17 research outputs found
Survey of Automotive Controller Area Network Intrusion Detection Systems
Novel attacks continue to appear against in-vehicle networks due to the increasing complexity of heterogeneous software and hardware components used in vehicles. These new components introduce challenges when developing efficient and adaptable security mechanisms. Several intrusion detection systems (IDS) have been proposed to identify and protect in-vehicle networks against malicious activities. We describe the state-of-the-art intrusion detection methods for securing automotive networks, with special focus on the Controller Area Network (CAN). We provide a description of vulnerabilities, highlight threat models, identify known attack vectors present in CAN, and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of suggested solutions
Misbehaviour Prediction for Autonomous Driving Systems
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are the core component of modern autonomous
driving systems. To date, it is still unrealistic that a DNN will generalize
correctly in all driving conditions. Current testing techniques consist of
offline solutions that identify adversarial or corner cases for improving the
training phase, and little has been done for enabling online healing of
DNN-based vehicles. In this paper, we address the problem of estimating the
confidence of DNNs in response to unexpected execution contexts with the
purpose of predicting potential safety-critical misbehaviours such as out of
bound episodes or collisions. Our approach SelfOracle is based on a novel
concept of self-assessment oracle, which monitors the DNN confidence at
runtime, to predict unsupported driving scenarios in advance. SelfOracle uses
autoencoder and time-series-based anomaly detection to reconstruct the driving
scenarios seen by the car, and determine the confidence boundary of
normal/unsupported conditions. In our empirical assessment, we evaluated the
effectiveness of different variants of SelfOracle at predicting injected
anomalous driving contexts, using DNN models and simulation environment from
Udacity. Results show that, overall, SelfOracle can predict 77% misbehaviours,
up to 6 seconds in advance, outperforming the online input validation approach
of DeepRoad by a factor almost equal to 3.Comment: 11 page
Evaluasi Algoritma LSTM dan Algoritma Validasi Sekuensi ID Untuk Mendeteksi Serangan Pada Protokol Komunikasi Modbus TCP/IP Dalam SCADA
Pesatnya perkembangan IoT terutama dengan penerapan teknologi 5G, SCADA menjadi protokol yang semakin banyak diminta yang dulunya hanya dikembangkan di lingkungan yang hampir tidak memerlukan dan menerapkan keamanan, menjadi target utama serangan cyber. Oleh karena itu, implementasi Intrusion Detection System (IDS) yang tepat menjadi penting. Diperlukan metode yang dapat mendeteksi penyusup dalam sistem. Metode neural network menjadi metode yang cukup terkenal dalam pendeteksi penyusup dan memiliki hasil yang baik tetapi, sifat neural network yang rumit dan memakan banyak waktu untuk melatih. Metode lainnya adalah metode validasi sekuensi ID yang sebelumnya diusulkan untuk CanBus. Kedua metode ini dievaluasi dalam penelitian ini dan ditemukan bahwa LSTM lebih unggul dengan akurasi 99,7%, presisi 99.74%, recal 99.7%, dan F1-Score 99,69
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Application-Layer Anomaly Detection Leveraging Time-Series Physical Semantics in CAN-FD Vehicle Networks
Data Availability Statement:
The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to the need for confidentiality of application layer protocols for car companies.The Controller Area Network with Flexible Data-Rate (CAN-FD) bus is the predominant in-vehicle network protocol, responsible for transmitting crucial application semantic signals. Due to the absence of security measures, CAN-FD is vulnerable to numerous cyber threats, particularly those altering its authentic physical values. This paper introduces Physical Semantics-Enhanced Anomaly Detection (PSEAD) for CAN-FD networks. Our framework effectively extracts and standardizes the genuine physical meaning features present in the message data fields. The implementation involves a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network augmented with a self-attention mechanism, thereby enabling the unsupervised capture of temporal information within high-dimensional data. Consequently, this approach fully exploits contextual information within the physical meaning features. In contrast to the non-physical semantics-aware whole frame combination detection method, our approach is more adept at harnessing the physical significance inherent in each segment of the message. This enhancement results in improved accuracy and interpretability of anomaly detection. Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves a mere 0.64% misclassification rate for challenging-to-detect replay attacks and zero misclassifications for DoS, fuzzing, and spoofing attacks. The accuracy has been enhanced by over 4% in comparison to existing methods that rely on byte-level data field characterization at the data link layer.National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 52202494 and 52202495
Automated and intelligent hacking detection system
Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Informatics EngineeringThe Controller Area Network (CAN) is the backbone of automotive networking, connecting many Electronic ControlUnits (ECUs) that control virtually every vehicle function from fuel injection to parking sensors. It possesses,however, no security functionality such as message encryption or authentication by default. Attackers can easily inject or modify packets in the network, causing vehicle malfunction and endangering the driver and passengers. There is an increasing number of ECUs in modern vehicles, primarily driven by the consumer’s expectation of more features and comfort in their vehicles as well as ever-stricter government regulations on efficiency and emissions. Combined with vehicle connectivity to the exterior via Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or cellular, this raises the risk of attacks. Traditional networks, such as Internet Protocol (IP), typically have an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) analysing traffic and signalling when an attack occurs. The system here proposed is an adaptation of the traditional IDS into the CAN bus using a One Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) trained with live, attack-free traffic. The system is capable of reliably detecting a variety of attacks, both known and unknown, without needing to understand payload syntax, which is largely proprietary and vehicle/model dependent. This allows it to be installed in any vehicle in a plug-and-play fashion while maintaining a large degree of accuracy with very few false positives.A Controller Area Network (CAN) é a principal tecnologia de comunicação interna automóvel, ligando muitas
Electronic Control Units (ECUs) que controlam virtualmente todas as funções do veículo desde injeção de
combustível até aos sensores de estacionamento. No entanto, não possui por defeito funcionalidades de
segurança como cifragem ou autenticação. É possível aos atacantes facilmente injetarem ou modificarem
pacotes na rede causando estragos e colocando em perigo tanto o condutor como os passageiros. Existe um
número cada vez maior de ECUs nos veículos modernos, impulsionado principalmente pelas expectativas do
consumidores quanto ao aumento do conforto nos seus veículos, e pelos cada vez mais exigentes regulamentos de eficiência e emissões. Isto, associada à conexão ao exterior através de tecnologias como o Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, ou redes móveis, aumenta o risco de ataques. Redes tradicionais, como a rede Internet Protocol (IP), tipicamente possuem um Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) que analiza o tráfego e assinala a presença de um ataque. O sistema aqui proposto é uma adaptação do IDS tradicional à rede CAN utilizando uma One Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) treinada com tráfego real e livre de ataques. O sistema é capaz de detetar com fiabilidade uma variedade de ataques, tanto conhecidos como desconhecidos, sem a necessidade de entender a sintaxe do campo de dados das mensagens, que é maioritariamente proprietária. Isto permite ao sistema ser instalado em qualquer veículo num modo plug-and-play enquanto mantém um elevado nível de desempenho com muito poucos falsos positivos
Techniques for utilizing classification towards securing automotive controller area network and machine learning towards the reverse engineering of CAN messages
The vehicle industry is quickly becoming more connected and growing. This growth is due to advancements in cyber physical systems (CPSs) that enhance the safety and automation in vehicle. The modern automobile consists of more than 70 electronic control units (ECUs) that communicate and interact with each other over automotive bus systems. Passenger comforts, infotainment features, and connectivity continue to progress through the growth and integration of Internet-of-Things (IoT) technologies. Common networks include the Controller Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnect Network (LIN), and FlexRay.
However, the benefits of increased connectivity and features comes with the penalty of increased vulnerabilities. Security is lacking in preventing attacks on safety-critical control systems. I will explore the state of the art methods and approaches researchers have taken to identify threats and how to address them with intrusion detection. I discuss the development of a hybrid based intrusion detection approach that combines anomaly and signature based detection methods.
Machine learning is a hot topic in security as it is a method of learning and classifying system behavior and can detect intrusions that alter normal behavior. In this paper, we discuss utilizing machine learning algorithms to assist in classifying CAN messages. I present work that focuses on the reverse engineering and classification of CAN messages. The problem is that even though CAN is standardized, the implementation may vary for different manufacturers and vehicle models. These implementations are kept secret, therefore CAN messages for every vehicle needs to be analyzed and reverse engineered in order to get information. Due to the lack of publicly available CAN specifications, attackers and researchers need to reverse engineer messages to pinpoint which messages will have the desired impact. The reverse engineering process is needed by researchers and hackers for all manufacturers and their respective vehicles to understand what the vehicle is doing and what each CAN message means. The knowledge of the specifications of CAN messages can improve the effectiveness of security mechanisms applied to CAN