1 research outputs found
Facility location with double-peaked preference
We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on
the reports of self-interested agents, when agents have double-peaked
preferences, with the peaks being on opposite sides of their locations. We
observe that double-peaked preferences capture real-life scenarios and thus
complement the well-studied notion of single-peaked preferences. We mainly
focus on the case where peaks are equidistant from the agents' locations and
discuss how our results extend to more general settings. We show that most of
the results for single-peaked preferences do not directly apply to this
setting; this makes the problem essentially more challenging. As our main
contribution, we present a simple truthful-in-expectation mechanism that
achieves an approximation ratio of 1+b/c for both the social and the maximum
cost, where b is the distance of the agent from the peak and c is the minimum
cost of an agent. For the latter case, we provide a 3/2 lower bound on the
approximation ratio of any truthful-in-expectation mechanism. We also study
deterministic mechanisms under some natural conditions, proving lower bounds
and approximation guarantees. We prove that among a large class of reasonable
mechanisms, there is no deterministic mechanism that outperforms our
truthful-in-expectation mechanism