Establishing norms with metanorms in distributed computational systems

Norms provide a valuable mechanism for establishing coherent cooperative behaviour in decentralised systems in which there is no central authority. One of the most influential formulations of norm emergence was proposed by Axelrod (Am Political Sci Rev 80(4):1095–1111, 1986). This paper provides an empirical analysis of aspects of Axelrod’s approach, by exploring some of the key assumptions made in previous evaluations of the model. We explore the dynamics of norm emergence and the occurrence of norm collapse when applying the model over extended durations . It is this phenomenon of norm collapse that can motivate the emergence of a central authority to enforce laws and so preserve the norms, rather than relying on individuals to punish defection. Our findings identify characteristics that significantly influence norm establishment using Axelrod’s formulation, but are likely to be of importance for norm establishment more generally. Moreover, Axelrod’s model suffers from significant limitations in assuming that private strategies of individuals are available to others, and that agents are omniscient in being aware of all norm violations and punishments. Because this is an unreasonable expectation , the approach does not lend itself to modelling real-world systems such as online networks or electronic markets. In response, the paper proposes alternatives to Axelrod’s model, by replacing the evolutionary approach, enabling agents to learn, and by restricting the metapunishment of agents to cases where the original defection is observed, in order to be able to apply the model to real-world domains . This work can also help explain the formation of a “social contract” to legitimate enforcement by a central authority

Establishing norms with metanorms over interaction topologies

Norms are a valuable means of establishing coherent cooperative behaviour in decentralised systems in which there is no central authority. Axelrod’s seminal model of norm establishment in populations of self-interested individuals provides some insight into the mechanisms needed to support this through the use of metanorms, but considers only limited scenarios and domains. While further developments of Axelrod’s model have addressed some of the limitations, there is still only limited consideration of such metanorm models with more realistic topological configurations. In response, this paper tries to address such limitation by considering its application to different topological structures. Our results suggest that norm establishment is achievable in lattices and small worlds, while such establishment is not achievable in scale-free networks, due to the problematic effects of hubs. The paper offers a solution, first by adjusting the model to more appropriately reflect the characteristics of the problem, and second by offering a new dynamic policy adaptation approach to learning the right behaviour. Experimental results demonstrate that this dynamic policy adaptation overcomes the difficulties posed by the asymmetric distribution of links in scale-free networks, leading to an absence of norm violation, and instead to norm emergence

Axelrod’s metanorm games on networks

Metanorms is a mechanism proposed to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental results show that network structures that underlie social interactions influence the emergence of norms that promote cooperation. We generalize Axelrod’s analysis of metanorms dynamics to interactions unfolding on networks through simulation and mathematical modeling. Network topology strongly influences the effectiveness of the metanorms mechanism in establishing cooperation. In particular, we find that average degree, clustering coefficient and the average number of triplets per node play key roles in sustaining or collapsing cooperationSpanish MICINN projects CSD2010-00034 (CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010) and DPI2010-16920, and by the Junta de Castilla y Leo´ n, references BU034A08 and GREX251-2009

Service management for multi-domain Active Networks

The Internet is an example of a multi-agent system. In our context, an agent is synonymous with network operators, Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers. ISPs mutually interact for connectivity's sake, but the fact remains that two peering agents are inevitably self-interested. Egoistic behaviour manifests itself in two ways. Firstly, the ISPs are able to act in an environment where different ISPs would have different spheres of influence, in the sense that they will have control and management responsibilities over different parts of the environment. On the other hand, contention occurs when an ISP intends to sell resources to another, which gives rise to at least two of its customers sharing (hence contending for) a common transport medium. The multi-agent interaction was analysed by simulating a game theoretic approach and the alignment of dominant strategies adopted by agents with evolving traits were abstracted. In particular, the contention for network resources is arbitrated such that a self-policing environment may emerge from a congested bottleneck. Over the past 5 years, larger ISPs have simply peddled as fast as they could to meet the growing demand for bandwidth by throwing bandwidth at congestion problems. Today, the dire financial positions of Worldcom and Global Crossing illustrate, to a certain degree, the fallacies of over-provisioning network resources. The proposed framework in this thesis enables subscribers of an ISP to monitor and police each other's traffic in order to establish a well-behaved norm in utilising limited resources. This framework can be expanded to other inter-domain bottlenecks within the Internet. One of the main objectives of this thesis is also to investigate the impact on multi-domain service management in the future Internet, where active nodes could potentially be located amongst traditional passive routers. The advent of Active Networking technology necessitates node-level computational resource allocations, in addition to prevailing resource reservation approaches for communication bandwidth. Our motivation is to ensure that a service negotiation protocol takes account of these resources so that the response to a specific service deployment request from the end-user is consistent and predictable. To promote the acceleration of service deployment by means of Active Networking technology, a pricing model is also evaluated for computational resources (e.g., CPU time and memory). Previous work in these areas of research only concentrate on bandwidth (i.e., communication) - related resources. Our pricing approach takes account of both guaranteed and best-effort service by adapting the arbitrage theorem from financial theory. The central tenet for our approach is to synthesise insights from different disciplines to address problems in data networks. The greater parts of research experience have been obtained during direct and indirect participation in the 1ST-10561 project known as FAIN (Future Active IP Networks) and ACTS-AC338 project called MIAMI (Mobile Intelligent Agent for Managing the Information Infrastructure). The Inter-domain Manager (IDM) component was integrated as an integral part of the FAIN policy-based network management systems (PBNM). Its monitoring component (developed during the MIAMI project) learns about routing changes that occur within a domain so that the management system and the managed nodes have the same topological view of the network. This enabled our reservation mechanism to reserve resources along the existing route set up by whichever underlying routing protocol is in place

Regulated MAS: Social Perspective

This chapter addresses the problem of building normative multi-agent systems in terms of regulatory mechanisms. It describes a static conceptual model through which one can specify normative multi-agent systems along with a dynamic model to capture their operation and evolution. The chapter proposes a typology of applications and presents some open problems. In the last section, the authors express their individual views on these mattersMunindar Singh’s effort was partially supported by the U.S. Army Research Office under grant W911NF-08-1-0105. The content of this paper does not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the U.S. Government; no official endorsement should be inferred or implied. Nicoletta Fornara’s effort is supported by the Hasler Foundation project nr. 11115-KG and by the SER project nr. C08.0114 within the COST Action IC0801 Agreement Technologies. Henrique Lopes Cardoso’s effort is supported by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), under project PTDC/EIA-EIA/104420/2008. Pablo Noriega’s effort has been partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology through the Agreement Technologies CONSOLIDER project under contract CSD2007-0022, and the Generalitat of Catalunya grant 2009-SGR-1434.Peer Reviewe

Reasoning about constitutive norms in BDI agents

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Logic Journal of the IGPL following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version: Criado Pacheco, N.; Argente Villaplana, E.; Noriega, P.; Botti Navarro, VJ. (2014). Reasoning about constitutive norms in BDI agents. Logic Journal of the IGPL. 22(1):66-93 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/1093/jigpal/jzt035Software agents can be members of different institutions along their life; they might even belong to different institutions simultaneously. For these reasons, agents need capabilities that allow them to determine the repercussion that their actions would have within the different institutions. This association between the physical word, in which agents interactions and actions take place, and the institutional world is defined by means of constitutive norms. Currently, the problem of how agents reason about constitutive norms has been tackled from a theoretical perspective only. Thus, there is a lack of more practical proposals that allow the development of software agents capable of reasoning about constitutive norms. In this article we propose an information model, knowledge representation and an inference mechanism to enable Belief-Desire-Intention agents to reason about the consequences of their actions on the institutions and making decisions accordingly. Specifically, the information model, knowledge representation and inference mechanism proposed in this article allows agents to keep track of the institutional state given that they have a physical presence in some real-world environment. Agents have a limited and not fully believable knowledge of the physical world (i.e. they are placed in an uncertain environment). Therefore, our proposal also deals with the uncertainty of the environment.Criado Pacheco, N.; Argente Villaplana, E.; Noriega, P.; Botti Navarro, VJ. (2014). Reasoning about constitutive norms in BDI agents. Logic Journal of the IGPL. 22(1):66-93. doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzt035S6693221Baldi, P., Brunak, S., Chauvin, Y., Andersen, C. A. F., & Nielsen, H. (2000). Assessing the accuracy of prediction algorithms for classification: an overview. Bioinformatics, 16(5), 412-424. doi:10.1093/bioinformatics/16.5.412Bloch, I. (1996). Information combination operators for data fusion: a comparative review with classification. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics - Part A: Systems and Humans, 26(1), 52-67. doi:10.1109/3468.477860Casali, A., Godo, L., & Sierra, C. (2011). A graded BDI agent model to represent and reason about preferences. Artificial Intelligence, 175(7-8), 1468-1478. doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.12.006Criado, N., Julián, V., Botti, V., & Argente, E. (2010). A Norm-Based Organization Management System. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 19-35. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14962-7_2Governatori, G., & Rotolo, A. (2008). BIO logical agents: Norms, beliefs, intentions in defeasible logic. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 17(1), 36-69. doi:10.1007/s10458-008-9030-4Grossi, D., Aldewereld, H., Vázquez-Salceda, J., & Dignum, F. (2006). Ontological aspects of the implementation of norms in agent-based electronic institutions. Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory, 12(2-3), 251-275. doi:10.1007/s10588-006-9546-6Hübner, J. F., Boissier, O., Kitio, R., & Ricci, A. (2009). Instrumenting multi-agent organisations with organisational artifacts and agents. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 20(3), 369-400. doi:10.1007/s10458-009-9084-yJONES, A. J. I., & SERGOT, M. (1996). A Formal Characterisation of Institutionalised Power. Logic Journal of IGPL, 4(3), 427-443. doi:10.1093/jigpal/4.3.427Rawls, J. (1955). Two Concepts of Rules. The Philosophical Review, 64(1), 3. doi:10.2307/2182230Da Silva, V. T. (2008). From the specification to the implementation of norms: an automatic approach to generate rules from norms to govern the behavior of agents. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 17(1), 113-155. doi:10.1007/s10458-008-9039-

Exploring the resource recovery potentials of municipal solid waste: a review of solid wastes composting in developing countries

Population explosion, high urbanization and improved living standards have induced rapid changes in quantities and materiacompositions of solid waste generation globally. Until recently solid waste disposal in landfills and open dump sites waconsidered more economical and it is the most widely used methods in developing countries. Hence the potentials in the othealternative methods such as the resource recovery and recycling and their integration into waste management have been scarcelassessed. However, the ever growing challenges posed by the rapidly increasing quantities and compositions of solid wastes ideveloping countries led to the searching for alternative waste disposal methods. In this regard the paper presented an assessmenof the resource potentials of municipal solid waste materials arising from cities in developing countries as a strategy fosustainable solid waste management. Using published data on solid waste composition the paper has identified that there is higpotentials of composting in the solid waste stream from cities in developing countries. In conclusion, it recommended the recoverof organic waste material and papers for composting and the recycling of plastic, metals, textiles and others to explore their resource recovery potentials. This will largely reduce the ultimate quantities of solid waste for disposal and lower the operatincosts. This strategy will achieve sustainable waste management in developing countries. It is hoped that the paper has provided useful guide for wastes management policy decisions in developing countries

The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation

Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players' incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2) a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives. (authors' abstract

Conditions for the Emergence of Shared Norms in Populations with Incompatible Preferences

Understanding norms is a key challenge in sociology. Nevertheless, there is a lack of dynamical models explaining how one of several possible behaviors is established as a norm and under what conditions. Analysing an agent-based model, we identify interesting parameter dependencies that imply when two behaviors will coexist or when a shared norm will emerge in a heterogeneous society, where different populations have incompatible preferences. Our model highlights the importance of randomness, spatial interactions, non-linear dynamics, and self-organization. It can also explain the emergence of unpopular norms that do not maximize the collective benefit. Furthermore, we compare behavior-based with preference-based punishment and find interesting results concerning hypocritical punishment. Strikingly, pressuring others to perform the same public behavior as oneself is more effective in promoting norms than pressuring others to meet one’s own private preference. Finally, we show that adaptive group pressure exerted by randomly occuring, local majorities may create norms under conditions where different behaviors would normally coexist