316 research outputs found
Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions
Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government
agencies, we consider the problem of fairly pricing public goods in a combinatorial
auction. A well-known problem with the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) auction mechanism is that the resulting prices may not be in the core. Loosely
speaking, this means the payments of the winners could be so low, that there are losing
bidders who would have been willing to pay more than the payments of the winning bidders.
Clearly, this ``unfair\u27\u27 outcome is unacceptable for a public-sector auction. Proxy-based
combinatorial auctions,
in which each bidder submits several package bids to a proxy, result in efficient outcomes
and bidder-Pareto-optimal core-payments by winners, thus offering a viable practical alternative
to address this problem.
This paper confronts two critical issues facing the proxy-auction. First, motivated to
minimize a bidder\u27s ability to benefit through strategic manipulation (through collusive
agreement or unilateral action), we demonstrate the strength of a mechanism that minimizes
total payments among all possible proxy auction outcomes, narrowing the previously broad
solution concept. Secondly, we address the computational difficulties of achieving these outcomes
with a constraint-generation approach, promising to broaden the range of applications for which the
proxy-auction achieves a comfortably rapid solution
Allocation in Practice
How do we allocate scarcere sources? How do we fairly allocate costs? These
are two pressing challenges facing society today. I discuss two recent projects
at NICTA concerning resource and cost allocation. In the first, we have been
working with FoodBank Local, a social startup working in collaboration with
food bank charities around the world to optimise the logistics of collecting
and distributing donated food. Before we can distribute this food, we must
decide how to allocate it to different charities and food kitchens. This gives
rise to a fair division problem with several new dimensions, rarely considered
in the literature. In the second, we have been looking at cost allocation
within the distribution network of a large multinational company. This also has
several new dimensions rarely considered in the literature.Comment: To appear in Proc. of 37th edition of the German Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (KI 2014), Springer LNC
Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions over Continuous Goods
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of
different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage
costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which
coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to
obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we show that coalition-proof outcomes are
achieved if the submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of a
polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the complexity of
the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the
property of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that
are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the
constraint sets. Since calculating the payments directly for these mechanisms
is computationally difficult for auctions involving many participants, we
present two computationally efficient methods. Our results are verified with
several case studies based on electricity market data
Efficient and Equitable Airport Slot Allocation
This paper studies slot allocation at congested airports in Europe. First, I discuss the inefficiencies of the current regulation, introduced as part of the liberalisation process of the air transport market. Then, I consider three marked based methods which are suitable to achieve a more efficient allocation of slots to airlines: congestion pricing, auctions and secondary trading. These methods are examined in terms of their ability to improve efficiency and in terms of their implications on the distribution of slots’ scarcity rents. Special attention is drawn to complementarities between slots. Finally, I propose to auction slots periodically, allowing secondary trading well before the first auction takes place. By selling slots before the first auction incumbents can be partially compensated for the subsequent withdrawal of their slots.
Combinatorial auctions in practice
We survey the uses of combinatorial auctions that have been deployed in practice, giving emphasis to their key representational and economic aspects. In addition, we discuss behavioral economics considerations on both the bidder and auctioneer sides of the market, and the interrelated topics of simplicity and trust, highlighting key opportunities for future work
- …