The Role of Patents in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). A survey of the Literature.

During the last decades, the number of ICT related patents has increased considerably. In association with a great fragmentation in IP rights, the increasing number of patents has generated a series of potentially problematic consequences. Patent thickets, royalty stacking, the emergence of patent assertion entities, increased patent litigation \u2013 in particular around standard essential patents \u2013 and the difficulties in the definition of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms are among the most debated issues in the literature that we review in this paper. We devote a specific section of our survey to patents involving software products, where the above problems are amplified by the high level of abstraction of computer algorithms. In our analysis we mix theoretical and empirical arguments with a more policy-oriented reasoning. This allows us to better position the different issues in the relevant political and economic context

THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (ICTS). A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE.

During the last decades, the number of ICT related patents has increased considerably. In association with a great fragmentation in IP rights, the increasing number of patents has generated a series of potentially problematic consequences. Patent thickets, royalty stacking, the emergence of patent assertion entities, increased patent litigation \u2013 in particular around standard essential patents \u2013 and the difficulties in the definition of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms are among the most debated issues in the literature that we review in this paper. We devote a specific section of our survey to patents involving software products, where the above problems are amplified by the high level of abstraction of computer algorithms. In our analysis we mix theoretical and empirical arguments with a more policy-oriented reasoning. This allows us to better position the different issues in the relevant political and economic context

Dynamic strategies of patent licensing for Latecomer Firms under the constraint of technology gap and cost advantage

Since China's reform and opening up, along with the continuous improvement of China's patent system, Huawei and other Chinese companies, as latecomer firms, have gone through a development process of technology introduction, technology imitation, imitation innovation, independent innovation, and open innovation. In this process, Chinese companies are charged high royalty fees. As their technological capabilities develop and cost advantages weaken, patent licensing renegotiations are initiated, all of which deserves careful review, especially the strategies adopted to reduce royalty fees. The thesis adopts the mathematical model construction and derivation method based on game theory. A patent hold-up model based on the technology gap and cost advantages is then constructed to analyze the dynamic impact of gaps in technological capabilities and cost advantages on patent hold-up. The thesis further verifies the above theoretical research conclusions through empirical analysis and the case study. For example, the technology gap and cost advantages of the latecomer firms are analyzed at two points of time, namely, “ten years ago” and “the recent three years”. One of the important conclusions is that compared with ten years ago, in the recent three years, as the cost advantages of latecomer firms weaken and their technology gap with foreign leading companies narrows, the severity of hold-up encountered by latecomer firms has not mitigated, which demonstrates to some extent that in the case of reduced technology gap and weakened cost advantage, latecomer firms must adopt corresponding strategies to reinitiate negotiations with foreign leading companies in order to obtain lower royalty rates. As a conclusion, the thesis proposes ways to achieve technological progress and patent-holdup to catching-up ICT. The Chinese ICT industry could take effective measures to control the labour cost and increase in investment in R&D, especially in basic research. Chinese companies should optimize the patent portfolio while working on technological advancement, realize the value of patents and establish and contribute to an improved IP system to facilitate IP operations. Foreign frontier firms can adapt and adjust their patent licensing strategies to fully utilize the infringement relief rule brought about by China’ s IP system reform, while actively seeking cooperation with Chinese companies like Huawei in emerging fields and look for the future technological pathways.Desde a abertura económica da China, depois graças ao melhoramento contínuo do sistema de patentes da China, a Huawei e outras empresas retardatárias chinesas passaram por um processo de desenvolvimento de introdução tecnológica, imitação tecnológica, inovação em imitação, inovação independente e inovação aberta. Nesse processo, as empresas chinesas pagam altas taxas de licenciamento de patentes a entidades ocidentais. À medida que suas capacidades tecnológicas se desenvolvem e as vantagens de custo enfraquecem, renegociações de licença de patentes são iniciadas, todas as quais merecem uma revisão cuidadosa, especialmente as estratégias adotadas para reduzir as taxas de patentes. A tese adopta o método de construção e derivação de modelos matemáticos com base na teoria dos jogos. Um modelo de patente "holdup" baseado no fosso tecnológico e vantagens de custo é então construído para analisar o impacto dinâmico do "holdup" dos espaços nas capacidades tecnológicas e vantagens de custo. A tese verifica ainda as conclusões teóricas da pesquisa acima por meio da análise empírica e do estudo de caso. O fosso tecnológico e as vantagens de custo das empresas retardatárias são analisadas em dois momentos, a saber, "dez anos atrás" e "os últimos três anos". Uma das conclusões importantes é que, em comparação com dez anos atrás, nos últimos três anos, à medida que as vantagens de custo das empresas retardatárias enfraquecem e seu fosso tecnológico com as empresas dominantes estrangeiras diminuiu, a gravidade de patente "holdup" encontrado pelas empresas retardatárias não se mitigou, o que demonstra até certo ponto que, no caso de fosso tecnológico reduzido e vantagem de custo enfraquecida, as empresas retardatárias devem adotar estratégias correspondentes para reiniciar as negociações com empresas estrangeiras dominantes a fim de obter acesso mais económico a tecnologias proprietárias. A tese propõe maneiras de alcançar o progresso tecnológico e o gerir o "holdup" nas novas tecnologias de informação e comunicação (TIC). As empresas chinesas de NTIC devem tomar medidas eficazes para controlar os custos de trabalho e aumentar o investimento em I&D (Investigação e desenvolvimento), especialmente em pesquisa básica. As empresas chinesas de NTIC devem optimizar o portfólio de patentes enquanto trabalham no avanço tecnológico, criar confiança em sua tecnologia própria, perceber o valor das patentes e estabelecer e melhorar um sistema de PI (propriedade intelectual) para facilitar as estratégias de operação. As empresas avançadas estrangeiras devem adaptar-se e ajustar oportunamente suas estratégias de licenciamento de patentes, utilizar totalmente a regra de alívio de infração trazida pela reforma do sistema de PI da China, buscar activamente a cooperação com empresas chinesas como a Huawei em campos emergentes e olhar para futuras avenidas tecnológicas

Innovation, Intellectual Property Rights and Non-Practicing Entities in the European Patent Market

I brevetti sono una forma di diritti di proprietà intellettuale particolarmente rilevante per promuovere attività innovative. Un brevetto concede al suo proprietario un temporaneo diritto esclusivo su invenzioni che sono nuove, comportano un passo inventivo e sono suscettibili di applicazione industriale. Con questo diritto, gli inventori possono proteggere le loro idee dall'imitazione e ottenere un ritorno economico dai loro investimenti in ricerca e sviluppo (R&S). Tuttavia, l'uso dei brevetti ha subito una significativa trasformazione, estendendosi oltre lo scopo tradizionale di ricompensare gli sforzi innovativi. In particolare, nel campo delle Tecnologie dell'Informazione e della Comunicazione (ICT), i brevetti sono sempre più utilizzati come strumenti strategici (Blind, 2021). In particolare negli ultimi trent’anni, l'impressionante aumento del numero di brevetti concessi e l’emergere di un vero e proprio mercato dei brevetti hanno creato le condizioni per lo sviluppo di nuovi intermediari nel mercato delle tecnologie (Hagiu e Yoffie, 2013). Le "non-practicing entities"—aziende che non utilizzano i loro brevetti in senso tradizionale, ma si dedicano principalmente alla concessione di licenze e al ricorso al contenzioso legale—sono così emerse come attori di spicco nel mercato dei brevetti (Golden, 2007; Feldman ed Ewing, 2012). Comunemente definite anche "patent assertion entities" (PAE), e talvolta in modo dispregiativo "patent trolls," le NPEs hanno fortemente polarizzato il dibattito accademico e politico. A causa del loro status di entità non produttiva, le NPEs vantano vantaggi specifici rispetto alle entità che al contrario implementano direttamente nei loro prodotti le tecnologie di cui sono proprietarie. Per esempio, le NPEs sono tipicamente al riparo da contro-ingiunzioni per violazione del diritto di proprietà intellettuale e per questo sono state accusate di mettere in pratica strategie di "patent hold-up" (Lemley e Shapiro, 2007), che alcuni sostengono impongano una "tassa sull'innovazione" con effetti negativi sull'innovazione futura (Chien, 2008). Mentre le NPEs sono state ampiamente analizzate nel mercato dei brevetti degli Stati Uniti fin dalla loro comparsa all'inizio degli anni 2000 (Mezzanotti, 2021; Lemley e Zyontz, 2021), è solo di recente che i ricercatori hanno iniziato a studiare la loro presenza nel mercato tecnologico europeo (Fusco, 2013; Love, 2013; Leiponen e Delcamp, 2019). Questa tesi si propone esainare nel dettaglio il fenomeno delle NPEs nel mercato europeo dei brevetti. Il primo capitolo della tesi analizza la letteratura sui modelli di business delle NPEs, adottando un innovativo approccio bibliometrico per un esame sistematico della letteratura esistente guidato dal protocollo PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis). Successivamente ad un’analisi critica della letterature rilevante vengono presentati tre casi studio sui modelli di business delle NPEs. Nel secondo capitolo, la presenza delle NPEs nel mercato europeo dei brevetti viene empiricamente analizzata attraverso un nuovo dataset di depositi e acquisizioni di brevetti da parte delle NPEs presso l'Ufficio Europeo dei Brevetti (EPO). In questo capitolo viene inoltre sviluppata una nuova tassonomia, che classifica le NPEs in tre modelli di business: "Litigation," "Portfolio" e "Technology" NPEs. Infine, il terzo capitolo esplora empiricamente l'interazione tra le caratteristiche qualitative del brevetto litigato e la propensione delle NPEs a scegliere giurisdizioni europee specifiche in cui avviare contenziosi (“forum shopping”).Patents are a form of intellectual property rights (IPRs) that are particularly relevant to promoting innovative activities. A patent grants to its owner a temporary exclusive right over inventions that are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application. Relying on this right, inventors can protect their ideas from imitation and gain an economic return from their past investments in research and development (R&D). However, the use of patents has undergone a significant transformation, extending beyond the traditional purpose of rewarding innovative efforts. Especially in the field of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), patents are increasingly used as strategic tools (Blind, 2021). Moreover, over the past three decades, the sharp increase in the number of granted patents and the unprecedented flourishing of patent trading have paved the way for new intermediaries in the market for technology (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013). Non-practicing entities (NPEs)—firms that do not use their patents in a traditional manufacturing sense, but primarily engage in licensing and enforcement—have emerged as prominent actors on the patent market (Golden, 2007; Feldman and Ewing, 2012). Also referred to as Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), sometimes pejoratively called "patent trolls," NPEs have greatly polarized the academic and policy debate. Due to their non-manufacturing status, NPEs have unique advantages over operating companies. They are typically shielded from patent infringement counter-claims and have recently faced allegations of employing patent "hold-up" strategies (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007), which some argue it imposes a significant "tax on innovation" with potential negative effects on subsequent innovation (Chien, 2008). While NPEs have been extensively analyzed in the US patent market since their emergence in the early 2000s (Mezzanotti, 2021; Lemley and Zyontz, 2021), it is only recently that researchers have started to investigate their presence in the European technology market (Fusco, 2013; Love, 2013; Leiponen and Delcamp, 2019). This thesis aims to address these research gaps by examining the NPE phenomenon in the European patent marketplace. First, we extensively explore and analyze the literature on NPE business models by adopting a novel bibliometric approach guided by the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) protocol for systematic literature reviews. In addition, we will integrate three relevant NPE business models case studies. Second, we empirically investigate the presence of NPEs in the European patent market through a brand-new dataset of NPE patent filings and acquisitions at the European Patent Office (EPO). Furthermore, we develop an original taxonomy, thus categorizing NPEs into three business models: "Litigation," "Portfolio" and "Technology" NPEs. Finally, we empirically explore the interplay between the quality characteristics of the asserted patent and the propensity of NPEs to choose specific European jurisdictions where to initiate litigation (forum shopping)

Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations

The theoretical literature on the cumulative innovation process has emphasized the role of ex-ante licensing \u2013 namely, licensing agreements negotiated before the follow-on innovator has sunk its R&D investment \u2013 in mitigating the risk of hold-up of future innovations. In this paper, we consider a patent-holder and a follow-on innovator bargaining over the licensing terms in a context where the former firm is unable to observe the timing of the R&D investment of the latter. We show that the possibilities of restoring the R&D incentives by setting the licensing terms appropriately are severely limited

Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations

The theoretical literature on the cumulative innovation process has emphasized the role of ex-ante licensing \u2013 namely, licensing agreements negotiated before the follow-on innovator has sunk its R&D investment \u2013 in mitigating the risk of hold-up of future innovations. In this paper, we consider a patent-holder and a follow-on innovator bargaining over the licensing terms in a context where the former firm is unable to observe the timing of the R&D investment of the latter. We show that the possibilities of restoring the R&D incentives by setting the licensing terms appropriately are severely limited

Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations

The theoretical literature on the cumulative innovation process has emphasized the role of ex-ante licensing - namely, licensing agreements negotiated before the follow-on innovator has sunk its R&D investment - in mitigating the risk of hold-up of future innovations. In this paper, we consider a patent-holder and a follow-on innovator bargaining over the licensing terms in a context where the former firm is unable to observe the timing of the R&D investment of the latter. We show that the possibilities of restoring the R&D incentives by setting the licensing terms appropriately are severely limited