Deontic Logic and Natural Language

There has been a recent surge of work on deontic modality within philosophy of language. This work has put the deontic logic tradition in contact with natural language semantics, resulting in significant increase in sophistication on both ends. This chapter surveys the main motivations, achievements, and prospects of this work

Practical Language: Its Meaning and Use

I demonstrate that a "speech act" theory of meaning for imperatives is—contra a dominant position in philosophy and linguistics—theoretically desirable. A speech act-theoretic account of the meaning of an imperative !φ is characterized, broadly, by the following claims. LINGUISTIC MEANING AS USE !φ’s meaning is a matter of the speech act an utterance of it conventionally functions to express—what a speaker conventionally uses it to do (its conventional discourse function, CDF). IMPERATIVE USE AS PRACTICAL !φ's CDF is to express a practical (non-representational) state of mind—one concerning an agent's preferences and plans, rather than her beliefs. Opposed to speech act accounts is a preponderance of views which deny that a sentence's linguistic meaning is a matter of what speech act it is used to perform, or its CDF. On such accounts, meaning is, instead, a matter of "static" properties of the sentence—e.g., how it depicts the world as being (or, more neutrally, the properties of a model-theoretic object with which the semantic value of the sentence co-varies). On one version of a static account, an imperative 'shut the window!' might, for instance, depict the world as being such that the window must be shut. Static accounts are traditionally motivated against speech act-theoretic accounts by appeal to supposedly irremediable explanatory deficiencies in the latter. Whatever a static account loses in saying (prima facie counterintuitively) that an imperative conventionally represents, or expresses a picture of the world, is said to be offset by its ability to explain a variety of phenomena for which speech act-theoretic accounts are said to lack good explanations (even, in many cases, the bare ability to offer something that might meet basic criteria on what a good explanation should be like). I aim to turn the tables on static accounts. I do this by showing that speech act accounts are capable of giving explanations of phenomena which fans of static accounts have alleged them unable to give. Indeed, for a variety of absolutely fundamental phenomena having to do with the conventional meaning of imperatives (and other types of practical language), speech act accounts provide natural and theoretically satisfying explanations, where a representational account provides none

Practical Language: Its Meaning and Use.

I demonstrate that a "speech act" theory of meaning for imperatives is—contra a dominant position in philosophy and linguistics—theoretically desirable. A speech act account of the meaning of an imperative !φ is characterized, broadly, by the following claims. LINGUISTIC MEANING AS USE !φ's meaning is a matter of the speech act an utterance of it conventionally functions to express—what a speaker conventionally uses it to do (its conventional discourse function, CDF). IMPERATIVE USE AS PRACTICAL !φ's CDF is to express a practical (non-representational) state of mind—one concerning an agent's preferences and plans, rather than her beliefs. Opposed to speech act accounts is a preponderance of views which deny a sentence's linguistic meaning is a matter of its CDF. On such accounts, meaning is, instead, a matter of "static" properties of the sentence—e.g., how it depicts the world as being (or, more neutrally, the properties of a model-theoretic object with which the semantic value of the sentence co-varies). On one version of a static account, an imperative 'shut the window!' might, for instance, depict the world as being such that the window must be shut. Static accounts are traditionally motivated against speech act-theoretic accounts by appeal to supposedly irremediable explanatory deficiencies in the latter. Whatever a static account loses in saying (prima facie counterintuitively) that an imperative conventionally represents, or expresses a picture of the world, is said to be offset by its ability to explain a variety of phenomena for which speech act-theoretic accounts are said to lack good explanations (even, in many cases, the bare ability to offer something that might meet basic criteria on what a good explanation should be like). I aim to turn the tables on static accounts. I do this by showing that speech act accounts are capable of giving explanations of phenomena which fans of static accounts have alleged them unable to give. Indeed, for a variety of absolutely fundamental phenomena having to do with the conventional meaning of imperatives (and other types of practical language), speech act accounts provide natural and theoretically satisfying explanations, where a representational account provides none.Ph.D.PhilosophyUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/89709/1/ncharlo_1.pd

Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21

TesisSe realizó un análisis clínico-electrocardiográfico integral de los hemibloqueos comprendiendo incidencia, edad, etiología, evaluación cuantitativa de los criterios diagnósticos, relación con los trastornos de conducción aurículo-ventricular, y pronóstico. Con tal motivo se estudiaron 221hemibloqueos encontrados en 7,130 pacientes adultos de sexo masculino en un servicio de cardiología y medicina. Los hemibloqueos fueron diagnosticados mediante los criterios señalados por Rosenbaum, Castellanos, y Prior y Blount

Logics of Responsibility

The study of responsibility is a complicated matter. The term is used in different ways in different fields, and it is easy to engage in everyday discussions as to why someone should be considered responsible for something. Typically, the backdrop of these discussions involves social, legal, moral, or philosophical problems. A clear pattern in all these spheres is the intent of issuing standards for when---and to what extent---an agent should be held responsible for a state of affairs. This is where Logic lends a hand. The development of expressive logics---to reason about agents' decisions in situations with moral consequences---involves devising unequivocal representations of components of behavior that are highly relevant to systematic responsibility attribution and to systematic blame-or-praise assignment. To put it plainly, expressive syntactic-and-semantic frameworks help us analyze responsibility-related problems in a methodical way. This thesis builds a formal theory of responsibility. The main tool used toward this aim is modal logic and, more specifically, a class of modal logics of action known as stit theory. The underlying motivation is to provide theoretical foundations for using symbolic techniques in the construction of ethical AI. Thus, this work means a contribution to formal philosophy and symbolic AI. The thesis's methodology consists in the development of stit-theoretic models and languages to explore the interplay between the following components of responsibility: agency, knowledge, beliefs, intentions, and obligations. Said models are integrated into a framework that is rich enough to provide logic-based characterizations for three categories of responsibility: causal, informational, and motivational responsibility. The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses at length stit theory, a logic that formalizes the notion of agency in the world over an indeterministic conception of time known as branching time. The idea is that agents act by constraining possible futures to definite subsets. On the road to formalizing informational responsibility, Chapter 3 extends stit theory with traditional epistemic notions (knowledge and belief). Thus, the chapter formalizes important aspects of agents' reasoning in the choice and performance of actions. In a context of responsibility attribution and excusability, Chapter 4 extends epistemic stit theory with measures of optimality of actions that underlie obligations. In essence, this chapter formalizes the interplay between agents' knowledge and what they ought to do. On the road to formalizing motivational responsibility, Chapter 5 adds intentions and intentional actions to epistemic stit theory and reasons about the interplay between knowledge and intentionality. Finally, Chapter 6 merges the previous chapters' formalisms into a rich logic that is able to express and model different modes of the aforementioned categories of responsibility. Technically, the most important contributions of this thesis lie in the axiomatizations of all the introduced logics. In particular, the proofs of soundness & completeness results involve long, step-by-step procedures that make use of novel techniques

Logics for strategic reasoning and collective decision-making

Strategic decision-making is ubiquitous in everyday life. The analysis of game strategies has been a research theme in game theory for several decades since von Neumann and Morgenstern. Sophisticated models and analysis tools have been developed with wide applications in Economics, Management Science, Social Science and Computer Science, especially in the field of Artificial Intelligence. However, \much of game theory is about the question whether strategic equilibria exist", as Johan van Benthem, a world-leading logician and game-theorist, points out, \but there are hardly any explicit languages for defining, comparing, or combining strategies". Without such a facility it is challenging for computer scientists to build intelligent agents that are capable of strategic decision-making. In the last twenty years, logical approaches have been proposed to tackle this problem. Pioneering work includes Game Logics, Coalition Logic and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). These logics either provide facilities for expressing and combining games or offer mechanisms for reasoning about strategic abilities of players. But none of them can solve the problem. The intrinsic difficulty in establishing such a logic is that reasoning about strategies requires combinations of temporal reasoning, counterfactual reasoning, reasoning about actions, preferences and knowledge, as well as reasoning about multi-agent interactions and coalitional abilities. More recently, a few new logical formalisms have been proposed by extending ATL with strategy variables in order to express strategies explicitly. However, most of these logics tend to have high computational complexity, because ATL introduces quantifications over strategies (functions), which leaves little hope of building any tractable inference system based on such a logic. This thesis takes up the challenge by using a bottom-up approach in order to create a balance between expressive power and computational efficiency. Instead of starting with a highly complicated logic, we propose a set of logical frameworks based on a simple and practical logical language, called Game Description Language (GDL), which has been used as an official language for General Game Playing (GGP) since 2005. To represent game strategies, we extend GDL with two binary prioritized connectives for combining actions in terms of their priorities specified by these connectives, and provide it with a semantics based on the standard state transition model. To reason about the strategic abilities of players, we further extend the framework with coalition operators from ATL for specifying the strategic abilities of players. More importantly, a unified semantics is provided for both GDL- and ATL- formulas, which allows us to verify and reason about game strategies. Interestingly, the framework can be used to formalize the fundamental game-playing principles and formally derive two well-known results on two-player games: Weak Determinacy and Zermelo's Theorem. We also show that the model-checking problem of the logic is not worse than that of ATL*, an extension of ATL. To deal with imperfect information games, we extend GDL with the standard epistemic operators and provide it with a semantics based on the epistemic state transition model. The language allows us to specify an imperfect information game and formalize its epistemic properties. Meanwhile, the framework allows us to reason about players' own as well as other players' knowledge during game playing. Most importantly, the logic has a moderate computational complexity, which makes it significantly different from similar existing frameworks. To investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of players and its coalitional abilities, we provide a variant of semantics for ATL with imperfect information. The relation between knowledge sharing and coalitional abilities is investigated through the interplay of epistemic and coalition modalities. Moreover, this semantics is able to preserve the desirable properties of coalitional abilities. To deal with collective decision-making, we apply the approach of combining actions via their priorities for collective choice. We extend propositional logic with the prioritized connective for modelling reason-based individual and collective choices. Not only individual preferences but also aggregation rules can be expressed within this logic. A model-checking algorithm for this logic is thus developed to automatically generate individual and collective choices. In many real-world situations, a group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups different priorities to determine the collective judgment. We design an aggregation rule based on the priorities of individuals so as to investigate how the judgment from each individual affects group judgment in a hierarchical environment. We also show that this rule satisfies a set of plausible conditions and has a tractable computational complexity

Logics for strategic reasoning and collective decision-making

Cette thèse aborde le problème du raisonnement stratégique. Le raisonnement stratégique est un thème de recherches existant depuis e nombreuses années en théorie des jeux. Toutefois, celui-ci a le plus souvent pour objet de déterminer si des équilibres stratégiques existent sans détailler la définition en elle-même de ces stratégies. La construction d'agents artificiels capable de raisonner stratégiquement implique de se poser la question de la représentation de ces stratégies afin que les agents puissent les construire, combiner, comparer et enfin et surtout exécuter. Cette thèse propose un ensemble de logiques pour le raisonnement stratégique et la prise de décision collective. Elle établit dans un premier temps un cadre unifiée pour la définition de jeux, la représentation de stratégies et le raisonnement sur celles-ci dans le contexte des jeux à information parfaite. Ce cadre est ensuite étendu pour prendre en compte les jeux à information imparfaite. Les relations entre les connaissances de groupe, le pouvoir des coalitions ainsi que le partage d'informations dans une coalition sont ensuite étudiés. Dans un dernier temps, est introduit une logique modale permettant de de raisonner sur les choix collectifs, cette logique permet de généraliser les approches logiques existantes pour l'agrégation de jugements. La complexité de ces différents cadres logiques est aussi étudiée et nous montrons que ces différents cadres offre un équilibre pertinent entre efficacité computationnelle et pouvoir d'expression.This thesis proposes a set of logics for modelling strategic reasoning and collective decision-making. It first establishes a unified logical framework for game specifications, strategy representation and strategic reasoning in perfect information games. Based on that, it proposes an epistemic extension to address imperfect information games. To investigate the interplay of group knowledge and coalitional abilities, it further models knowledge sharing within coalitions. Finally it introduces a modal logic for collective choice and generalizes the logic-based approach to judgment aggregation. The complexity analysis of these logics indicates that these frameworks make a good balance between expressive power and computational efficiency

Multivalued Logic, Neutrosophy and Schrodinger equation

This book was intended to discuss some paradoxes in Quantum Mechanics from the viewpoint of Multi-Valued-logic pioneered by Lukasiewicz, and a recent concept Neutrosophic Logic. Essentially, this new concept offers new insights on the idea of ‘identity’, which too often it has been accepted as given. Neutrosophy itself was developed in attempt to generalize Fuzzy-Logic introduced by L. Zadeh. While some aspects of theoretical foundations of logic are discussed, this book is not intended solely for pure mathematicians, but instead for physicists in the hope that some of ideas presented herein will be found useful. The book is motivated by observation that despite almost eight decades, there is indication that some of those paradoxes known in Quantum Physics are not yet solved. In our knowledge, this is because the solution of those paradoxes requires re-examination of the foundations of logic itself, in particular on the notion of identity and multi-valuedness of entity. The book is also intended for young physicist fellows who think that somewhere there should be a ‘complete’ explanation of these paradoxes in Quantum Mechanics. If this book doesn’t answer all of their questions, it is our hope that at least it offers a new alternative viewpoint for these old questions