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Transformation without Paternalism

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Abstract: Human development is meant to be transformational in that it aims to improve people’s lives by enhancing their capabilities. But who does it target: people as they are or the people they will become? This paper argues that the human development approach relies on an understanding of personal identity as dynamic rather than as static collections of preferences, and that this distinguishes human development from conventional approaches to development. Nevertheless this dynamic understanding of personal identity is presently poorly conceptualized and this has implications for development practice. We identify a danger of paternalism and propose institutionalizing two procedural principles as side constraints on development policies and projects: the principle of free prior informed consent, and the principle of democratic development.

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JEL codes: D63, D99, L31, O15, O29
Human development is a transformational project. It is about changing people’s lives for the better. This is so obvious that one might suppose it wouldn’t need saying. And yet the transformative nature of development has controversial implications that are rarely explicitly considered. Do the people concerned agree that their lives are deficient? Do they freely consent to the process of development, or is it something that is done to them? Are they better off after development than they were before, or merely changed? Intuitively, something is amiss if we cannot give affirmative answers to these questions. Should we even call it development? This paper is concerned with elucidating the ethical implications and constraints that follow from examining the idea of development as transformation. These issues have, we believe, been relatively neglected in the development literature, including that of the human development approach.

Other ‘conventional’ accounts of development may fudge the issue of transformation by speaking only of enhancing people’s capacities to live well, for example in terms of meeting people’s existing basic needs, or increasing their ability to satisfy their existing wants (perhaps by increasing their ‘budget’ through economic development). In such accounts, people’s values are understood as essentially passive and static with respect to the development process itself, and the challenge of development is merely to help them to better live the lives they now have. In contrast, the human development approach has directly transformational goals: to enhance people’s freedom to live the kinds of lives they have reason to value. Not only is its focus on people rather than the means of development, but it actively engages those concerned in two ways in an approach to development understood “as a participatory and dynamic process” (UNDP 1990, 11). Its goal is that people become more truly the authors of their own lives, and it considers this active authorship also the means by which development should be achieved (cf. Sen 1999a, 18–9). The human development approach thus has no choice but to face up to the conceptual and ethical implications of personal transformation.

The general risk in neglecting the ethics of transformation is paternalism: directly substituting one’s own values for those one is trying to help. That is inconsistent with the centrality of self-authorship to the human development approach. Nevertheless, paternalism is an ever present danger in work on development and one which can creep in all too easily in the company of good intentions. This paper seeks to make three distinct contributions to preventing paternalism in development, one theoretical and two practical.
First, although the capability approach understands persons as agents, it represents people in terms of their location in the capability space (that is, in terms of the set of functioning n-tuples to which they have effective access). This way of representing persons can be problematic to the extent that it suggests a thin, static, and passive sense of personal identity that distorts evaluation or policy. We address this by introducing the concept of a ‘personal identity capability’, a conception of personal autonomy analyzed as a capability. Thus theorized, persons are understood not only in the general, somewhat diffuse sense of the agent as a “doer and a judge” (Sen 1985, 208), but as able to take up a reflective stance towards themselves as a person persisting and yet developing over time, and to make plans and choices accordingly.

Second, we argue that this theoretical representation provides a new goal and side-constraint for development practice. The protection and enhancement of individuals’ personal identity capability should be recognised as an important goal in its own right. And it should also be recognised as a requirement for any policy to count as human development, rather than as something else. Applying this is not straightforward, however, and this leads us to make two specific proposals for development practice. We first introduce the principle of Free Prior Informed Consent as a central ethical concept for organizing and guiding ethical reflection in the practice of development. Second, we argue that Democratic Development, in which the people concerned participate deliberatively in deciding what kind of development programmes they want, and thus the kind of transformations that will take place, is not only a generally good thing among others. Like free prior informed consent it should be understood as a necessary condition for any project claiming to be part of the human development approach.

In the following section we contrast the conventional development and human development approaches to demonstrate the directly transformative aspirations of the latter. Section II analyses how neglect of the transformational character of development can lead to methodological and ethical problems. Section III introduces the concept of a personal identity capability, and argues that it offers a way of overcoming these problems. Section IV introduces the principle of informed consent and its place in development practice. Section V analyses the necessary relationship between democracy and human development.
I. Development as Transformation

Sen has distinguished the capability approach to development from its alternatives in terms of their respective focuses. He claims that conventional approaches all focus, in one way or another, on providing the means and circumstances for a better life (what we term 'capacity building'). In practice this has meant the ‘fetishisation’ of indirectly relevant features, such as economic growth, at the expense of what is of direct relevance - the ability of individuals to live lives they have reason to value. The capability approach addresses this tendency by subsuming the logistical concerns of its alternatives within an account of development that puts people at the centre (UNDP 1990, chap. 1). Nevertheless, a focus on the means of development has one apparent advantage: it allows an evasion of explicit consideration of important ethical concerns about individual transformation. In contrast, the capability approach must address these concerns directly.

Conventional ‘capacity building’ accounts of development policy tend to represent, or implicitly assume a view of, the individual as having an unchanging personal identity with respect to the development process. This does not mean that development policies aren’t expected or even intended to change people’s choice behaviour. For example, the recent ‘institutional turn’ in development economics has brought attention to problematic social norms like corruption that reduce and distort economic growth, while the human capital approach emphasises how investing in children’s education and health can pay off, both for them and for society as a whole. Development policies directed at these goals (reducing corruption, increasing schooling) are generally oriented to institutional reforms and incentives; that is to changing the constraints that individuals face (principally, budgetary and informational), but not, directly, to transforming their values or preferences. For instance, Kaushik Basu (as Chief Economic Adviser to the Government of India) proposed making it legal to pay harassment bribes, but not to receive them (Basu 2011); evidence from randomised controlled trials has been used to suggest small adjustments to the costs and benefits of schooling to make it more attractive to parents, such as providing free school uniforms and free lunches (see e.g. Banerjee and Duflo 2011). Thus, in both cases, the objective seems to be not the transformation of individual values, but the promotion of certain behavioural patterns conducive to improving the functioning of the economy and reducing material poverty.
A similar point can be made about the Basic Needs Approach to development, which flourished briefly from the mid-1970s to early 1980s in response to the perceived failings of GDP growth-based approaches to development and income based views of poverty, before being largely subsumed within the human development approach. Although in theory the Basic Needs Approach was explicitly concerned with democratic participation as well as with meeting minimum requirements for goods and services like food, shelter, sanitation and education, in practice democratic participation was often considered separately if at all.\(^4\) Thus, in practice, the Basic Needs Approach was mainly a technocratic enterprise concerned with the logistics of serving externally identified universal needs. Hence also its general lack of engagement with the people concerned in determining what their needs were - which seems to have been perceived as patronising and harmed its reception in poor countries (Stewart 2007, 15). The same neglect of democratic deliberation can be seen in contemporary examples of Basic Needs style development policies, such as the Millennium Development Goals project.

Thus, what we have termed ‘capacity building’ approaches to development do not conceive the goal or processes of development to be transformational. Instead they are focused on and justified by their concern with increasing people’s capacity to live the lives they already have (whether that is understood in terms of meeting their basic needs as humans or their personal consumption preferences\(^5\)). Taking this perspective evades having to address the ethical controversies involved in the idea of development as transformation. But of course, capacity building development still transforms people. It just does so indirectly and without evaluation, direction, or accountability. As Denis Goulet, a pioneer of development ethics, noted,

The experience which villagers in traditional societies have of what Westerners call technical or economic progress is that the values which matter most to them – religious institutions, local practices, and extended family solidarity networks – fall apart under the impact of technology, the monetization of the economy, and the specialization of tasks. (Goulet 1992, 468)

In contrast, the human development approach is concerned not only with making people’s lives go better, but also often directly with transforming them. For example it sees education as important not merely for increasing economic productivity via human capital formation, but also for directly \textit{transforming} the
lives of individuals (their capability for practical reasoning, their social relations, the way that what they read may change them, and so on) and, indirectly, for transforming society (by enhancing the inclusivity and quality of public debate about social norms like family size) (Sen 1997). Making this explicit directs our attention to how the capability approach should understand and represent individuals – in terms of agency, not preference orderings or sets of needs.

Unlike conventional development, then, the human development approach deliberately sets out to transform people’s lives. The way the capability approach represents individuals, in terms of their location in the capability space, reflects this, since changing (improving) a person’s location is the goal of development. Although the capability approach is often said to be concerned with ‘expanding’ individuals’ capability sets (including by Sen (Sen 1989)) the word ‘expansion’ may be misleading, since the capability approach is actually concerned with enhancing the quality of options people have access to rather than merely adding to them. This is an important distinction, because development doesn’t simply provide people with additional options on top of what they already had, such as for industrial sector formal employment as well as their present self-employed craftwork. It is quite likely that the new options will permanently displace old ones; for instance, a modern textile factory may render traditional production methods such as Gandhi’s famous spinning wheel uneconomical. This is an important reason to ensure that the new options really are better than the old ones, i.e. that one has development rather than merely change. ‘Capability enhancement’ may therefore be a better term for what the capability approach is concerned to achieve.

Development understood as capability enhancement has transformative implications for individuals’ lifestyles and values, and for societies in general. Achievements of some functionings may lead to a re-evaluation and re-ranking of other functionings. For example, increased individual mobility may change how an individual - and society as a whole - values community and family life and associated norms. Development will likely also change the definition of particular capabilities, such as what constitutes adequate health-care or literacy (often making their requirements more substantial). To give a more concrete example, women’s literacy is strongly associated with increased empowerment and substantial effects on social norms around family life, including lower fertility and a more equal intra-family distribution of resources between males and females (Alkire 2005, 255–271; 294–6; Sen 1999a, 198–9). Altogether then,
the capability approach to development expects (and promotes) multiple transformations in individuals’ and society’s self-understanding, values, and ways of life: some intended, others unintended but foreseeable, and yet others that are more or less unknowable.

The value of a person’s capability set is understood in terms of her effective access to functioning combinations she has reason to value. Thus, an individual’s capability depends not only on her commodity entitlements and ability to convert them into functionings (the logistical aspect of the capability approach), but also on her reasoned valuation. What kinds of life an individual has reason to value will depend on her concerns and interests, which may be quite different from other people’s, though still influenced by local social norms and arrangements. The important point to note is that this valuation is dynamic and endogenous to the development process itself. That is, as part of the development process individuals are expected to change their views both about which specific capabilities matter and about what constitutes a good life.

How can people be understood as changing in this way while remaining the same people? The capability approach is evolutionary in that having any particular set of capabilities opens the door to acquiring additional capabilities. For example, when a person achieves a certain level of education, they then have opportunities for employment they previously did not have. Thus the person with basic literacy in her native language who exercises her capability for further education and chooses to pursue an advanced degree in, say, ancient Sanskrit literature. Pursuing this option will shape her future capabilities for work and leisure, while the commitment it requires may also reduce her access to other, plausibly valuable, kinds of life and specific capabilities that were originally open to her (cf Livet 2006). That is, individuals are understood as autonomous agents who are engaged with development in a co-evolutionary way.

There is no claim here, as there is implicitly in the capacity building approaches, that development is something that happens apart from individuals and their values. Unlike those accounts, the capability approach cannot avoid directly addressing the ethical challenges involved in combining a commitment to autonomous agency with the fact of transformative development. The first part of addressing that challenge is to give a clearer account of agent autonomy. How should the capability approach conceptualize the ability of people to be the author of their own lives, to change while remaining the same person?
II. Is Development Good for the Individuals Concerned? The Autonomy Critique

Writing with Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen identifies two ways in which development can undermine values (Nussbaum and Sen 1989). First there is what he calls ‘object failure’: when structural changes make traditionally valued goods or ways of life more expensive or difficult to obtain. For example, industrialization may increase the relative costs of labour intensive goods such as religious rituals or traditional dress, or land reform may make many of the traditional ways of life of nomadic peoples impossible. This may be experienced directly as a sense of loss.

Second, and analytically much more difficult, is what Sen calls ‘value rejection’: when people turn against their old values. For example, Buddhist Japan was once religiously vegetarian but meat-eating became ubiquitous with Japan’s rise to opulence; in Nepal the nuclear family household model is rapidly displacing the extended family; and so on. Value rejection is methodologically problematic because the frame of reference is itself changed, so whether the change is a loss or a gain for those concerned cannot be read off from either their antecedent or subsequent values. Indeed those values may be incommensurable. It is ethically problematic, in terms of paternalism, because it opens a space for a stable external ‘guardian’ authority to provide that evaluation, an authority which, by definition, cannot be held accountable to those concerned. When the same authority is in a position to deliberately engineer that value rejection, all the elements are in place for paternalistic development policy. Such paternalism is quite different from providing information or arguments to persuade people to see that a different life would be better or that certain of their values are invidious, such as excluding girl children from education. Honest persuasion respects the autonomy of others, their right to determine for themselves by their own reasoning what plans of life follow from their conception of the good, including revisions to their values in the light of new reasons, information, or options.

To identify more specifically how such paternalism may occur inadvertently even in well-intended (beneficent) development projects we analyse it in terms of the relationship between distinct intertemporal selves of the individuals concerned. Our ‘autonomy critique’ here parallels a famous criticism of utilitarianism for disregarding the proper boundaries between persons in its
The use of sum ranking (cf. Rawls 1999, 24; Sen 1999a, 57). In that approach states of the world are assessed only in terms of the total sum of welfare (however defined), and possible states are ranked in terms of desirability from highest to lowest scores. Snapshots of social welfare are taken at different times and if aggregate welfare at time$_2$ is higher than at time$_1$, then welfare is considered improved, even though the welfare of some particular individuals may have declined quite severely. With sum-ranking, the welfare of some individuals may be sacrificed for aggregate improvement, and this is part of what is generally recognized to be ethically problematic about conventional economic development programs. When a dam is built in a rural area to provide hydro-electric power for cities, it seems questionable to call the results for those displaced from their homes, communities, and livelihoods ‘development’ since their lives have been made worse (cf. Roy 1999).

The autonomy critique raises similar questions about the sacrifice of some individuals’ welfare for the sake of others, but focuses on respecting the interests and values of inter-temporal selves within the life of the same individual. Development is often understood and evaluated as an end-state: the production of people with certain features, whether that be greater opulence or an expanded capability set. For example literacy or morbidity statistics are compared before and after a policy intervention. The problem is that this comparative statics approach neglects the dimension of ‘becoming’, including the processes by which an outcome is brought about and whether these respect the personal autonomy of those concerned. Extending the evaluation of individual advantage to the capability space (i.e. to incorporate non-pecuniary ‘beings and doings’ such as empowerment and literacy) enriches the comparative statics analysis but does not address this dimension of becoming.

The ethical force of the autonomy critique is to highlight the possibly illegitimate conflation of a person’s interests and values at different points in time. It is motivated by a concern to justify and assess development with proper regard to each person as a “doer and a judge” before as well as after they take part: no-one may be ‘forced to be free’, even for their own future self’s sake. Even if everyone agrees that the ‘developed life’ is better - and even if the ‘developed person’ herself endorses that ex post - one may still be uneasy (cf. Elster 1982). Firstly about the ethical justification for development if the ex ante evaluation and concerns of that person are ignored or neglected. And secondly about how one could assess the benefits or failings of these changes to that person without considering the perspective she started from as well as
where she ended up. There is a troubling circularity in assessing and justifying development only or mainly from the single perspective of the conclusion.

A nice example of the problems this raises may be found in Sabina Alkire’s pioneering work, in *Valuing Freedoms* (2005), on operationalizing the capability approach by developing a capability based approach to the cost-benefit evaluation of development projects. Alkire considers various exemplary NGO projects in Pakistan, such as rose cultivation and goat raising, and shows how the capability approach allows a wider range of significant impacts to be included in evaluation than merely financial returns.

However in one Oxfam project, teaching adult female literacy, inter-temporal problems appear (Alkire 2005, 255–271; 294–6). Alkire relates that the program was promoted to women and taken up by them (with the permission of their fathers/husbands) principally on the basis of claims that it would make them more employable. Oxfam’s other aim of empowering the women was not emphasized or even necessarily explained (though the choice of teaching methods inspired by Paulo Freire suggests its centrality). There were however no job opportunities for the graduates in the local area since no suitable workplaces would employ women. Nevertheless Alkire says that the project “had a fundamental and transformative impact on the women students” (Alkire 2005, 256): they reported increased empowerment and greatly valued this, despite it not being one of their original reasons for participating.

What seems problematic about the literacy project is not the promotion of specific transformative goals like empowerment, but its structure, which raises questions about both legitimacy and assessment. One can question the legitimacy of recruiting people to projects by appealing to interests which it is known will not be fulfilled. Are those people being properly respected as bearers of ends, or are they being used as means for the furtherance of the interests of their future selves? Indeed, Alkire herself is somewhat troubled by the possible duplicity or paternalism in how the literacy program was presented as opposed to how it worked. She notes that her capability-based approach to the evaluation of development projects “does not provide a way to distinguish activities which use informed consent from activities in which consent is built during the process” (Alkire 2005, 296).

One can also be sceptical of cost-benefit analysis in such cases since the valuational frame of reference is not constant and it is unclear which set of values truly represents the individual concerned. From the perspective of the women at the point they agreed to take part in the literacy programme, it might
be seen as a failure, or at least less of a success, because the main projected benefit – jobs – did not appear, while the costs in terms of time were significant. If those women had known that there would be no jobs at the end of their education, they might not have agreed to participate (and their male guardians might not have permitted them to). Yet from the perspective of the women after completing the programme, an unanticipated result – ‘empowerment’ – was perceived as a central and significant benefit. These women might have considered the classes well worthwhile even though things turned out differently than they had been prepared for.

Putting the issue this way, in terms of present and future selves, may seem abstruse, but it points directly to significant ethical issues. As Alkire notes, focusing entirely on the *ex post* valuations of the women and ignoring their *ex ante* valuations would allow all sorts of intensive political or religious indoctrination programs to be justified in exactly the same way as beneficent development programmes: the people who go through them would claim to value what they have become. This suggests that *ex post* evaluation is very susceptible to domination by external policy-makers, substituting their own values for those of the people subject to their policies and then attempting to bring people with those values about.

The autonomy critique questions the standard practice of assessing development by comparing how well people are doing before and after an intervention. Development work founded on the capability approach improves on conventional evaluations by including non-pecuniary aspects of how well individuals’ lives are going. Yet the autonomy critique notes the methodological problem that an inconstant valuational framework poses to a capability-based cost-benefit evaluation. It relates this issue to a second and more fundamental problem in determining the legitimacy of the process of transformation. Only if individuals are transformed in a way that respects their personal autonomy to manage their lives over time can their *ex post* perspective be reliable in informing us as to whether their lives have been genuinely improved rather than merely changed. It seems to us that including the dimension of becoming within capability analysis requires finding a way to talk about autonomy in capability terms.
III. The Capability for Personal Identity

In *Development as Freedom*, Amartya Sen contrasts the “agent-oriented” capability approach with conventional approaches to development in terms of treating those concerned as agents rather than merely as patients. As he puts it, “With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other. They need not be seen primarily as passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs” (Sen 1999a, 11). Sen thus defines an agent “as someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives” (Sen 1999a, 19). This understanding derives from Sen’s distinction between well-being and agency aspects of individual advantage, and his distinction within the latter between agency achievement and agency freedom (Sen 1985; Sen 1993).

Philosopher and development ethicist David Crocker devotes considerable attention to Sen’s concept of agency freedom, emphasizing both self-determination and critical scrutiny of one’s values and objectives (Crocker 2009, 153ff; Crocker and Robeyns 2009). We build on his thinking about personal autonomy by linking it to Sen’s approach to social identity (Sen 1999b; Sen 2006). Sen recognizes that people are members of a variety of social groups and have many different social identities or affiliations, and says we reason about what our relevant identities are and their relative importance (Sen 2006, 24). The self-determination and critical scrutiny of one’s values and objectives that Crocker makes central to personal autonomy thus echoes Sen’s claims about how we reflexively evaluate our social identities. The identity a person has is not reducible to any single identity, or even collection of identities, because a person is able to reflect on who she is as an autonomous—self-governing—individual apart from all her social identities when she explicitly makes herself her object of concern (Davis 2007). We add that being able to reflect on who one is is not something we are all immediately able to do but a capability people have reason to value.

We see this ‘personal identity capability’ as a meta-capability for self-governance that is an aspect of individuals’ agency freedom. Agency freedom in general concerns a person’s ability to choose in light of their values, i.e., to weigh well-being functionings against their other values and commitments in their decisions, while autonomy or self-governance focuses on the more specific
ability to plan their lives, i.e., to determine which kinds of life they have most reason to value. Personal identity capability is thus concerned not directly with having and acting on values and objectives of one’s own, but with one’s conception of oneself over time. Only in this case does the person reflexively conceive of herself as a whole—and exercise agency freedom with respect to her personal identity.

It is important to stress that our drawing on Crocker’s and Sen’s views of self-determination and self-scrutiny as something people engage in more or less successfully but not continuously - makes our personal identity capability a very anti-essentialist concept quite different from much traditional ‘folk-psychological’ reasoning about personal identity.12 Moreover, that people can be more or less successful in exercising agency freedom in this regard means that one can talk about measuring this meta-capability. Indeed there exists a large literature on the nature and requirements of successful self-narratives (e.g., Schechtman 1996; Davis 2011)—which we do not have space to explore properly here.

Self-narratives are ‘autobiographies with co-authors’ or accounts people give of their past, present lives, and planned futures that can draw on how others help us think about ourselves. A child in a poor village who is supported by others in wanting to go to school, has an account of her life assisted by co-authors that comprehends the various opportunities she wishes she could have. As she develops in her self-understanding as a person, as well as in terms of her relationships to others, her account of herself and her co-authors both change. Her personal autonomy can be understood in terms of her meta-capability for reflecting upon and choosing between the kinds of lives she has reason to value. In this respect, her life in her community is in significant degree self-transforming to the extent that her individual freedom is supported by social commitment (Sen 1999a, xi).

Translating our concern for personal autonomy into a capability for maintaining and developing a personal identity clarifies its centrality to the development context, which, as we have shown, may be neglected despite the general agreement of human development practitioners and scholars about the importance of agency. Doing so also allows us to analyse it as we might any other capability. There are relevant resources, such as access to credible truthful information, time free from the demands of work and duty (leisure), and a stable enough environment to permit long-term planning. There is the heterogeneity of individuals, in terms of their internal and combined capacities
for practical reasoning, their social environment, powers of intervening in the world, and so on. Just as with other capabilities, such as the capability for appearing in public without shame, being capable of managing one’s capability set over time is not a yes or no issue, but can be met to one degree or another. Capability analysis can be employed in the usual way: to identify inadequacies, diagnose their specific causes, and recommend how they might be ameliorated. For example, to show that those concerned have not understood what a development project is about; to determine that this is because the information they were given was in the wrong language; and to recommend remedying that.

In addition, however, to Crocker and Sen’s emphasis on self-determination and critical scrutiny of one’s values and objectives, there is another reason to recognize a personal identity meta-capability that lies at the heart of this paper. In the capability approach, people are represented as collections of capabilities. But how are policy-makers to determine which collections of capabilities people should be without being paternalistic? Sen’s “agent-oriented” approach and Crocker’s emphasis on agency freedom combined with the idea of a personal identity capability tells us that individuals’ conceptions of themselves should determine which collections of capabilities policy-makers promote. The challenge is how these self-conceptions are related. We turn to this in the next two sections in connection with the principle of free prior informed consent and democratic development. Before doing so, however, let us give just one example of where a failure to focus on the autonomy aspect of agency limits policy-makers’ understanding of development.

In Poor Economics Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo discuss the consumption and saving behaviour of the poor and the puzzle of why the poor don’t take up opportunities to save for their future. They note that many of the poor don’t feel a sense of control over their lives, that their choices can ever add up to a different better future, and suggest, “Perhaps this idea that there is a future is what makes the difference between the poor and the middle-class” (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 229). But this not because the poor lack either choices or rationality. In fact they face a bewildering number of potentially life-altering choices every day, which people in the rich world rarely have to trouble themselves with, from navigating unreliable and untrustworthy health and education systems to securing safe drinking water (cf Sen 1992, 62–4; Duflo 2012, Lecture 1). Merely surviving deprivation requires rational agency in the general sense. Rather, the character of their deprivation here concerns the absence of valuable ‘options’: choices that they are able to relate to achieving a
better life. The people surveyed by Banerjee and Duflo appear unable to systematically link their choices over the alternatives open to them to feasible pathways to the kinds of lives they want to live. In other words, their capability to manage and enhance their own capability sets is often distinctly limited, and this is quite compatible with agency in the general sense, and even with substantial freedom to make life-altering decisions.

Individuals obviously face great difficulties in making rational choices about their future. For example they may lack adequate information about the outcomes of developmental choices which are nevertheless irreversible. That problem seems most severe when their own values, and thus their frame of reference, are likely to change over the course of development. In the following sections we therefore focus more specifically on the requirements for autonomous intertemporal choice in development. How can we ensure that the subjects of transformational human development projects are able to exercise autonomous authorship over their own development?

**IV. The Principle of Free Prior Informed Consent**

One characteristic of paternalism is that it ignores actual people’s forward-looking evaluations or treats them strategically, as obstacles to be overcome. That is inconsistent with the central ethical commitment of the human development approach, in which development is to be considered not as something that is done to people, but as something that people are involved in authoring for themselves.

Genuinely human development must engage with individuals as autonomous agents in managing their own transformation. An important way of ensuring this is to institutionalise the principle of ‘free prior informed consent’ throughout development practice. This principle provides a robust framework that those concerned with planning and carrying out development programmes can refer to in considering the practical requirements of “agent-oriented” development in different kinds of cases. It can clarify what follows from respecting agency, in terms of a requirement to respect, protect, and enhance the personal identity capability of those involved to plan their lives in accordance with their own values. It thus provides safeguards against well meaning paternalism, by which the values of development agents are, perhaps inadvertently, substituted for those of the people they are trying to help.
Applying the informed consent principle requires that the people concerned be adequately and truthfully informed in advance of the overall aims of a project, its benefits and costs to them (and the degree of uncertainty about these), and are free to say yes or no. In the bioethics literature, in which this principle has been most thoroughly analysed and debated, it has been justified by a number of distinct though overlapping moral concerns, including protection of well-being; autonomy (the most prominent); prevention of abusive conduct; trust; self-ownership; non-domination; and personal integrity (Eyal 2011, sec. 2). Each of these justifications emphasises a distinct moral concern about the issues and relationships involved. For example, the justification in terms of trust points to the long term requirements of persuading people to take part in the kind of relationship which such treatment/research requires. The justification in terms of preventing abusive conduct is concerned with how the simple obstacle of gaining informed consent can support the effectiveness of codes of conduct in governing the behaviour of doctors and researchers.

Each of these moral concerns, or close analogues, is also of potential relevance to the ethical conduct of development, though different kinds of situations will likely call for emphasising different moral concerns. For example, in many cases the beneficent intentions of development agents may be more questionable than in the Oxfam literacy project, and informed consent might then be particularly important as a tool to prevent abusive conduct. Indeed, the informed consent principle has thus far been most clearly formulated and institutionalized in the development context with respect to protecting indigenous peoples from exploitation in the name of development. Yet we believe that a genuinely human development policy requires more than good intentions. It also requires respecting, protecting, supporting and restoring the personal autonomy of the individuals concerned. It seems to us that the wider institutionalisation of the informed consent principle in development practice can play a role in bringing this about. Understanding personal autonomy in capability terms can help to clarify its requirements.

As we have noted, focusing on personal autonomy rather than agency in general brings out the importance of factors other than holding values and choosing freely, such as the role of information. Free prior consent is insufficient for meeting the requirements of personal autonomy, because, while it guarantees a choice between alternatives, without adequately informing people about those alternatives it fails to provide them with options that they can relate to their ideas of a better life. They may be provided with a selection
of different levers to pull, but yet be unable to systematically link their choice of levers to plans for their future. Thus, the disrespect for autonomy involved in inadequately informing recruits to the Oxfam literacy project is that it undermined the women’s capability to govern their own lives. They were given a choice of levers and tried to use the opportunity to pursue the option of getting a paid job. But it turned out that the lever wasn’t connected to that option after all.

We are concerned in capability analysis not only with the resources that people have access to and their characteristics, but also the relation in which individuals stand to these (their ‘personal utilization function’). Understanding personal autonomy in terms of a personal identity capability allows the multi-dimensional character of its determinants to be scrutinised. The principle of free prior informed consent can thus be understood as prescribing a threshold for what counts as adequate capability to manage one’s own life with respect to the project at issue. Where that capability appears insufficient, the informed consent principle requires us to analyse why this is so and what can be done about it. We should ask not only whether the information people are given is adequate (truthful, relevant, and including caveats), but whether they have been adequately informed (understanding). We should ask not only whether people have choices, but whether these constitute valuable options that they can exercise to improve their lives.

Sometimes it might seem that informing people about the consequences of their decisions is impossible and that the duty of the development agent is rather to get them to make the right decision. Even if those running a literacy programme know the likely outcome—empowered women who value their transformation—it might seem obvious that potential recruits would be incompetent to comprehend or properly evaluate that outcome in advance (cf Alkire 2005, 295–6). But it is not so obvious to us. All over the world people living in poverty exercise their autonomy to embark on dramatic personal transformations, such as those involved in marriage, parenthood, religious conversion, or moving from the countryside to a big city or foreign country. What justifies the presumption that they are incompetent to make their own decisions about development projects?

It is already established practice, as part of the requirement to adequately inform, for members of indigenous peoples to visit completed dams and mines of a similar scale to those proposed for their area and talk to those affected by them, in order to help them think through how similar projects would change
their own lives (Goodland 2004, 68). Likewise, prospective students can meet graduates to see for themselves how literacy does and doesn’t transform lives. In such ways, the kind of engagement required by seeking informed consent can also challenge so-called ‘adaptive preferences’ by bringing them to the subjects’ attention and self-scrutiny. Since the phenomenon of adaptation results, on Sen’s account, from individuals’ abnegation of agency freedom in order to cope with, or merely survive, circumstances of poverty and oppression (Sen 1988, 45–6; Qizilbash 2009, §2) it seems to us particularly important to engage with such people in a way that enhances their capability for reasoning and self-scrutiny, rather than to second guess what kind of life they should value. 

The significance of the informed consent principle here is to require development agents to recognise their positive moral responsibility to ensure that their clients are adequately informed as well as adequately empowered to make an autonomous decision about their development. Supporting as well as respecting the autonomy of the subjects of development requires astute judgement by development agents that cannot be straightforwardly codified. Embedding the principle of informed consent in the practice of development is not meant to make this any easier. Rather, as in bioethics where it originates, it takes the form of an explicit ethical commitment to meet this challenge. Its contribution is to bridge the gap between the theoretical understanding of the self-authorship requirements of genuine human development and the goals and design of development best-practice by spurring and directing ethical self-scrutiny.

Our analysis so far has focused on the relationship between individuals and development programmes, and the procedural requirements that follow from that for legitimate human development. Yet it is of course the case that most transformational development programmes take place at the social not the individual scale. In the next section we therefore turn to considering the requirements for respecting autonomy at this more complex group level, in terms of ‘democratic development’.

V. Democratic Development

The human development approach takes a specifically democratic perspective to development theory and practice that rests on a central distinction between
the *means* and *ends* of the life one has reason to value (e.g. Sen 1999a). The ends of development are the beings and doings that people have reason to value, and are identified through an exercise of public deliberation and social choice by all those concerned (cf. Crocker 2009, chap. 9–10). The means of development are those things (such as capital, commodities, institutions, laws, public services, and so on) that are necessary for bringing about the kind of life people have reason to value. They are provided by those agencies (such as government ministries and development NGOs) which possess technical knowledge and command over the causal factors of development. These development agencies may provide advice and even ethical arguments, for instance in the form of critical perspectives on gender justice, or factual information about the feasibility of different policy proposals. But their evaluations do not determine what the ends of development are, i.e. what people in this community have reason to value.

This division of labour between the valuation exercise and its technocratic implementation—values and facts—contrasts with the standard development paradigm in which development agencies assume responsibility for the goals, conception, design, implementation and evaluation of development policies. The democratic perspective taken by the human development approach puts the policy exercise in service to the valuation exercise so that collective deliberation over the ends of development, often very local, substitutes for their technocratic determination. As Sen puts it,

> The people have to be seen, in this perspective, as being actively involved—given the opportunity—in shaping their own destiny, and not just as passive recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs. The state and the society have extensive roles in strengthening and safeguarding human capabilities. This is a supporting role, rather than one of ready-made delivery. (Sen 1999a, 53)

Democratic development requires that those involved be able to *influence* the outcome both through participation in a community’s deliberations and through having their final decisions counted equally with those of others if a vote is necessary. Of course individuals will not always get their own way or be entirely satisfied about their community’s developmental priorities. The value of democracy understood as collective self-determination does not consist in providing each individual, or even each sub-group, with control or ‘veto’ rights over such decisions, but in the extent to which its procedures respect and
enhance every individual’s capability to be engaged in the authorship of decisions that will transform their lives.

The involvement of individuals in a forward-looking democratic process of public deliberation over social goals is qualitatively different from cases where either policy-makers decide those goals directly or it is decided by one-off voting (mere aggregative social choice). This is because such public deliberation directly engages people as autonomous agents in the collective self-determination of their values and concerns. Such exercises work through, not over, the personal identity capability of individuals since they presuppose that agents reflect upon the consequences of the options open to them, for themselves as well as for society, in making their contributions to the participatory process. Thus development pursued in this democratic manner is not paternalistic, even if outside development agencies assist in setting up its institutions. Rather, by making the individuals themselves the (co)authors of change in their lives rather than groups of external experts, democratic development is a necessary component of transformation without paternalism.

It is important to note the feasibility of integrating what may seem an abstract ideal into development projects, as demonstrated for example by the Indian development NGO Gram Vikas. Gram Vikas approaches villages with the offer of financial and technical support in building water and sanitation systems. But it won’t proceed without the commitment and engagement of the whole community. That requires the formation of a village general assembly including all adults that discusses over a period of many months the NGO’s proposals and their long-term implementation by the villagers themselves before deciding whether to sign a contract between the village and the NGO. Several hundred villages covering over 150,000 people have signed on to the programme in this way so far.

Our analysis of the demands of a truly “agent-oriented” development provides a powerful supplementary argument for the constitutive importance of democratic deliberation in human development policy. Of course it is well recognized among proponents of the capability approach that democracy and political freedoms are intrinsically valuable dimensions of development in general, but this is not always extended to development projects in particular. For example, local participation is often promoted in terms of respecting agency in general as a goal, while we have argued that democratic participation should also be seen as respecting personal autonomy in particular as a side-
constraint, a requirement for these projects to be understood as human development rather than as something else.

In addition to being required for the conceptual coherence of the human development approach, public reasoning and deliberation also have a positive instrumental relationship with the personal identity capability we have identified, since they provide important opportunities for its exercise and development. They give people real options to choose between, and the ‘leisure’ (information, space, freedom, and other minds) to consider them properly. That experience is likely to enhance individuals’ personal identity capability in their private lives to reflect upon and deliberate about who they want to become and how to get there. To the extent that individuals reflect upon and change their own values or group affiliations through participation in public reasoning - for example coming to see certain social norms concerning women’s fertility as invidious (Sen 1995, 17) - they exercise their personal identity capability for determining their own values and what follows from them. Sen has argued for the constructive value of public reasoning and deliberation. From the perspective of the individual they might also be seen as transformational.

VI. Conclusion
This paper aimed to elucidate and address the ethical concerns underlying the idea of development as transformation. We began the paper by noting that while conventional ‘capacity building’ approaches to development evade the concerns this raises, the human development approach cannot. Human development not only aims directly at the transformation of people’s lives, but it also claims to be an “agent-oriented” view. We believe this implies specific goals and constraints for the practice of development which have not so far been explicitly recognised.

In working these out, we noted that the human development perspective assumes that an individual’s values evolve with development. We introduced the concept of a personal identity capability to represent the understanding of personal autonomy this implied: the ability to change one’s life, including one’s ideas about the kind of life one has reason to value, and yet remain the same person. In doing so we clarified the requirements of taking an “agent-oriented” view in the context of value transformation. One can only evaluate whether people are better or worse off, rather than merely changed, if they themselves provide evaluative continuity in the form of auto-biographical accounts of themselves relating their paths chosen to their reasons for them.
We then showed that this analysis of personal identity has important implications for development practice. Analysis in terms of personal identity capability can be helpful in identifying and diagnosing ethical problems in the practice of human development which standard comparative static methods, such as before and after capability-set evaluations, would miss. In consequence, we argued that human development policy should incorporate procedural principles that protect and promote the capability of those concerned to be the authors of their own development: the principles of free prior informed consent and democratic development.

The capability approach is generally understood as being founded on respect for individual freedom and agency. What we believe to be less well recognized is that it also implicitly relies on a conception of people as evolving and able to reflect upon their personal identities and individual development. This paper has sought to make explicit the theoretical and practical implications of this conception of the person.

References


Endnotes

1 This paper is concerned with the conceptual and practical implications of one specific concept of development - the Human Development Approach promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and based on Amartya Sen's capability approach. We do not seek to comment on the broader range of practises sometimes termed development but which fall outside this definition, such as the displacement of communities for economic development projects like dam and road-building (cf. Penz, Drydyk, and Bose 2011). Such practises certainly require ethical scrutiny, but the central concern would seem to be inter-personal relations (i.e. justice), not the intra-personal relations that we focus on here (i.e. autonomy).

2 Sen has made this point elsewhere - in discussing the discipline of cost-benefit analysis - “It is important to distinguish between genuine changes in values and those that reflect alterations of relative weights because of parametric variations of the determining variables” (Sen 2000b, 945).

3 Where public officials extort bribes for performing their mandated duties (such as taking crime reports, issuing identity documents, and the like), the people who pay do so unwillingly.
This reform gives them an asymmetric legal power to denounce officials after getting what they need. The knowledge of this would significantly change officials' subjective expected utility calculations about demanding bribes. As a result, this type of corrupt behaviour may decline.

4 This point was noted in the first UN Human Development Report: “The basic needs approach usually concentrates on the bundle of goods and services that deprived population groups need: food, shelter, clothing, health care and water. It focuses on the provision of these goods and services rather than on the issue of human choices” (UNDP 1990, 11). For other critical comparisons of the Basic Needs Approach with respect to the capability approach, see for example (Sen 1984, 513–515; Alkire 2005, 166–177; Stewart 2007).

5 The latter is the utility function - ‘Homo economicus’ - view of neo-classical economics in which an individual is represented as having a given set of preferences that are specifically ‘their own’. For a critique of the circularity of this account in terms of personal identity over time, see Davis (2003; 2011, chap. 1).

6 We do not believe this emphasis on (self) transformation renders our view of the human development approach unacceptably ‘athletic’ in terms of requiring an unfeasibly high level of continuous active agency, as G.A. Cohen once accused Sen (Cohen 1993; Sen 1993; Pettit 2001). Transformation is a simply a fact about development, including conventional development policies. Our concern here is with the capability of individuals to exercise control over their transformation, and with integrating this explicitly as both a goal and a side-constraint in the theory and practice of human development. Autonomous transformation no more requires continuous self-reflection than literacy requires that one always be reading.

7 Of course, for many evaluative purposes specific lists may be used, for example concerning a threshold for what is generally agreed to be severe poverty (Alkire and Santos 2010), or to focus on a particular issue like gender inequality (Robeyns 2003). Nevertheless the foundational concern of the capability approach is with individuals’ capability to live the lives they have reason to value.

8 Note that incorporating the evaluation of process into consequentialist analysis is a longtime concern of Sen’s (Thompson 2010; Sen 2000a). Recent work on children and the capability approach has brought a new focus to issues of becoming, and the respect for procedural as well as opportunity aspects of freedom that this requires (e.g. Biggeri, Ballet, and Comim 2011)

9 One further justification for the structure of the project could be that if enough women in the local area were to become literate, supply would create its own demand: social norms would change and job opportunities would appear (Alkire 2005, 280). But this still means using the present students as a means to an end in some sense, and in any case the scale of the increase in women's literacy that would require is far beyond the capacities of that NGO project.

10 This can be generalized further. Neglecting how people’s value transformations come about – for example, whether they are ‘brought about’ by others – would seem to leave development programmes open to the same general critique of adaptive preferences on which the capability approach is itself (partly) founded.

11 Here Sen goes beyond Thomas Schelling’s conception of multiple selves (Schelling 1978, 1984). Schelling cannot say how individuals organize their different selves because each self is merely a utility function, and as such none can engage in reflection and reasoned self-scrutiny.

12 We share Derek Parfit’s dissatisfaction with the mis-use of such common-sense conceptions of personal identity (Parfit 1995).

13 Although most systematically developed in the area of bioethics (with respect to medical treatment and research involving human subjects) the application of the informed consent principle is not limited to dealings between institutions and individuals, but has also recently been extended and adapted to cases where large numbers of people are involved, such as the reform of health systems (Daniels 2006); economic policy making (DeMartino 2011; Blomfield 2012); and conventional economic development programmes (cf Goodland 2004; Penz, Drydyk, and Bose 2011). In such cases it is the self-determination of a community, rather than the autonomy of an individual, that is at stake and legitimate decision-making processes will vary
from the bioethics case (for example through public deliberation and social choice). We consider such extensions below, under ‘democratic development’.

14 It is recognised that indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable to coercive exploitation of their lands and resources, even when that goes against national laws and official policies, because of their degree of political and social exclusion in many countries. The relative simplicity of informed consent requirements (for example as a requirement by the World Bank for supporting projects) may protect such marginalised groups from abusive conduct in a way that more complex, under-enforced, or politicised national laws may not (cf Goodland 2004).

15 The issue of adaptation is a complex and contested one within the human development literature (Nussbaum 2000, chap. 2; Khader 2011; see also Wells 2013, chapter 4). Of particular significance is the scope this concept can allow for well-meaning paternalism by development agencies (David Clark, 2009, explains this problem with particular vigour), when deprived people are seen to lack the *capacity* - not merely the capability - to make decisions for themselves and therefore cede the right to do so. Note that adaptation may be even more effectively addressed by engagement in the collective deliberation required by ‘democratic development’.

16 Lack of space prevents us from discussing this fascinating case study of democratic development further (but see Keirns 2008).