1,849 research outputs found
Pretty Private Group Management
Group management is a fundamental building block of today's Internet
applications. Mailing lists, chat systems, collaborative document edition but
also online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter use group management
systems. In many cases, group security is required in the sense that access to
data is restricted to group members only. Some applications also require
privacy by keeping group members anonymous and unlinkable. Group management
systems routinely rely on a central authority that manages and controls the
infrastructure and data of the system. Personal user data related to groups
then becomes de facto accessible to the central authority. In this paper, we
propose a completely distributed approach for group management based on
distributed hash tables. As there is no enrollment to a central authority, the
created groups can be leveraged by various applications. Following this
paradigm we describe a protocol for such a system. We consider security and
privacy issues inherently introduced by removing the central authority and
provide a formal validation of security properties of the system using AVISPA.
We demonstrate the feasibility of this protocol by implementing a prototype
running on top of Vuze's DHT
Accountable infrastructure and its impact on internet security and privacy
The Internet infrastructure relies on the correct functioning of the basic underlying protocols, which were designed for functionality. Security and privacy have been added post hoc, mostly by applying cryptographic means to different layers of communication. In the absence of accountability, as a fundamental property, the Internet infrastructure does not have a built-in ability to associate an action with the responsible entity, neither to detect or prevent misbehavior. In this thesis, we study accountability from a few different perspectives. First, we study the need of having accountability in anonymous communication networks as a mechanism that provides repudiation for the proxy nodes by tracing back selected outbound traffic in a provable manner. Second, we design a framework that provides a foundation to support the enforcement of the right to be forgotten law in a scalable and automated manner. The framework provides a technical mean for the users to prove their eligibility for content removal from the search results. Third, we analyze the Internet infrastructure determining potential security risks and threats imposed by dependencies among the entities on the Internet. Finally, we evaluate the feasibility of using hop count filtering as a mechanism for mitigating Distributed Reflective Denial-of-Service attacks, and conceptually show that it cannot work to prevent these attacks.Die Internet-Infrastrutur stützt sich auf die korrekte Ausführung zugrundeliegender Protokolle, welche mit Fokus auf Funktionalität entwickelt wurden. Sicherheit und Datenschutz wurden nachträglich hinzugefügt, hauptsächlich durch die Anwendung kryptografischer Methoden in verschiedenen Schichten des Protokollstacks. Fehlende Zurechenbarkeit, eine fundamentale Eigenschaft Handlungen mit deren Verantwortlichen in Verbindung zu bringen, verhindert jedoch, Fehlverhalten zu erkennen und zu unterbinden.
Diese Dissertation betrachtet die Zurechenbarkeit im Internet aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln. Zuerst untersuchen wir die Notwendigkeit für Zurechenbarkeit in anonymisierten Kommunikationsnetzen um es Proxyknoten zu erlauben Fehlverhalten beweisbar auf den eigentlichen Verursacher zurückzuverfolgen. Zweitens entwerfen wir ein Framework, das die skalierbare und automatisierte Umsetzung des Rechts auf Vergessenwerden unterstützt. Unser Framework bietet Benutzern die technische Möglichkeit, ihre Berechtigung für die Entfernung von Suchergebnissen nachzuweisen. Drittens analysieren wir die Internet-Infrastruktur, um mögliche Sicherheitsrisiken und Bedrohungen aufgrund von Abhängigkeiten zwischen den verschiedenen beteiligten Entitäten zu bestimmen. Letztlich evaluieren wir die Umsetzbarkeit von Hop Count Filtering als ein Instrument DRDoS Angriffe abzuschwächen und wir zeigen, dass dieses Instrument diese Art der Angriffe konzeptionell nicht verhindern kann
A Utility-Theoretic Approach to Privacy in Online Services
Online offerings such as web search, news portals, and e-commerce applications face the challenge of providing high-quality service to a large, heterogeneous user base. Recent efforts have highlighted the potential to improve performance by introducing methods to personalize services based on special knowledge about users and their context. For example, a user's demographics, location, and past search and browsing may be useful in enhancing the results offered in response to web search queries. However, reasonable concerns about privacy by both users, providers, and government agencies acting on behalf of citizens, may limit access by services to such information. We introduce and explore an economics of privacy in personalization, where people can opt to share personal information, in a standing or on-demand manner, in return for expected enhancements in the quality of an online service. We focus on the example of web search and formulate realistic objective functions for search efficacy and privacy. We demonstrate how we can find a provably near-optimal optimization of the utility-privacy tradeoff in an efficient manner. We evaluate our methodology on data drawn from a log of the search activity of volunteer participants. We separately assess users’ preferences about privacy and utility via a large-scale survey, aimed at eliciting preferences about peoples’ willingness to trade the sharing of personal data in returns for gains in search efficiency. We show that a significant level of personalization can be achieved using a relatively small amount of information about users
Privacy-preserving techniques for computer and network forensics
Clients, administrators, and law enforcement personnel have many privacy concerns when it comes to network forensics. Clients would like to use network services in a freedom-friendly environment that protects their privacy and personal data. Administrators would like to monitor their network, and audit its behavior and functionality for debugging and statistical purposes (which could involve invading the privacy of its network users). Finally, members of law enforcement would like to track and identify any type of digital crimes that occur on the network, and charge the suspects with the appropriate crimes. Members of law enforcement could use some security back doors made available by network administrators, or other forensic tools, that could potentially invade the privacy of network users. In my dissertation, I will be identifying and implementing techniques that each of these entities could use to achieve their goals while preserving the privacy of users on the network. I will show a privacy-preserving implementation of network flow recording that can allow administrators to monitor and audit their network behavior and functionality for debugging and statistical purposes without having this data contain any private information about its users. This implementation is based on identity-based encryption and differential privacy. I will also be showing how law enforcement could use timing channel techniques to fingerprint anonymous servers that are running websites with illegal content and services. Finally I will show the results from a thought experiment about how network administrators can identify pattern-like software that is running on clients\u27 machines remotely without any administrative privileges. The goal of my work is to understand what privileges administrators or law enforcement need to achieve their goals, and the privacy issues inherent in this, and to develop technologies that help administrators and law enforcement achieve their goals while preserving the privacy of network users
Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey
This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh
network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user
privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various
possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for
WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the
security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application
layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols,
user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation
protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the
chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms
and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible
attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with
regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed,
use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved
etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management
approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly
becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open
problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed
before the chapter is finally concluded.Comment: 62 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. This chapter is an extension of the
author's previous submission in arXiv submission: arXiv:1102.1226. There are
some text overlaps with the previous submissio
Data Leak Detection As a Service: Challenges and Solutions
We describe a network-based data-leak detection (DLD)
technique, the main feature of which is that the detection
does not require the data owner to reveal the content of the
sensitive data. Instead, only a small amount of specialized
digests are needed. Our technique – referred to as the fuzzy
fingerprint – can be used to detect accidental data leaks due
to human errors or application flaws. The privacy-preserving
feature of our algorithms minimizes the exposure of sensitive
data and enables the data owner to safely delegate the
detection to others.We describe how cloud providers can offer
their customers data-leak detection as an add-on service
with strong privacy guarantees.
We perform extensive experimental evaluation on the privacy,
efficiency, accuracy and noise tolerance of our techniques.
Our evaluation results under various data-leak scenarios
and setups show that our method can support accurate
detection with very small number of false alarms, even
when the presentation of the data has been transformed. It
also indicates that the detection accuracy does not degrade
when partial digests are used. We further provide a quantifiable
method to measure the privacy guarantee offered by our
fuzzy fingerprint framework
Assessing the Privacy Benefits of Domain Name Encryption
As Internet users have become more savvy about the potential for their
Internet communication to be observed, the use of network traffic encryption
technologies (e.g., HTTPS/TLS) is on the rise. However, even when encryption is
enabled, users leak information about the domains they visit via DNS queries
and via the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension of TLS. Two recent proposals
to ameliorate this issue are DNS over HTTPS/TLS (DoH/DoT) and Encrypted SNI
(ESNI). In this paper we aim to assess the privacy benefits of these proposals
by considering the relationship between hostnames and IP addresses, the latter
of which are still exposed. We perform DNS queries from nine vantage points
around the globe to characterize this relationship. We quantify the privacy
gain offered by ESNI for different hosting and CDN providers using two
different metrics, the k-anonymity degree due to co-hosting and the dynamics of
IP address changes. We find that 20% of the domains studied will not gain any
privacy benefit since they have a one-to-one mapping between their hostname and
IP address. On the other hand, 30% will gain a significant privacy benefit with
a k value greater than 100, since these domains are co-hosted with more than
100 other domains. Domains whose visitors' privacy will meaningfully improve
are far less popular, while for popular domains the benefit is not significant.
Analyzing the dynamics of IP addresses of long-lived domains, we find that only
7.7% of them change their hosting IP addresses on a daily basis. We conclude by
discussing potential approaches for website owners and hosting/CDN providers
for maximizing the privacy benefits of ESNI.Comment: In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (ASIA CCS '20), October 5-9, 2020, Taipei, Taiwa
Recommended from our members
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Defenses in Low Latency Anonymous Communication
The recent public disclosure of mass surveillance of electronic communication, involving powerful government authorities, has drawn the public's attention to issues regarding Internet privacy. For almost a decade now, there have been several research efforts towards designing and deploying open source, trustworthy and reliable systems that ensure users' anonymity and privacy. These systems operate by hiding the true network identity of communicating parties against eavesdropping adversaries. Tor, acronym for The Onion Router, is an example of such a system. Such systems relay the traffic of their users through an overlay of nodes that are called Onion Routers and are operated by volunteers distributed across the globe. Such systems have served well as anti-censorship and anti-surveillance tools. However, recent publications have disclosed that powerful government organizations are seeking means to de-anonymize such systems and have deployed distributed monitoring infrastructure to aid their efforts.
Attacks against anonymous communication systems, like Tor, often involve trac analysis. In such attacks, an adversary, capable of observing network traffic statistics in several different networks, correlates the trac patterns in these networks, and associates otherwise seemingly unrelated network connections. The process can lead an adversary to the source of an anonymous connection. However, due to their design, consisting of globally distributed relays, the users of anonymity networks like Tor, can route their traffic virtually via any network; hiding their tracks and true identities from their communication peers and eavesdropping adversaries. De-anonymization of a random anonymous connection is hard, as the adversary is required to correlate traffic patterns in one network link to those in virtually all other networks. Past research mostly involved reducing the complexity of this process by rst reducing the set of relays or network routers to monitor, and then identifying the actual source of anonymous traffic among network connections that are routed via this reduced set of relays or network routers to monitor. A study of various research efforts in this field reveals that there have been many more efforts to reduce the set of relays or routers to be searched than to explore methods for actually identifying an anonymous user amidst the network connections using these routers and relays. Few have tried to comprehensively study a complete attack, that involves reducing the set of relays and routers to monitor and identifying the source of an anonymous connection. Although it is believed that systems like Tor are trivially vulnerable to traffic analysis, there are various technical challenges and issues that can become obstacles to accurately identifying the source of anonymous connection. It is hard to adjudge the vulnerability of anonymous communication systems without adequately exploring the issues involved in identifying the source of anonymous traffic.
We take steps to ll this gap by exploring two novel active trac analysis attacks, that solely rely on measurements of network statistics. In these attacks, the adversary tries to identify the source of an anonymous connection arriving to a server from an exit node. This generally involves correlating traffic entering and leaving the Tor network, linking otherwise unrelated connections. To increase the accuracy of identifying the victim connection among several connections, the adversary injects a traffic perturbation pattern into a connection arriving to the server from a Tor node, that the adversary wants to de-anonymize. One way to achieve this is by colluding with the server and injecting a traffic perturbation pattern using common traffic shaping tools. Our first attack involves a novel remote bandwidth estimation technique to conrm the identity of Tor relays and network routers along the path connecting a Tor client and a server by observing network bandwidth fluctuations deliberately injected by the server. The second attack involves correlating network statistics, for connections entering and leaving the Tor network, available from existing network infrastructure, such as Cisco's NetFlow, for identifying the source of an anonymous connection. Additionally, we explored a novel technique to defend against the latter attack. Most research towards defending against traffic analysis attacks, involving transmission of dummy traffic, have not been implemented due to fears of potential performance degradation. Our novel technique involves transmission of dummy traffic, consisting of packets with IP headers having small Time-to-Live (TTL) values. Such packets are discarded by the routers before they reach their destination. They distort NetFlow statistics, without degrading the client's performance. Finally, we present a strategy that employs transmission of unique plain-text decoy traffic, that appears sensitive, such as fake user credentials, through Tor nodes to decoy servers under our control. Periodic tallying of client and server logs to determine unsolicited connection attempts at the server is used to identify the eavesdropping nodes. Such malicious Tor node operators, eavesdropping on users' traffic, could be potential traffic analysis attackers
- …