Protection of Classified Information in Estonia (1918-1940)

Sõna „saladus“ tekitab uudishimu, soovi teada saada, mis on selle taga. Veelgi suuremat huvi äratab ehk sõna riigisaladus. Lisaks uudishimule tekitavad need mõisted ka soovi neid kasutada – sõltumata sellest, kas nende sisu mõistetakse või mitte – kohati nendega isegi manipuleerida. Käesolev doktoritöö uurib maailmasõdadevahelise Eesti näitel, millised on salastamise põhjused ja riigisaladuse kaitse praktikat, kattes kogu selleks rakendatavate meetmete spektri ning püüab seeläbi teemat demüstifitseerida. Varasema teoreetilise raamistiku nõrkuse tõttu on see tulnud välja töötada käesoleva töö jaoks kasutades luuretsükli kontseptisooni. Riigisaladuse kaitse võib jagada nelja valdkonda: Õiguslik kaitse on aluseks ka kõigile teistele valdkondadele, määrates, mis on riigisaladus, kuidas seda tuleb kaitsta, mida ei tohi teha ja kuidas selle eest karistatakse. Siia alla on liigitatud ka piirangud info avaldamisele (st tsensuur). Füüsiline kaitse peab tagama, et ruumid, kus riigisaladust töödeldakse (sh hoitakse) peavad olema valvatud ja kõrvalistele isikutele ligipääsmatud. Keerukam on see kaitseehitiste puhul, millel mõõtmed on suured, kuid mis olid kehtivate seaduste järgi riigisaladus – maskeerimise ja valvamise abil kaitsti neidki. Taustakontroll ja väljaõpe peavad välistama ebausaldusväärsete isikute ligipääsu riigisaladusele ning meenutama juurdepääsu omavatele isikutele selle kaitse olulisust. Taustakontroll on tihedalt seotud vastuluurega ja peab takistama võõrriigi agentuurluuret. Sideturvalisus peab välistama riigisaladuse lekkimise võimalused nende edasiandmise ajal, ükskõik kas kulleri, raadiolainete või kaabli abil. Selleks arendati turvalisemaks sidevõrke ja kasutati teabe edasiandmise ajal arusaamatuks muutmiseks krüptosüsteeme. Sideturvalisus peab tõkestama vaenulikku signaalluuret. Kasutades teooriat ja vaadeldavast perioodist publitseeritud nõukogude luureettekandeid, vaadeldakse töös avaliku ja salajase info vahelise piiri defineerimist ja hinnatakse riigisaladuse kaitse efektiivsust.Secrets and secrecy have always provided food for human fantasy. Both words are common in the titles of books, although, usually used without context and (ab)using the words in the interests of commercial success. However, in some cases the classification term is misused due to lack of knowledge. This thesis uses interwar Estonia as its case study in order to study the reasons for classification and its practice covering the whole specter of measures applied. It aims to demystify the field at least to some extent. The thesis is mainly based on archival material available in Estonia. Due to the lack of a prior theoretical framework, one is constructed using the concept of intelligence cycle. The protection of classified information may be dealt with by separating the measures into four fields: Legal protection is basis for all the other fields as well. It has to define what information has to be classified and how it should be protected, what is punishable and which are the punishments, and what are the restrictions for publication of information (i.e. censorship). Facility security (or physical protection) means that rooms where classified information is processed have to be inaccessible for unauthorized personnel and safes have to be available for storing secret documents. It is a more complex issue in the case of fortifications that have huge dimensions but were classified according to law of the period – that makes camouflage one of the subjects of facility security. Vetting procedures and training have to prevent unreliable people from getting access to classified information and remind the cleared personnel of the importance of keeping secrets. Vetting is closely connected to counterintelligence and has to prevent hostile espionage. Communication security has to protect information while it is transmitted or moved from one place to another, whatever mode of communication is used (mail, courier, phone, telegraph, radio). It contains upgrading communication networks to be more secure and use of cryptology. Communication security has to counter foreign signals intelligence. Based on theory and published contemporary Soviet intelligence reports, the thesis also deals with the problem of defining the border between public and secret during the period and the efficiency of protection

World war I and the invention of American intelligence, 1878-1918

Intelligence changes as the nature of war changes. From the late 1870s, the United States military, as part of a broader reform process, began learning about intelligence in part from experience but more importantly by observing the practices of the great powers of Europe. The period of American involvement in World War I saw a rapid acceleration of this dev.elopment, with the United States continuing to learn from the United Kingdom and France. The war also saw intelligence spreading into fields that it had seldom if ever entered in the American experience. During the nineteen months of American belligerency American Intelligence agencies, notably the War Department's Military Intelligence Division and the Navy Department's Office of Naval Intelligence expanded greatly. In addition, the services started to adopt high technology tools such as aerial photography and signals intelligence. These new tools required the admission into the military departments and services of esoteric specialists who did not fit previous military stereotypes. The war also occasioned a vast expansion of domestic surveillance and intelligence, a result of the idea that the World War was a struggle not only of militaries but of entire societies. Espionage, too, grew in extent and sophistication and the moral stigma associated with it began to erode. Overseas, the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France grew its own large intelligence staff. All of these measures allowed General John J. Pershing, the AEF's commander, as well has other American leaders to be better informed than they had ever been during previous wars