487 research outputs found
Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication
C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication".
Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary
box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater
expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the
ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular
semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal
logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with
the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction
between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the
strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the
functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with
"idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the
intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of
Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years
later
On formal aspects of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency
This paper reviews the central points and presents some recent developments of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency in terms of the preservation of evidence. Two formal systems are surveyed, the basic logic of evidence (BLE) and the logic of evidence and truth (LET J ), designed to deal, respectively, with evidence and with evidence and truth. While BLE is equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4, it has been conceived for a different purpose. Adequate valuation semantics that provide decidability are given for both BLE and LET J . The meanings of the connectives of BLE and LET J , from the point of view of preservation of evidence, is explained with the aid of an inferential semantics. A formalization of the notion of evidence for BLE as proposed by M. Fitting is also reviewed here. As a novel result, the paper shows that LET J is semantically characterized through the so-called Fidel structures. Some opportunities for further research are also discussed
Logics for modelling collective attitudes
We introduce a number of logics to reason about collective propositional
attitudes that are defined by means of the majority rule. It is well known that majoritarian
aggregation is subject to irrationality, as the results in social choice theory and judgment
aggregation show. The proposed logics for modelling collective attitudes are based on
a substructural propositional logic that allows for circumventing inconsistent outcomes.
Individual and collective propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, obligations, are
then modelled by means of minimal modalities to ensure a number of basic principles. In
this way, a viable consistent modelling of collective attitudes is obtained
Non-normal modalities in variants of Linear Logic
This article presents modal versions of resource-conscious logics. We
concentrate on extensions of variants of Linear Logic with one minimal
non-normal modality. In earlier work, where we investigated agency in
multi-agent systems, we have shown that the results scale up to logics with
multiple non-minimal modalities. Here, we start with the language of
propositional intuitionistic Linear Logic without the additive disjunction, to
which we add a modality. We provide an interpretation of this language on a
class of Kripke resource models extended with a neighbourhood function: modal
Kripke resource models. We propose a Hilbert-style axiomatization and a
Gentzen-style sequent calculus. We show that the proof theories are sound and
complete with respect to the class of modal Kripke resource models. We show
that the sequent calculus admits cut elimination and that proof-search is in
PSPACE. We then show how to extend the results when non-commutative connectives
are added to the language. Finally, we put the logical framework to use by
instantiating it as logics of agency. In particular, we propose a logic to
reason about the resource-sensitive use of artefacts and illustrate it with a
variety of examples
Stone-Type Dualities for Separation Logics
Stone-type duality theorems, which relate algebraic and
relational/topological models, are important tools in logic because -- in
addition to elegant abstraction -- they strengthen soundness and completeness
to a categorical equivalence, yielding a framework through which both algebraic
and topological methods can be brought to bear on a logic. We give a systematic
treatment of Stone-type duality for the structures that interpret bunched
logics, starting with the weakest systems, recovering the familiar BI and
Boolean BI (BBI), and extending to both classical and intuitionistic Separation
Logic. We demonstrate the uniformity and modularity of this analysis by
additionally capturing the bunched logics obtained by extending BI and BBI with
modalities and multiplicative connectives corresponding to disjunction,
negation and falsum. This includes the logic of separating modalities (LSM), De
Morgan BI (DMBI), Classical BI (CBI), and the sub-classical family of logics
extending Bi-intuitionistic (B)BI (Bi(B)BI). We additionally obtain as
corollaries soundness and completeness theorems for the specific Kripke-style
models of these logics as presented in the literature: for DMBI, the
sub-classical logics extending BiBI and a new bunched logic, Concurrent Kleene
BI (connecting our work to Concurrent Separation Logic), this is the first time
soundness and completeness theorems have been proved. We thus obtain a
comprehensive semantic account of the multiplicative variants of all standard
propositional connectives in the bunched logic setting. This approach
synthesises a variety of techniques from modal, substructural and categorical
logic and contextualizes the "resource semantics" interpretation underpinning
Separation Logic amongst them
Modalities as interactions between the classical and the intuitionistic logics
We give an equivalent formulation of topological algebras, interpreting S4, as boolean algebras equipped with intuitionistic negation. The intuitionistic substructure—Heyting algebra—of such an algebra can be then seen as an “epistemic subuniverse”, and modalities arise from the interaction between the intuitionistic and classical negations or, we might perhaps say, between the epistemic and the ontological aspects: they are not relations between arbitrary alternatives but between intuitionistic substructures and one common world governed by the classical (propositional) logic. As an example of the generality of the obtained view, we apply it also to S5. We give a sound, complete and decidable sequent calculus, extending a classical system with the rules for handling the intuitionistic negation, in which one can prove all classical, intuitionistic and S4 valid sequents
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