Efficient Local Search in Coordination Games on Graphs

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given strategy. These games capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. Prior work shows that the problem of determining the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium for these games is NP-complete already for graphs with all weights equal to one and no bonuses. However, for several classes of graphs (e.g. DAGs and cliques) pure Nash equilibria or even strong equilibria always exist and can be found by simply following a particular improvement or coalition-improvement path, respectively. In this paper we identify several natural classes of graphs for which a finite improvement or coalition-improvement path of polynomial length always exists, and, as a consequence, a Nash equilibrium or strong equilibrium in them can be found in polynomial time. We also argue that these results are optimal in the sense that in natural generalisations of these classes of graphs, a pure Nash equilibrium may not even exist.Comment: Extended version of a paper accepted to IJCAI1

On the Structure of Equilibria in Basic Network Formation

We study network connection games where the nodes of a network perform edge swaps in order to improve their communication costs. For the model proposed by Alon et al. (2010), in which the selfish cost of a node is the sum of all shortest path distances to the other nodes, we use the probabilistic method to provide a new, structural characterization of equilibrium graphs. We show how to use this characterization in order to prove upper bounds on the diameter of equilibrium graphs in terms of the size of the largest $k$-vicinity (defined as the the set of vertices within distance $k$ from a vertex), for any $k \geq 1$ and in terms of the number of edges, thus settling positively a conjecture of Alon et al. in the cases of graphs of large $k$-vicinity size (including graphs of large maximum degree) and of graphs which are dense enough. Next, we present a new swap-based network creation game, in which selfish costs depend on the immediate neighborhood of each node; in particular, the profit of a node is defined as the sum of the degrees of its neighbors. We prove that, in contrast to the previous model, this network creation game admits an exact potential, and also that any equilibrium graph contains an induced star. The existence of the potential function is exploited in order to show that an equilibrium can be reached in expected polynomial time even in the case where nodes can only acquire limited knowledge concerning non-neighboring nodes.Comment: 11 pages, 4 figure

Equilibrium statistical mechanics on correlated random graphs

Biological and social networks have recently attracted enormous attention between physicists. Among several, two main aspects may be stressed: A non trivial topology of the graph describing the mutual interactions between agents exists and/or, typically, such interactions are essentially (weighted) imitative. Despite such aspects are widely accepted and empirically confirmed, the schemes currently exploited in order to generate the expected topology are based on a-priori assumptions and in most cases still implement constant intensities for links. Here we propose a simple shift in the definition of patterns in an Hopfield model to convert frustration into dilution: By varying the bias of the pattern distribution, the network topology -which is generated by the reciprocal affinities among agents - crosses various well known regimes (fully connected, linearly diverging connectivity, extreme dilution scenario, no network), coupled with small world properties, which, in this context, are emergent and no longer imposed a-priori. The model is investigated at first focusing on these topological properties of the emergent network, then its thermodynamics is analytically solved (at a replica symmetric level) by extending the double stochastic stability technique, and presented together with its fluctuation theory for a picture of criticality. At least at equilibrium, dilution simply decreases the strength of the coupling felt by the spins, but leaves the paramagnetic/ferromagnetic flavors unchanged. The main difference with respect to previous investigations and a naive picture is that within our approach replicas do not appear: instead of (multi)-overlaps as order parameters, we introduce a class of magnetizations on all the possible sub-graphs belonging to the main one investigated: As a consequence, for these objects a closure for a self-consistent relation is achieved.Comment: 30 pages, 4 figure

A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares

In a seminal paper, Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant studied cost sharing protocols for network design with the objective to implement a low-cost Steiner forest as a Nash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing open problems to date is to understand the power of budget-balanced and separable cost sharing protocols in order to induce low-cost Steiner forests. In this work, we focus on undirected networks and analyze topological properties of the underlying graph so that an optimal Steiner forest can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium (by some separable cost sharing protocol) independent of the edge costs. We term a graph efficient if the above stated property holds. As our main result, we give a complete characterization of efficient undirected graphs for two-player network design games: an undirected graph is efficient if and only if it does not contain (at least) one out of few forbidden subgraphs. Our characterization implies that several graph classes are efficient: generalized series-parallel graphs, fan and wheel graphs and graphs with small cycles.Comment: 60 pages, 69 figures, OR 2017 Berlin, WINE 2017 Bangalor