Feasibility of Using Discriminate Pricing Schemes for Energy Trading in Smart Grid

This paper investigates the feasibility of using a discriminate pricing scheme to offset the inconvenience that is experienced by an energy user (EU) in trading its energy with an energy controller in smart grid. The main objective is to encourage EUs with small distributed energy resources (DERs), or with high sensitivity to their inconvenience, to take part in the energy trading via providing incentive to them with relatively higher payment at the same time as reducing the total cost to the energy controller. The proposed scheme is modeled through a two-stage Stackelberg game that describes the energy trading between a shared facility authority (SFA) and EUs in a smart community. A suitable cost function is proposed for the SFA to leverage the generation of discriminate pricing according to the inconvenience experienced by each EU. It is shown that the game has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE), under the certain condition at which the SFA's total cost is minimized, and that each EU receives its best utility according to its associated inconvenience for the given price. A backward induction technique is used to derive a closed form expression for the price function at SPE, and thus the dependency of price on an EU's different decision parameters is explained for the studied system. Numerical examples are provided to show the beneficial properties of the proposed scheme.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figures, 3 tables, conference pape

Energy Management for a User Interactive Smart Community: A Stackelberg Game Approach

This paper studies a three party energy management problem in a user interactive smart community that consists of a large number of residential units (RUs) with distributed energy resources (DERs), a shared facility controller (SFC) and the main grid. A Stackelberg game is formulated to benefit both the SFC and RUs, in terms of incurred cost and achieved utility respectively, from their energy trading with each other and the grid. The properties of the game are studied and it is shown that there exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium (SE). A novel algorithm is proposed that can be implemented in a distributed fashion by both RUs and the SFC to reach the SE. The convergence of the algorithm is also proven, and shown to always reach the SE. Numerical examples are used to assess the properties and effectiveness of the proposed scheme.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figure

Scenarios for the development of smart grids in the UK: literature review

Smart grids are expected to play a central role in any transition to a low-carbon energy future, and much research is currently underway on practically every area of smart grids. However, it is evident that even basic aspects such as theoretical and operational definitions, are yet to be agreed upon and be clearly defined. Some aspects (efficient management of supply, including intermittent supply, two-way communication between the producer and user of electricity, use of IT technology to respond to and manage demand, and ensuring safe and secure electricity distribution) are more commonly accepted than others (such as smart meters) in defining what comprises a smart grid. It is clear that smart grid developments enjoy political and financial support both at UK and EU levels, and from the majority of related industries. The reasons for this vary and include the hope that smart grids will facilitate the achievement of carbon reduction targets, create new employment opportunities, and reduce costs relevant to energy generation (fewer power stations) and distribution (fewer losses and better stability). However, smart grid development depends on additional factors, beyond the energy industry. These relate to issues of public acceptability of relevant technologies and associated risks (e.g. data safety, privacy, cyber security), pricing, competition, and regulation; implying the involvement of a wide range of players such as the industry, regulators and consumers. The above constitute a complex set of variables and actors, and interactions between them. In order to best explore ways of possible deployment of smart grids, the use of scenarios is most adequate, as they can incorporate several parameters and variables into a coherent storyline. Scenarios have been previously used in the context of smart grids, but have traditionally focused on factors such as economic growth or policy evolution. Important additional socio-technical aspects of smart grids emerge from the literature review in this report and therefore need to be incorporated in our scenarios. These can be grouped into four (interlinked) main categories: supply side aspects, demand side aspects, policy and regulation, and technical aspects.

Loss Allocation in Joint Transmission and Distribution Peer-to-Peer Markets

Large deployment of distribute energy resources and the increasing awareness of end-users towards their energy procurement are challenging current practices of electricity markets. A change of paradigm, from a top-down hierarchical approach to a more decentralized framework, has been recently researched, with market structures relying on multi-bilateral trades among market participants. In order to guarantee feasibility in power system operation, it is crucial to rethink the interaction with system operators and the way operational costs are shared in such decentralized markets. We propose here to include system operators, both at transmission and distribution level, as active actors of the market, accounting for power grid constraints and line losses. Moreover, to avoid market outcomes that discriminate agents for their geographical location, we analyze loss allocation policies and their impact on market outcomes and prices.Comment: Submitted to "IEEE Transactions on Power Systems" on January 15, 2020 - Revised on May 6, 2020 and on August 6, 2020 - Accepted on September 13, 202

Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United States

Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United States provides a “legal playbook” for deep decarbonization in the United States, identifying well over 1,000 legal options for enabling the United States to address one of the greatest problems facing this country and the rest of humanity. The book is based on two reports by the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP) that explain technical and policy pathways for reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% from 1990 levels by 2050. This 80x50 target and similarly aggressive carbon abatement goals are often referred to as deep decarbonization, distinguished because it requires systemic changes to the energy economy. Legal Pathways explains the DDPP reports and then addresses in detail 35 different topics in as many chapters. These 35 chapters cover energy efficiency, conservation, and fuel switching; electricity decarbonization; fuel decarbonization; carbon capture and negative emissions; non-carbon dioxide climate pollutants; and a variety of cross-cutting issues. The legal options involve federal, state, and local law, as well as private governance. Authors were asked to include all options, even if they do not now seem politically realistic or likely, giving Legal Pathways not just immediate value, but also value over time. While both the scale and complexity of deep decarbonization are enormous, this book has a simple message: deep decarbonization is achievable in the United States using laws that exist or could be enacted. These legal tools can be used with significant economic, social, environmental, and national security benefits.https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1000/thumbnail.jp

Customer Engagement Plans for Peak Load Reduction in Residential Smart Grids

In this paper, we propose and study the effectiveness of customer engagement plans that clearly specify the amount of intervention in customer's load settings by the grid operator for peak load reduction. We suggest two different types of plans, including Constant Deviation Plans (CDPs) and Proportional Deviation Plans (PDPs). We define an adjustable reference temperature for both CDPs and PDPs to limit the output temperature of each thermostat load and to control the number of devices eligible to participate in Demand Response Program (DRP). We model thermostat loads as power throttling devices and design algorithms to evaluate the impact of power throttling states and plan parameters on peak load reduction. Based on the simulation results, we recommend PDPs to the customers of a residential community with variable thermostat set point preferences, while CDPs are suitable for customers with similar thermostat set point preferences. If thermostat loads have multiple power throttling states, customer engagement plans with less temperature deviations from thermostat set points are recommended. Contrary to classical ON/OFF control, higher temperature deviations are required to achieve similar amount of peak load reduction. Several other interesting tradeoffs and useful guidelines for designing mutually beneficial incentives for both the grid operator and customers can also be identified

Demand Response and Energy Prosumers: A Legislative Comparison Between Estonia, France and Norway

Written as part of the ARQUS Twinning Programme on “Local Energy Transitions” between Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3 and University of Bergen spring 2022By now, there is a sufficient amount of binding EU legislation enabling the incorporation of energy prosumers and demand response in the national regulations of the Member States. Nevertheless, the Member States are just now transposing the Recast Electricity Regulation and Electricity Directive into their domestic laws for which reason demand-side management and the empowering of consumers has been delayed. Because Norway has not accepted the Clean Energy Package, the relevant EU legislation is not mandatory for them to implement. As for the EU Member States, regardless of the binding rules, they have some discretion in designing the conditions for aggregation, energy prosumers and flexibility services. This results in an array of different regulations in Europe, with some more open to new competitors while others not. Looking into how France, Estonia and Norway (a non-EU state) have regulated these fields showcases that European jurisdictions are still in very different stages of introducing active consumers and independent aggregators to the electricity markets. While France has been leading the game for years by now with actual energy communities and consumers concluding aggregation contracts with their energy suppliers, Estonia has just made these options legally available and is awaiting the emergence of new market participants. Even though Norway produces a lot of energy, there doesn't seem to be a lot of interest in the prosumer-movement. There is not a lot of legislation regarding this, and the existing legislation is not very developed compared to other European countries. The most likely reasons for this are the already low electricity prices and the overwhelming dominance of renewable energy in Norway. Therefore, there is no strong need for greenification and little motivation for consumers becoming prosumers. When it comes to the reviewed legal challenges, the ones still prevalent when it comes to prosumers are enabling consumers to become prosumers without triggering the European Union competition law and without sacrificing the consumers’ right to property. The problem regarding the EU competition law and its state aid regulation has been mostly eliminated though when it comes to prosumers. The issues that States may have to face in the future might be mostly related to protecting the consumers’ personal data when they become prosumers, but also when they choose not to become one. Regarding demand response, the first obstacle is still non-sufficient regulation, as Norway has none and Estonia is still in the process of adopting further rules. Before there are binding rules for network operators to accept flexibility services, whether independent or aggregated, the new market participants won’t be allowed entrance on the market or will be rendered unsuccessful competitors. Furthermore, independent aggregation must be authorised, since retailers still don’t have sufficient interest in becoming aggregators. On the other hand, all markets are moving towards facilitating smaller bids with shorter duration and other more flexible conditions. This is partly triggered by pan-European network codes and regional cooperation projects which aim to harmonise the European electricity markets. Moreover, consumers’ rights as energy prosumers have been codified and therefore expanded which also means that consumers are a step closer to playing a part in the energy transition. On the whole, it seems that things are getting better in time and a lot has changed since the analysis by Zancanella et al in 2017. With the threat of climate change becoming more real every year, so increases the urgency for an energy transition. Involving consumers in the transition and initiating a bottom-up movement in facilitating clean, yet unstable, renewable energy on the market and managing the grid through energy efficiency and demand-side management instead of network expansion is of utmost importance. For consumers to be proactive in the energy transition, governments must create conditions for participation in the electricity markets which at the same time are in accordance with the capabilities of small actors and allow them a fair chance to compete next to the established and experienced market participants. Therefore, the authors of this paper believe that the obstacles remaining in unleashing the full potential of energy prosumers and demand response in Europe are the inactivity of states in making the necessary regulatory changes and the lack of information available to consumers about their rights and possibilities