Competition and Growth in a Vintage Knowledge Model

This paper models the relationship between growth, technology-lifetime, entry, and competition in a vintage-knowledge model of endogenous growth and perfect competition. The model has a unique steady state REE equilibrium. Variations of R&D-efficiency lead to a negative relation between growth and vintage-lifetime and indicate a non-monotonic relation between growth and competition. A shift of population size and its growth rates have qualitatively different consequences here than in standard models. The extent of entry constitutes a buffer, neutralizing the effect of population size or population growth rates on per-capita income levels and growth rates.Endogenous Growth, Vintage-Model, Perfect Competition

Leadership Cycles

We study a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth that produces stochastic leadership cycles. Over a cycle, industry leaders can innovate several successive times in the same industry, gradually increasing the magnitude of their technological lead before being replaced by a new en-trant. Initially, new leaders are eager to enlarge their lead and do much of the research, but if they innovate repeatedly, their propensity to invest in R&D decreases. Eventually they stop doing research ltogether, and as they are overtaken a new cycle starts. The model generates a skewed firm size distribution and a deviation from Gibrat's law that accord with the empirical evidence. We also consider various policy measures, showing that in some cases policy should favour R&D by incumbents, not outsiders, and that stronger patent protection may reduce innovation and growth.

Neoclassical Growth and the Adoption of Technologies

We introduce a growth model of technology diffusion and endogenous Total Factor Productivity (TFP) levels both at the sector and aggregate level. At the aggregate, the model behaves as the Neoclassical growth model. Our goal is for this model to bridge the gap between the theoretical and empirical studies of technology adoption and economic growth. We bridge this gap in three important directions. First of all, we use our model to show how one unified theoretical framework is broadly consistent with the observed dynamics of both economic growth as well as of many different measures of technology adoption, like adoption rates, capital to output ratios, and output ratios. Secondly, we estimate our model using a broad range of technological adoption measures, covering 17 technologies and 21 industrialized countries over the past 180 years. This allows us to show how its predicted adoption patterns fit those observed in the data. Finally, we estimate the disparities in sectoral productivity levels as well as aggregate TFP that can be attributed to the differences in the range of technologies in use across countries. These disparities are almost completely determined by the quality of the worst technology in use, rather than by the quality of the newest technology that has just been adopted or by the number of technologies in use. Further, we find that the TFP component attributable to the range of technologies used is highly correlated with overall sectoral TFP differences across countries, though the variance is smaller.

Vintage capital as an origin of inequalities

Does capital-embodied technological change play an important role in shaping labor market inequalities? This paper addresses the question in a model with vintage capital and search / matching frictions where costly capital investment leads to large heterogeneity in productivity among vacancies in equilibrium. The paper first demonstrates analytically how both technology growth and institutional variables affect equilibrium wage inequality, income shares and unemployment. Next, it applies the model to a quantitative evaluation of capital as an origin of wage inequality: at the current rate of embodied productivity growth a 10-year vintage differential in capital translates into a 6% wage gap. The model also allows a U.S. – continental Europe comparison: an embodied technological acceleration interacted with different labor market institutions can explain a significant part of the differential rise in unemployment and capital share and some of the differential dynamics in wage inequality.

Adoption Lags, Implementation Gaps, and Economic Growth

We introduce a model of endogenous growth in which the returns to innovation are determined by the technology adoption decisions of the users of the new innovative technologies. The technology adoption decisions in our model consist of two dimensions. The first is when to adopt a new technology. The second is at what initial productivity level to adopt it and which part of its productivity potential to learn by doing. Our model economy is one with realistic adoption curves for each technology, the shape of which are an important determinant of the return to innovations and thus of economic growthendogenous growth, learning by doing, technology adoption

Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation

Vintage-differentiated regulation (VDR) is a common feature of many environmental and other regulatory policies in the United States. Under VDR, standards for regulated units are fixed in terms of the units’ respective dates of entry, or “vintage,” with later entrants facing more stringent regulation. In the most common application, often referred to as “grandfathering,” units produced prior to a specific date are exempted from new regulation or face less stringent requirements. The vintage-differentiated approach has long appealed to many participants in the policy community, for reasons associated with efficiency, equity, and simple politics. First, it is frequently more cost-effective—in the short-term—to introduce new pollutionabatement technologies at the time that new plants are constructed than to retrofit older facilities with such technologies. Second, it seems more fair to avoid changing the rules of the game in mid-stream, and hence to apply new standards only to new plants. Third, political pressures tend to favor easily-identified existing facilities rather than undefined potential facilities. On the other hand, VDRs can be expected—on the basis of standard investment theory—to retard turnover in the capital stock (of durable plants and equipment), and thereby to reduce the cost-effectiveness of regulation in the long-term, compared with equivalent undifferentiated regulations.1 A further irony is that, when this slower turnover results in delayed adoption of new, cleaner technology, VDR can result in higher levels of pollutant emissions than would occur in the absence of regulation. In this Article, I survey previous applications and synthesize current thinking regarding VDRs in the environmental realm, and develop lessons for public policy and for future research. In Part 2, I describe the ubiquitous nature of VDRs in U.S. regulatory policy, and examine the reasons why VDRs are so common. In Part 3, I establish a theoretical framework for analysis of the cost-effectiveness of alternative types of environmental policy instruments to provide a context for the analysis of VDRs. In Part 4, I focus on the effects of VDRs, and describe a general theory of the impacts of these instruments in terms of their effects on technology adoption, capital turnover, pollution abatement costs, and environmental performance. In Parts 5 and 6, I examine empirical analyses of the impacts of VDRs in two significant sectors: Part 5 focuses on the effects of VDRs in the U.S. auto industry, and Part 6 on the effects of new source review, which is a form of VDR, in power generation and other sectors. In Part 7, I examine implications for policy and research, and recommend avenues for improvements in both.

International Schumpeterian Competition and Optimal R&D subsidies

This paper studies the welfare effects of international competition in the market for innovations, and analyzes how competition affects the costs and the benefits of cooperative and non-cooperative R&D subsidies. I set up a two-country quality-ladder growth model where the leader, the home country, has R&D firms innovating in all sectors of the economy, and the follower, the foreign country, shows innovating firms only in a subset of industries. The measure of the set of sectors where R&D workers from both countries compete for innovation determines the scale of international Schumpeterian competition. Both governments engage in a strategic R&D subsidy game and respond optimally to changes in competition. For a given level of subsidies, increases in foreign competition raise the quality of goods available (growth effect) and lowers domestic profits (business-stealing effect); the overall effect of competition on domestic welfare depends on the relative strength of these two counteracting forces. When governments play a strategic subsidy game, increases in foreign competition trigger a defensive innovation policy mechanism that raises the optimal domestic R&D subsidy. Cooperation in subsidies leads both countries to set higher subsidies. Finally, while cooperation is beneficial for the global economy, there exists a threshold level of competition below which the home country experiences welfare losses under cooperation.international competition, endogenous technical change, growth theory, strategic R&D subsidies, international policy cooperation

Competitive Innovation with Codified And Tacit Knowledge

R&D-based models of endogenous technical progress rest on a premise that technical progress is driven by profit-seeking entrepreneurs. This literature led to a dominant view that endogenous technical advance is not consistent with perfect competition with constant returns to scale. Departing from this dominant perspective, we demonstrate that technical progress endogenously occurs in a perfectly competitive economy under constant returns to scale in rivalrous inputs. Our result is based on a hypothesis that R&D creates codified and tacit knowledge as joint products. Empirical and case studies are discussed to support the hypothesis. Using the model, we demonstrate that stronger patent protection can encourage or discourage R&D, depending on the size of an economy.

Assessing the political viability of labor market reform : the case of employment protection

Labor market