In Harm\u27s Way: The Continued Relevance of the U.S. Navy\u27s Forward Presence Mission in the Post-Cold War World

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States Navy has seen the fleet shrink from nearly 600 ships in 1988 to 320 ships in 1999, with a planned reduction to 305 ships by 2004. While the fleet has been reduced by nearly 50 percent over the last decade, the deployment of U.S. naval forces has continued at near-Cold War levels. The result is a mismatch between the national security requirements that naval forces are called on to support, and the forces available to meet those requirements. Some have suggested that the traditional forward presence mission of the Navy-Marine Corps team is no longer relevant in the post-Cold War environment. Others suggest that virtual presence through space surveillance and global air power can replace the physical presence of naval forces. Still others have advocated a return to an isolationist policy, forgoing military presence altogether. Although U.S. naval forces are no longer required to counter the threat of Soviet aggression, possible peer or near-peer competitors, such as Russia and China, combined with emerging regional powers, require that the United States maintain forces in areas near U.S. interests. This thesis will examine the continued importance of maintaining a strong naval presence in the three principal areas of U.S. interest--the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia--and the inability to meet U.S. national security requirements with proposed alternatives to forward presence. Also covered will be new systems and operational concepts of the Navy-Marine Corps team, and their importance to the forward presence mission

A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Spain

In March 1993. the United States Navy and Marine Corps established the Naval Doctrine Command as the primary authority for the development of naval concepts and integrated naval doctrine. It has several specific roles-serving as the coordinating authority for the development and evaluation of Navy service-unique doctrine. providing a coordinated Navy-Marine Corps voice in joint and combined doctrine development. and ensuring that naval and joint doctrine are addressed in training and education curricula and in operations. exercises. and war games.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1008/thumbnail.jp

Geo-stategic approaches to co-operative maritime security in northeast Asia : with particular reference to naval arms control, maritime confidence-building measures and maritime co-operation measures

The purpose of this study is to design a co-operative maritime security structure for Northeast Asia through the application of naval arms control and disarmament measures (both structural and operational), maritime confidence-building measures (MCBMs) and maritime cooperation measures (MCMs). In order to construct an analytical framework for such an application it is necessary to introduce sub-objectives. The first is to explore the options for providing co-operative maritime security, such as naval arms control. MCBMs and MCMs, and to assess the value of their contribution to the general co-operative maritime security framework. The second is to examine the particular points of the major regional powers' maritime security policies with a view to considering their relevance to the construction of a system of co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia. The third is to delineate the regional geo-strategic security environment conducive to Northeast Asian co-operative maritime security in the framework of the various types of measures. The final part examines the potential conditions for the application of co-operative maritime security measures and suggests a priority of application on the basis of the regional maritime security environment.In the last decade, the United States and Russia have been forced to change their defence policies, trim their budgets, curtail operations overseas, and re-evaluate their fundamental purposes. Nonetheless, the medium powers, such as China and Japan, continue to build and deploy naval weapons and vessels that others find threatening. Unless they reconsider their positions toward co-operative maritime security, they may miss a critical opportunity to bring stability to the high seas. In Northeast Asia, the main boundary and territorial disputes are maritime in nature, e.g. Russia-Japan (South Kuril IslandslNorthern Territories), Korea-Japan (the Tok Islandsffakeshima), China-Japan (the Senkaku Islandsffiaoyu Tao), as well as Taiwan and, in the South China Sea, the Paracel Islands/Xisha Qundao (Vietnam-China), and the Spratly IslandslNansha Qundao (China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Philippines and Brunei). Multilateral security activities cannot replace formal diplomatic/legal negotiations to settle maritime boundary and territorial disputes, but co-operative maritime security measures may be particularly valuable in minimising the risk of conflict in such circumstances.Among the MCBMs, the most promising areas involve modifying existing INCSEA agreements, and establishing or expanding measures of transparency, such as compliance with the UN or an eventual regional arms register and the regular issue of credible official Defence White Papers. In the current context of strategic uncertainty and maritime force development in Northeast Asia, information exchange measures and communication measures may be the most valuable MCBM, applicable region-wide. Co-operative maritime security measures can offer a number of benefits. The main goals of MCMs are cost reduction through shared efforts or by joint operations for humanitarian purposes, joint development of marine resources, the protection of SLOCs and prevention of sea pollution. MCMs can also be used as confidence-building measures in themselves to maintain communication when tensions heighten. MCMs indicate that neighbouring countries can work together to look after certain problems at the regional or subregional level. This can help not onJy to deter potential adversaries but also to assure extraregional countries that no direct threat would be posed to their sea-borne trade. With functional and operational approaches, MCMs cover marine pollution, search and rescue, illegal activities, including drug smuggling, piracy and fisheries infringement.The first area of naval arms control to be considered covers constraints on naval activities as operational naval arms control measures. General operational arms control measures could be used to cover other naval activities, or they could serve as a model for similar agreements in other areas. The provisions for notification of dangerous activities, for instance, could be broadened to include mandatory notification of all naval exercises. After the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, the United States and Russia developed stabilising rules of behaviour as their navies came into contact with each other across the world's oceans. With the expansion of naval forces in Northeast Asia and the increased likelihood of accident and miscalculation, one could make a case for the negotiation of regional INCSEA agreements, particularly on a bilateral basis. Such agreements already exist in the North Pacific: Canada and Russia, the US and Russia, Russia-Japan and Russia-ROK. The United States and China have also signed a related agreement on maritime consultation. Operational measures at sea could be implemented by imposing restraints on naval activities and geographical limitations. Structural measures, as the second aspect of naval arms control, consist of quantitative and qualitative approaches. A quantitative approach based on ratios would inevitably affect the relative size of forces of different countries. Such agreements are difficult to achieve because of differences in geostrategic goals and asymmetries of naval forces in the region.This thesis argues that the development of co-operative maritime security measures to the point where they become a significant aspect of the regional maritime security framework in Northeast Asia will not be easy. It is a very diverse region, where there are quite different security perceptions and maritime territorial and legitimacy conflicts which require resolution. There is also little tradition of security co-operation, at least on a multilateral basis. The maritime issues themselves are generally complicated, and the practical and operational factors involved in the establishment of effective co-operative maritime security regimes are extremely demanding. Maritime confidence-building measures offer the greatest potentiaL as an initial step. As subsequent steps, maritime co-operation measures and naval arms control measures could be followed. The important question is whether or not the application of co-operative security models can be brought to the point where they can enable the effective management of the increasing complexities and uncertainties which characterise the emerging maritime environment in Northeast Asia. Current fiscal constraints might clearly provide an opportunity for Northeast Asian countries not only to consider more closely their threat perceptions but also to pursue regional co-operative maritime arrangements which rely more on mutual understanding and less on a naval arms build-up

More For Less: Protecting America's Security Interests Through Soft Power Programs

The U.S. Department of Defense is engaged in budget cutbacks that will have significant future implications for many defense programs. At the same time, emerging global threats require investment in diverse mechanisms for national defense over the long-term. Within this context, it is important to highlight the effectiveness of less traditional softer approaches to security in comparison to their cost as many of them may best be accomplished by the country’s hard power agency. This thesis explores three different soft power programs either funded and/or managed by the U.S. Military or Department of Defense: educating foreign military officers, deploying U.S. Navy medical ships on proactive humanitarian missions, and funding biological scientific engagement to counter the use of biological weapons of mass destruction. Each chapter analyzes the primary question of the individual program’s substance in comparison to its cost. The thesis acknowledges the difficulties of assessing the less quantifiable concept of soft power but seeks to make a qualitative assessment of each program’s relative value. This assessment is done by applying generated metrics shaped by reviewing literature applicable to each program’s goals to case studies of countries where each program has been implemented. Conclusions on the three programs’ current soft power influence is determined on the basis of existing data as applied to these expressed metrics. Additionally, based on evidence of the measurable metrics, each chapter draws a conclusion about its program’s indeterminable value in the future. Overall, this thesis contends that although modest and somewhat imprecise, measurable increases to U.S. soft power due to these programs can be shown. Furthermore, their relative low costs, along with their potential benefits to American and global security in an uncertain future, make them well worth their investment

Developing a Repeatable and Reliable Methodology to Determine Return-on-Investment

The high costs of modern weapons systems, fuel, personnel, and increasing environmental awareness is forcing U.S. forces to rely on simulation for training. Further, the need to train in a robust and theater specific environment is critical to ensure operational readiness immediately upon reaching the combat theater. Finally, the rapidly changing nature of the conflicts, crises, or contingencies in which U.S. forces are involved requires a new approach to training. The purpose of this research is to develop and demonstrate the feasibility of a methodology that can provide a reliable, consistent method for determining ROI in various forms, focusing on the staffs of Operational level commanders (those staffs who form Joint Task Force staffs or Service Component Commander staffs) so that the most appropriate format can be utilized in determining warfighting improvement or training vs. exercise cost. The major components of the ROI formulation are costs and performance assessment which can be applied in various combinations to quantify the performance benefits achieved for the expenditure of resources that are linked to specifically assessed performance parameters. The performance and cost parameters should apply to any operational or training environment, but the ability to evaluate the potential advantages of training in a completely synthetic environment as opposed to either a live or mixture of live, virtual, and constructive environments is of special interest. The cost components required to determine ROI must provide a reliable methodology to identify the costs of live and synthetic training regardless of the Service or Headquarters staff involved. A second necessary factor is the means to assess the performance of a Component Commander or Joint Task Force staff performance during a training exercise. The development of feasible methodologies, permitting evaluation of ROI in various formats, will provide a quantifiable means to assist in decisions regarding deployment readiness or support any Service or the Department of Defense during budgetary discussions. The ability to quantify ROI in the most appropriate or most applicable format can lead to better allocation of resources and to the ability to employ the most prepared or appropriately trained staff in a given crisis scenario

The Australia-Japan Defence and Security Relationship: Past, Present and Future

The thesis is a security practitioners\u27 past, present and future view of the Defence and Security Relationship between Australia and Japan. It examines security prospects as a rising hegemon challenges an extant one. It proposes the creation of a pragmatic regional security architecture based on alignments between like-minded nations

The technologies and principles needed for the powering of remote nodes in an interoperability network

This thesis investigates the various power system solutions and options available for affording remote network nodes autonomy. The approach taken is to first identify the particulars of a network that affect the power needs and requirements of remote network nodes. Secondly, this thesis examines candidates, and combinations of those candidates, for fulfilling the power needs of the remote nodes. Additionally, monitoring and management of power sources are studied. The purpose and focus of the work contained in this research is to provide insight to how best incorporate remote node power systems into the design of an interoperability communications network. Communications and the ability to exchange data are heavily depended upon today. This fact can be considered just as true or even more so in the event of a disaster. In times of need, where rural regions do not possess the infrastructure to support this need, the dependency is significant. A solution to this need is being filled by developing communication and interoperability networks. In both the situation of rural application and regions suffering from disaster, the use of network equipment is often limited by the means available to electrically power the equipment. This issue can be further complicated in situations requiring such equipment to be positioned in locations absent from network operators. Remote network node power system solutions require methods and technologies to allow these nodes some independence in terms of its power requirements.http://archive.org/details/thetechnologiesn109454847US Navy (USN) authors.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

EMC Chair Symposium - Sea Control and Foreign Policy - Working Papers

This fifth maritime-centric EMC Chair symposium builds on the 2016 release of Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, which noted the “U.S. Navy has been a cornerstone of American security and prosperity.” The symposium will consider future directions of U.S. foreign policy and reflect on demands the country places on the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to advance and defend national interests. Participants from DOD, academia, and the policy community will convene in Newport to discuss the implications for sea power as the Design challenges the Navy to “Deepen operational relationships with other services, agencies, industry, allies and partners – who operate with the Navy to support our shared interests.” Participants will consider the impact of technology, contested seas, and maritime partnerships on sea control.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/emcchair-symposia/1002/thumbnail.jp