Constraint through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control over Immigration Policy

This Article proposes recalibrating the separation of powers between the political branches in the context of their regulation of immigration law\u27s core questions: how many and what types of immigrants to admit to the United States. Whereas Congress holds a virtual monopoly over formal decisionmaking, the executive branch makes de facto admissions decisions using its discretionary enforcement power. As a result of this structure, stasis and excessive prosecutorial discretion characterize the regime, particularly with respect to labor migration. Both of these features exacerbate pathologies associated with illegal immigration and call for a structural response. This Article contends that Congress should create an executive branch agency, marked by indicia of independence, to set visa policy-an avenue increasingly contemplated by reformers. Though it may seem counterintuitive, delegation of greater authority can help constrain executive power by substituting a transparent process, subject to monitoring, for decisionmaking that occurs hidden from view. Delegation can also help overcome limitations in the legislative process that contribute to the current regime\u27s dysfunction, making immigration policy more efficient and effective. The Refugee Act of 1980 provides a parallel that is helpful in thinking through what it would mean to delegate ex ante admissions power to the executive

Annual report of the commissioners of Grafton county together with the reports of the treasurer, auditors, administrator-superintendent, attorney, sheriff, chaplains, physicians and extension service for the year July 1, 1985 - June 30, 1986.

This is an annual report containing vital statistics for a county in the state of New Hampshire

Community Agencies, Competition Law and ECB Initiatives on Securities Settlement

ISBN: 9780199571253 ; waiting for copyright clarification from publisher (Tim?)ISBN: 9780199571253ISBN: 978019957125

Shadow Lawyering: Nonlawyer Practice within Law Firms

Lawyers commonly associate with nonlawyers to assist in their performance of their lawyering tasks. A lawyer cannot know with confidence, though, whether the delegation of some tasks to a nonlawyer colleague might result in her assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, because the state of the law and the commentary about nonlawyer practice is so confused and incoherent. Some respected authority within the profession tells the lawyer that she may only delegate preparatory matters and must prohibit the nonlawyer from discussing legal matters with clients, or negotiating on behalf of clients. Other authority suggests that the lawyer may delegate a wide array of tasks as long as the lawyer supervises the work of the nonlawyer and accepts responsibility for it. A good faith lawyer reviewing the available commentary would find it difficult to achieve appropriate guidance for her work. This uncertainty affects not only lawyers working with paralegals and law clerks, but firms hiring out of state lateral associates and partners, and law school clinical programs engaged in transactional work. This Article articulates a framework for assessing delegation choices, a framework which is both coherent and sensible. The framework relies on insights about lawyering judgment and risk assessment, client informed consent, and unauthorized practice of law prophylaxis. Any delegation of work by a lawyer to a nonlawyer involves an exercise of the lawyer’s judgment about an appropriate balance of risk and efficiency, along with an eye toward the client’s informed choice about how to achieve the goals of the representation most efficiently. The prevailing unauthorized practice of law dogma prevents a client from seeking the most economical representation by only retaining a nonlawyer, but that dogma trusts lawyers to protect a client’s interests. With those considerations in place, this Article shows that the profession cannot, and in fact does not, deny the lawyer any categorical options in making delegation choices, except for those involving public court appearances. Aside from sending a nonlawyer to court, a lawyer may responsibly delegate any of her lawyering activities to a nonlawyer associate, subject to the prevailing conceptions of competent representation and subject to the lawyer’s retaining ultimate responsibility for the resulting work product and performance. Some commentary and some court opinions suggest a different answer to the questions addressed here, but those authorities do not withstand careful analysis. This Article shows that a more careful reading of the commentary and the court dicta supports the framework and the thesis offered here. Nonlawyers may not independently engage in activity which equates to the practice of law, if by “independently” we mean without supervision and oversight from a lawyer. That important and uncontroversial limitation, however, is the only categorical restriction on a lawyer’s discretion. A supervised nonlawyer may play a much more active and important role in a lawyer’s overall representation of her client than many have claimed. For the client, that is a very good result

Revisionist Zionism in America: The campaign to win American public support, 1939-1948

Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, followers of the Zionist Revisionists went to the United States at the urging of their leader, Vladimir Jabotinsky. They established two groups which initially attempted to gain public support for the creation of a Jewish Army. The New Zionist Organization of America, headed by Ben Zion Netanyahu, followed the Revisionist political party. Its campaign exposed the anti-Jewish position of the British in Palestine. It was effective in placing the Palestine problem on the world (rather than regional) agenda of the State Department. The Irgun Delegation to the United States, headed by Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson), acted independently, in defiance of the Revisionist political party. While assisting in some rescue work for the underground Irgun Z\u27vai Leumi, the American delegation did work which was primarily political and educational. Though independent of one another, the efforts of both groups heightened public awareness of the extermination of European Jewry. They created a nationwide advertisement campaign which pressured the United States government through growing public support. They fought for a Jewish Army and later for statehood. They were the pioneers of the Jewish lobby in America. The Irgun Delegation provided intelligence to the United States in World War II and aided in the rescue of American airmen. They also helped to forestall the pro-Arab policy of Franklin Roosevelt. His allegiance and promises to Ibn Saud resulted from wartime national security concerns which necessitated Saudi oil concessions and guarantees for an American air base at Dharan. The Irgun Delegation to the United States and the New Zionist Organization of America have generally been overlooked, or incorrectly described, in American Jewish historiography. Personal interviews, F.B.I. files, and government documents confirms that they were two distinct, independent organizations having different philosophies and goals. They remained neutral toward one another until Hillel Kook called for a democratic (rather than Jewish) state in Palestine. This resulted in charges that the Irgun Delegation was anti-Zionist and in an open attack by the NZO. The antagonism which existed between the two groups was never totally resolved

Bargaining in the (Murky) Shadow of Arbitration

Disputing parties who are unable to settle their differences will end up before an adjudicator (typically a judge or jury) who will decide their dispute for them. Dispute resolution scholars have long theorized that disputants bargain in the shadow of this adjudicated outcome, predicting what would happen in court substantively and procedurally, and negotiating based on an assessment of the strength of “bargaining endowments” derived from applicable legal norms. The increasing use of arbitration to resolve commercial disputes in the U.S. means that more and more disputants are negotiating in the shadow of arbitration, not litigation. This Article explores how procedural differences between arbitration and litigation impact disputants who bargain in arbitration\u27s shadow, and adds an entirely new critique to the robust scholarship criticizing the fairness of mandatory arbitration. Because arbitration awards are often not public and are not considered precedent, the law does not develop in areas where virtually all disputes are arbitrated. Disputants can only murkily predict the likely outcome in arbitration, and thus can neither negotiate from an anchoring premise nor manage the risk of a failed negotiation. Ultimately, this leads to a reduction in value of the bargaining endowments the shadow of the law would otherwise grant. In turn, this weakens the legitimacy of these settlements and of arbitration as a dispute resolution process

Establishing a European securities regulator: is the European Union an optimal economic area for a single securities regulator?

The paper’s purpose is to address the economic, institutional, and legal issues confronting the establishment of a more centralised approach to EU securities regulation and to suggest that the theory of optimum currency areas can be used as a model to assess the economic benefits and costs of further centralisation of securities regulation in the European Union. The European Union’s Financial Services Action Plan seeks to achieve an integrated market in financial services in order to accomplish the economic and political objectives of the Treaty of Rome. The FSAP is premised on the notion that the adoption of legal and regulatory measures to achieve liberalisation in cross-border trade in financial services will also achieve integration of EU financial markets. This paper argues that liberalisation of financial markets does not necessarily lead to integration of financial markets. Furthermore, it argues that the institutional design and scope of financial regulation should be based, in part, on the extent of integration in the financial market. That is, the domain of the regulator should be the same as the domain of the market. European capital and financial markets remain fragmented and segmented. This paper argues therefore that, until EU financial markets become more integrated, a single EU securities regulator would not be an efficient or effective institutional model for EU securities markets. In other words, at present, the EU is not an optimal economic area for a single securities regulator

Spartan Daily, March 12, 1980

Volume 74, Issue 29https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/6596/thumbnail.jp

Spartan Daily, March 12, 1980

Volume 74, Issue 29https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/6596/thumbnail.jp