The foundations of conscientious objection: against freedom and autonomy

According to the common view, conscientious objection is grounded in autonomy or in ‘freedom of conscience’ and is tolerated out of respect for the objector's autonomy. Emphasising freedom of conscience or autonomy as a central concept within the issue of conscientious objection implies that the conscientious objector should have an independent choice among alternative beliefs, positions or values. In this paper it is argued that: (a) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector has such a choice when they decide to act upon their conscience and (b) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector exercises autonomy when developing or acquiring their conscience. Therefore, with regard to tolerating conscientious objection, we should apply the concept of autonomy with caution, as tolerating conscientious objection does not reflect respect for the conscientious objector’s right to choose but rather acknowledges their lack of real ability to choose their conscience and to refrain from acting upon their conscience. This has both normative and analytical implications for the treatment of conscientious objectors

The concept of free will as an infinite metatheoretic recursion

It is argued that the concept of free will, like the concept of truth in formal languages, requires a separation between an object level and a meta-level for being consistently defined. The Jamesian two-stage model, which deconstructs free will into the causally open "free" stage with its closure in the "will" stage, is implicitly a move in this direction. However, to avoid the dilemma of determinism, free will additionally requires an infinite regress of causal meta-stages, making free choice a hypertask. We use this model to define free will of the rationalist-compatibilist type. This is shown to provide a natural three-way distinction between quantum indeterminism, freedom and free will, applicable respectively to artificial intelligence (AI), animal agents and human agents. We propose that the causal hierarchy in our model corresponds to a hierarchy of Turing uncomputability. Possible neurobiological and behavioral tests to demonstrate free will experimentally are suggested. Ramifications of the model for physics, evolutionary biology, neuroscience, neuropathological medicine and moral philosophy are briefly outlined.Comment: Accepted in INDECS (close to the accepted version

A General Approach for the Analysis of Habitat Selection

Investigating habitat selection of animals aims at the detection of preferred and avoided habitat types as well as at the identification of covariates influencing the choice of certain habitat types. The final goal of such analyses is an improvement of the conservation of animals. Usually, habitat selection by larger animals is assessed by radio-tracking or visual observation studies, where the chosen habitat is determined for a number of animals at a set of time points. Hence the resulting data often have the following structure: A categorical variable indicating the habitat type selected by an animal at a specific time point is repeatedly observed and shall be explained by covariates. These may either describe properties of the habitat types currently available and / or properties of the animal. In this paper, we present a general approach for the analysis of such data in a categorical regression setup. The proposed model generalises and improves upon several of the approaches previously discussed in the literature and in particular allows to account for changing habitat availability due to the movement of animals within the observation area. It incorporates both habitat- and animal-specific covariates, and includes individual-specific random effects in order to account for correlations introduced by the repeated measurements on single animals. The methodology is implemented in a freely available software package. We demonstrate the general applicability and the capabilities of the proposed approach in two case studies: The analysis of a songbird in South-America and a study on brown bears in Central Europe

Constitutional Democracy and Public Judgements

This paper proposes a new conceptual framework of a liberal social order, which emphasizes the freedom of action in social interaction and the freedom of participation in social rule-making process. Our articulation of public decision-making process can be interpreted as a formal way of capturing the essence of constitutional democracy, which is an impure mixture of constructivist rationalism and evolutionary rationalism, since we are bringing what is spontaneously evolved through individual experiments into the stage of public design and social choice of a new institutional set of rules. It is also construed as an impure mixture of perfect procedural fairness and pure procedural fairness, since the public judgements to be formed through public deliberations should pay due attention to the intrinsic value of procedures in conferring agency freedom to individuals, as well as to the instrumental value of procedures in expanding well-being freedom of individuals.

Conceptions of Individual Rights and Freedom in Welfare Economics: A Re-examination

This paper examines the literature in welfare economics with a focus on individual rights and freedom, two important components in welfare economics. The paper discusses conceptions of rights and freedom intuitively and presents a critical examination of the existing literature. Working Paper 07-3

Utilitarian Collective Choice and Voting

In his seminal Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow stated that his theory applies to voting. Many voting theorists have been convinced that, on account of Arrow’s theorem, all voting methods must be seriously flawed. Arrow’s theory is strictly ordinal, the cardinal aggregation of preferences being explicitly rejected. In this paper I point out that all voting methods are cardinal and therefore outside the reach of Arrow’s result. Parallel to Arrow’s ordinal approach, there evolved a consistent cardinal theory of collective choice. This theory, most prominently associated with the work of Harsanyi, continued the older utilitarian tradition in a more formal style. The purpose of this paper is to show that various derivations of utilitarian SWFs can also be used to derive utilitarian voting (UV). By this I mean a voting rule that allows the voter to score each alternative in accordance with a given scale. UV-k indicates a scale with k distinct values. The general theory leaves k to be determined on pragmatic grounds. A (1,0) scale gives approval voting. I prefer the scale (1,0,-1) and refer to the resulting voting rule as evaluative voting. A conclusion of the paper is that the defects of conventional voting methods result not from Arrow’s theorem, but rather from restrictions imposed on voters’ expression of their preferences. The analysis is extended to strategic voting, utilizing a novel set of assumptions regarding voter behavior

The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics in a Non-Welfaristic Approach

This paper investigates extensions of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics to the framework in which each agent is endowed with three types of preference relations: an allocation preference relation, an opportunity preference relation, and an overall preference relation. It is shown that, under certain conditions, the two theorems can be extended. It is also pointed out that the conditions underlying the positive results are restrictive.

On Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions

In this paper, criticizing the welfarist's framework in traditional welfare economics which provides a rather limited perspective for social evaluation, we propose a more comprehensive framework in which extended social ordering functions (ESOFs) are introduced. In this framework, not only welfaristic values, but also non-welfaristic values can be treated appropriately. Then, we examine the possibility of non-welfarist ESOFs which meet a value of Individual Autonomy, a criterion of non-welfairst distributive justice, and the welfarist Pareto principle. First, there is no first best ESOF in the sense that the above three axioms are satisfied simultaneously. Second, however, we can show the existence of some second best ESOFs, using a weaker lexicographic application method.

Transformation without Paternalism

Human development is meant to be transformational in that it aims to improve people's lives by enhancing their capabilities. But who does it target: people as they are or the people they will become? This paper argues that the human development approach relies on an understanding of personal identity as dynamic rather than as static collections of preferences, and that this distinguishes human development from conventional approaches to development. Nevertheless, this dynamic understanding of personal identity is presently poorly conceptualized and this has implications for development practice. We identify a danger of paternalism and propose institutionalizing two procedural principles as side constraints on development policies and projects: the principle of free prior informed consent and the principle of democratic development