Believing Does Not Equal Remembering: The Effects of Social Feedback and Objective False Evidence on Belief in Occurrence, Belief in Accuracy, and Recollection

We examined the impact of social feedback and objective false evidence on belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and recollection of an autobiographical experience. Participants viewed six virtual scenes (e.g., park) and were tested on their belief/recollection. After 1-week, participants were randomly assigned to four groups. One group received social feedback that one scene was not experienced. A second group received objective false evidence that one of the scenes was not shown. A third group received both social feedback and objective false evidence and the control group did not receive any manipulation. Belief in occurrence dropped considerably in the social feedback group and in the combined group. Also, nonbelieved memories were most likely to occur in participants receiving both social feedback and objective false evidence. We show that social feedback and objective false evidence undermine belief in occurrence, but that they leave belief in accuracy and recollection unaffected

Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia

Traditional Bayesianism requires that an agent’s degrees of belief be represented by a real-valued, probabilistic credence function. However, in many cases it seems that our evidence is not rich enough to warrant such precision. In light of this, some have proposed that we instead represent an agent’s degrees of belief as a set of credence functions. This way, we can respect the evidence by requiring that the set, often called the agent’s credal state, includes all credence functions that are in some sense compatible with the evidence. One known problem for this evidentially motivated imprecise view is that in certain cases, our imprecise credence in a particular proposition will remain the same no matter how much evidence we receive. In this article I argue that the problem is much more general than has been appreciated so far, and that it’s difficult to avoid it without compromising the initial evidentialist motivation. _1_ Introduction _2_ Precision and Its Problems _3_ Imprecise Bayesianism and Respecting Ambiguous Evidence _4_ Local Belief Inertia _5_ From Local to Global Belief Inertia _6_ Responding to Global Belief Inertia _7_ Conclusio

Continuum Belief, Categorical Belief, and Depression Stigma: Correlational Evidence and Outcomes of an Online Intervention

Continuum belief interventions that erode boundaries between “normal” individuals and individuals with psychiatric problems may help to reduce psychiatric stigma, but a number of questions persist. The magnitude of belief change attributable to the intervention is unclear. Moreover, most studies have executed continuum interventions to reduce stigma of schizophrenia, and all studies have examined intervention effects on only public stigma. This study utilized a large sample (n = 654) to examine effects of a continuum intervention on depression stigma—public stigma in the full sample and self-stigma among participants with a self-reported history of depression. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three intervention groups: (a) the control group, which read material that merely described depression, (b) the continuum group, which read material that attested to a continuum view of depression, or (c) the categorical group, which read material that attested to a categorical view of depression. Correlational analyses demonstrated that preintervention categorical belief positively predicted, and preintervention continuum belief negatively predicted, depression stigma. Moreover, preintervention categorical belief positively predicted, and preintervention continuum belief negatively predicted, self-stigma among participants with a self-reported history of depression. There was scant evidence that the intervention affected public stigma among participants without a history of depression and no evidence that it affected self-stigma among participants with a history of depression. These findings illuminate a number of key priorities for future research on continuum belief intervention and its prospects for stigma reduction

Evidence Propagation and Consensus Formation in Noisy Environments

We study the effectiveness of consensus formation in multi-agent systems where there is both belief updating based on direct evidence and also belief combination between agents. In particular, we consider the scenario in which a population of agents collaborate on the best-of-n problem where the aim is to reach a consensus about which is the best (alternatively, true) state from amongst a set of states, each with a different quality value (or level of evidence). Agents' beliefs are represented within Dempster-Shafer theory by mass functions and we investigate the macro-level properties of four well-known belief combination operators for this multi-agent consensus formation problem: Dempster's rule, Yager's rule, Dubois & Prade's operator and the averaging operator. The convergence properties of the operators are considered and simulation experiments are conducted for different evidence rates and noise levels. Results show that a combination of updating on direct evidence and belief combination between agents results in better consensus to the best state than does evidence updating alone. We also find that in this framework the operators are robust to noise. Broadly, Yager's rule is shown to be the better operator under various parameter values, i.e. convergence to the best state, robustness to noise, and scalability.Comment: 13th international conference on Scalable Uncertainty Managemen

Suspending is Believing

A good account of the agnostic attitude of Suspending Judgement should explain how it can be rendered more or less rational/justified according to the state of one's evidence – and one's relation to that evidence. I argue that the attitude of suspending judgement whether p constitutively involves having a belief; roughly, a belief that one cannot yet tell whether or not p. I show that a theory of suspending that treats it as a sui generis attitude, wholly distinct from belief, struggles to account for how suspension of judgement can be rendered more or less rational (or irrational) by one's evidence. I also criticise the related idea that suspension essentially requires an 'Inquiring Attitude'. I show how a belief-based theory, in contrast, neatly accounts for the rational and epistemic features of suspending and so neatly accounts for why an agnostic has a genuine neutral opinion concerning the question whether p, as opposed to simply having no opinion