Impaired perception of biological motion in Parkinson’s disease

OBJECTIVE: We examined biological motion perception in Parkinson’s disease (PD). Biological motion perception is related to one’s own motor function and depends on the integrity of brain areas affected in PD, including posterior superior temporal sulcus. If deficits in biological motion perception exist, they may be specific to perceiving natural/fast walking patterns that individuals with PD can no longer perform, and may correlate with disease-related motor dysfunction. METHOD: Twenty-six nondemented individuals with PD and 24 control participants viewed videos of point-light walkers and scrambled versions that served as foils, and indicated whether each video depicted a human walking. Point-light walkers varied by gait type (natural, parkinsonian) and speed (0.5, 1.0, 1.5 m/s). Participants also completed control tasks (object motion, coherent motion perception), a contrast sensitivity assessment, and a walking assessment. RESULTS: The PD group demonstrated significantly less sensitivity to biological motion than the control group (p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.22), regardless of stimulus gait type or speed, with a less substantial deficit in object motion perception (p = .02, Cohen’s d = .68). There was no group difference in coherent motion perception. Although individuals with PD had slower walking speed and shorter stride length than control participants, gait parameters did not correlate with biological motion perception. Contrast sensitivity and coherent motion perception also did not correlate with biological motion perception. CONCLUSION: PD leads to a deficit in perceiving biological motion, which is independent of gait dysfunction and low-level vision changes, and may therefore arise from difficulty perceptually integrating form and motion cues in posterior superior temporal sulcus.Published versio

Nine-months-old infants do not need to know what the agent prefers in order to reason about its goals: on the role of preference and persistence in infants’ goal-attribution

Human infants readily interpret others’ actions as goal-directed and their understanding of previous goals shapes their expectations about an agent’s future goal-directed behavior in a changed situation. According to a recent proposal (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005), infants’ goal-attributions are not sufficient to support such expectations if the situational change involves broadening the set of choice-options available to the agent, and the agent’s preferences among this broadened set are not known. The present study falsifies this claim by showing that 9-month-olds expect the agent to continue acting towards the previous goal even if additional choice-options become available for which there is no preference-related evidence. We conclude that infants do not need to know about the agent’s preferences in order to form expectations about its goal-directed actions. Implications for the role of action persistency and action selectivity are discussed

Anterior Insula Activity Reflects the Effects of Intentionality on the Anticipation of Aversive Stimulation

If someone causes you harm, your affective reaction to that person might be profoundly influenced by your inferences about the intentionality of their actions. In the present study, we aimed to understand how affective responses to a biologically salient aversive outcome administered by others are modulated by the extent to which a given individual is judged to have deliberately or inadvertently delivered the outcome. Using fMRI, we examined how neural responses to anticipation and receipt of an aversive stimulus are modulated by this fundamental social judgment. We found that affective evaluations about an individual whose actions led to either noxious or neutral consequences for the subject did indeed depend on the perceived intentions of that individual. At the neural level, activity in the anterior insula correlated with the interaction between perceived intentionality and anticipated outcome valence, suggesting that this region reflects the influence of mental state attribution on aversive expectations

Is He Being Bad? Social and Language Brain Networks during Social Judgment in Children with Autism

Individuals with autism often violate social rules and have lower accuracy in identifying and explaining inappropriate social behavior. Twelve children with autism (AD) and thirteen children with typical development (TD) participated in this fMRI study of the neurofunctional basis of social judgment. Participants indicated in which of two pictures a boy was being bad (Social condition) or which of two pictures was outdoors (Physical condition). In the within-group Social-Physical comparison, TD children used components of mentalizing and language networks [bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), bilateral medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and bilateral posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)], whereas AD children used a network that was primarily right IFG and bilateral pSTS, suggesting reduced use of social and language networks during this social judgment task. A direct group comparison on the Social-Physical contrast showed that the TD group had greater mPFC, bilateral IFG, and left superior temporal pole activity than the AD group. No regions were more active in the AD group than in the group with TD in this comparison. Both groups successfully performed the task, which required minimal language. The groups also performed similarly on eyetracking measures, indicating that the activation results probably reflect the use of a more basic strategy by the autism group rather than performance disparities. Even though language was unnecessary, the children with TD recruited language areas during the social task, suggesting automatic encoding of their knowledge into language; however, this was not the case for the children with autism. These findings support behavioral research indicating that, whereas children with autism may recognize socially inappropriate behavior, they have difficulty using spoken language to explain why it is inappropriate. The fMRI results indicate that AD children may not automatically use language to encode their social understanding, making expression and generalization of this knowledge more difficult. © 2012 Carter et al

Neural Coding of Cooperative vs. Affective Human Interactions: 150 ms to Code the Action's Purpose

The timing and neural processing of the understanding of social interactions was investigated by presenting scenes in which 2 people performed cooperative or affective actions. While the role of the human mirror neuron system (MNS) in understanding actions and intentions is widely accepted, little is known about the time course within which these aspects of visual information are automatically extracted. Event-Related Potentials were recorded in 35 university students perceiving 260 pictures of cooperative (e.g., 2 people dragging a box) or affective (e.g., 2 people smiling and holding hands) interactions. The action's goal was automatically discriminated at about 150–170 ms, as reflected by occipito/temporal N170 response. The swLORETA inverse solution revealed the strongest sources in the right posterior cingulate cortex (CC) for affective actions and in the right pSTS for cooperative actions. It was found a right hemispheric asymmetry that involved the fusiform gyrus (BA37), the posterior CC, and the medial frontal gyrus (BA10/11) for the processing of affective interactions, particularly in the 155–175 ms time window. In a later time window (200–250 ms) the processing of cooperative interactions activated the left post-central gyrus (BA3), the left parahippocampal gyrus, the left superior frontal gyrus (BA10), as well as the right premotor cortex (BA6). Women showed a greater response discriminative of the action's goal compared to men at P300 and anterior negativity level (220–500 ms). These findings might be related to a greater responsiveness of the female vs. male MNS. In addition, the discriminative effect was bilateral in women and was smaller and left-sided in men. Evidence was provided that perceptually similar social interactions are discriminated on the basis of the agents' intentions quite early in neural processing, differentially activating regions devoted to face/body/action coding, the limbic system and the MNS

Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem

Predictive coding posits that neural systems make forward-looking predictions about incoming information. Neural signals contain information not about the currently perceived stimulus, but about the difference between the observed and the predicted stimulus. We propose to extend the predictive coding framework from high-level sensory processing to the more abstract domain of theory of mind; that is, to inferences about others’ goals, thoughts, and personalities. We review evidence that, across brain regions, neural responses to depictions of human behavior, from biological motion to trait descriptions, exhibit a key signature of predictive coding: reduced activity to predictable stimuli. We discuss how future experiments could distinguish predictive coding from alternative explanations of this response profile. This framework may provide an important new window on the neural computations underlying theory of mind

Observation and imitation of actions performed by humans, androids, and robots : an EMG study

Understanding others’ actions is essential for functioning in the physical and social world. In the past two decades research has shown that action perception involves the motor system, supporting theories that we understand others’ behavior via embodied motor simulation. Recently, empirical approach to action perception has been facilitated by using well-controlled artificial stimuli, such as robots. One broad question this approach can address is what aspects of similarity between the observer and the observed agent facilitate motor simulation. Since humans have evolved among other humans and animals, using artificial stimuli such as robots allows us to probe whether our social perceptual systems are specifically tuned to process other biological entities. In this study, we used humanoid robots with different degrees of human-likeness in appearance and motion along with electromyography (EMG) to measure muscle activity in participants’ arms while they either observed or imitated videos of three agents produce actions with their right arm. The agents were a Human (biological appearance and motion), a Robot (mechanical appearance and motion), and an Android (biological appearance and mechanical motion). Right arm muscle activity increased when participants imitated all agents. Increased muscle activation was found also in the stationary arm both during imitation and observation. Furthermore, muscle activity was sensitive to motion dynamics: activity was significantly stronger for imitation of the human than both mechanical agents. There was also a relationship between the dynamics of the muscle activity and motion dynamics in stimuli. Overall our data indicate that motor simulation is not limited to observation and imitation of agents with a biological appearance, but is also found for robots. However we also found sensitivity to human motion in the EMG responses. Combining data from multiple methods allows us to obtain a more complete picture of action understanding and the underlying neural computations

Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem

Predictive coding posits that neural systems make forward-looking predictions about incoming information. Neural signals contain information not about the currently perceived stimulus, but about the difference between the observed and the predicted stimulus. We propose to extend the predictive coding framework from high-level sensory processing to the more abstract domain of theory of mind; that is, to inferences about others' goals, thoughts, and personalities. We review evidence that, across brain regions, neural responses to depictions of human behavior, from biological motion to trait descriptions, exhibit a key signature of predictive coding: reduced activity to predictable stimuli. We discuss how future experiments could distinguish predictive coding from alternative explanations of this response profile. This framework may provide an important new window on the neural computations underlying theory of mind.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award 0645960)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award 095518)National Institutes of Health (U.S.) (Grant 1R01 MH096914-01A1

Biological motion perception in Parkinson's disease

Parkinson’s disease (PD) disrupts many aspects of visual perception, which has negative functional consequences. How PD affects perception of moving human bodies, or biological motion, is unknown. The ability to accurately perceive others’ motion is related to one’s own motor ability and depends on the integrity of brain areas affected in PD, including superior temporal sulcus and premotor cortex. Biological motion perception may therefore be compromised in PD but also provide a target for intervention, with perceptual training potentially improving motor function. Experiment 1 investigated whether perception of biological motion was impaired in PD (N=26) relative to neurologically-healthy control (NC; N=24) individuals. Participants viewed videos of point-light human figures and judged whether or not they depicted walking. As predicted, PD were less sensitive to biological motion than NC. This deficit was not associated with participants’ own walking difficulties or with other perceptual deficits (contrast sensitivity, coherent motion perception). Experiment 2 evaluated the hypothesis that PD deficits would extend to more socially-complex biological motion. PD (N=23) and NC (N=24) viewed point-light figures depicting communicative and non-communicative (object-oriented) gestures. The PD group was less accurate than NC in describing non-communicative gestures, an effect driven by PD men, who also had difficulty perceiving communicative gestures. Experiment 3 tested the efficacy of perceptual training for PD. Because biological motion perception is associated with motor function, it was hypothesized that perceptual training would improve walking. Individuals with PD were randomized to Gait Observation (N=13; viewing videos of healthy and unhealthy gait) or Landscape Observation (N=10; viewing videos of moving water) and trained daily for one week while gait data were collected with accelerometers. Post-training, only the Gait Observation group self-reported increased mobility, though improvements were not seen in objective gait data (daily activity, walking speed, stride length, stride frequency, leg swing time, gait asymmetry). These studies demonstrate that individuals with PD have difficulty perceiving biological motion (walking and socially-complex gestures). Improving biological motion perception led to enhancement in self-perceived walking ability. Perceptual training that incorporates more explicit learning over a longer time period may be required to effect objective improvements in walking.2018-12-06T00:00:00