Decentralized Protection Strategies against SIS Epidemics in Networks

Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a SIS epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery software, once it is infected. We model our system using a game theoretic framework and find pure, mixed equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. Further, we propose both a decentralized algorithm and an iterative procedure to compute a pure equilibrium in the general case of a multiple communities network. Finally, we evaluate the algorithms and give numerical illustrations of all our results.Comment: accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network System

Existence and Iterative Approximation Methods for Generalized Mixed Vector Equilibrium Problems with Relaxed Monotone Mappings

We first consider an auxiliary problem for the generalized mixed vector equilibrium problem with a relaxed monotone mapping and prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution for the auxiliary problem. We then introduce a new iterative scheme for approximating a common element of the set of solutions of a generalized mixed vector equilibrium problem with a relaxed monotone mapping and the set of common fixed points of a countable family of nonexpansive mappings. The results presented in this paper can be considered as a generalization of some known results due to Wang et al. (2010)

Optimal Linear Precoding Strategies for Wideband Non-Cooperative Systems based on Game Theory-Part I: Nash Equilibria

In this two-parts paper we propose a decentralized strategy, based on a game-theoretic formulation, to find out the optimal precoding/multiplexing matrices for a multipoint-to-multipoint communication system composed of a set of wideband links sharing the same physical resources, i.e., time and bandwidth. We assume, as optimality criterion, the achievement of a Nash equilibrium and consider two alternative optimization problems: 1) the competitive maximization of mutual information on each link, given constraints on the transmit power and on the spectral mask imposed by the radio spectrum regulatory bodies; and 2) the competitive maximization of the transmission rate, using finite order constellations, under the same constraints as above, plus a constraint on the average error probability. In Part I of the paper, we start by showing that the solution set of both noncooperative games is always nonempty and contains only pure strategies. Then, we prove that the optimal precoding/multiplexing scheme for both games leads to a channel diagonalizing structure, so that both matrix-valued problems can be recast in a simpler unified vector power control game, with no performance penalty. Thus, we study this simpler game and derive sufficient conditions ensuring the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, although derived under stronger constraints, incorporating for example spectral mask constraints, our uniqueness conditions have broader validity than previously known conditions. Finally, we assess the goodness of the proposed decentralized strategy by comparing its performance with the performance of a Pareto-optimal centralized scheme. To reach the Nash equilibria of the game, in Part II, we propose alternative distributed algorithms, along with their convergence conditions.Comment: Paper submitted to IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, September 22, 2005. Revised March 14, 2007. Accepted June 5, 2007. To be published on IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 2007. To appear on IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 200