first level paradox that would unset earlier still than it was exposed by Russell. It then studies an alternative path, that departin1g from Frege’s initial premises, drives to a conception of numbers as synthetic a priori in a more Kantian sense. On this basis, it tentatively explores a possible derivation of basic logical rules on their behalf, suggesting a more rudimentary basis to inferential thinking, which supports reconsidering the difference between logical thinking and AI. Finally, it reflects upon the contributions of this approach to the problem of the a priori